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CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF RESEARCH 
 
Introduction 
 
Of one essence is the human race, 
Thusly has creation put the base; 
One limb impacted is sufficient, 
For all others to feel the mace* 
 
* Iranian poet, Saadi (1184-1283), in Golestan, 
Inscribed on the entrance of United Nations Hall of Nations 
 
The United States and Iran have fostered an increasingly antagonistic relationship 
over the past three decades.  For Iranians, the U.S. foreign policy of interference in Iran, 
such as the CIA coup in 1953, represents foreign arrogance.  For American leadership, 
the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis in 1979 are considered the turning point in the 
two nations‟ relationship.  The American interference in Iranian politics and the Iranian 
harsh rhetoric and actions created a sense of resistance to U.S. policy on the Iranian side 
and a fear and antagonism on the American side, resulting in an antagonistic narrative 
between the two.  In recent time, escalation of anger has reached the point of serious 
consideration of even military intervention and regime change by the U.S. and the 
reaction to this threat is increased rhetoric and non-compliance on the Iranian side.  This 
practice of rhetoric and not talking to each other has increased misunderstanding between 
the two countries over the last half of a century.  True conversation calls for equality for 
each side, but with the hostility between the US-Iran, if we wait for both sides to go 
forward together, we may never have a dialogue at all.  In this critical time, it is my 
assumption that the United States, as a world leader, may have a higher responsibility to 
go first and break down the wall of mistrust.  Through engagement, more opportunity 
may come by moving outside the arena of demonization and into dialogue.  The purpose 
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of this study is to engage experts in a dialogue, listen to them, and seek possibilities to 
transform the crisis from an antagonistic to a discursive level, using critical hermeneutic 
theory as the basis for my data analysis.  Since my audiences are the American policy 
makers and leaders, the hope is that the outcome may provide a more appropriate and 
comprehensive way to engage and perhaps, build a relationship with Iran.   
Research Topic 
At his address to the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations on September  
6
th
, 2000, former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami expressed his view that it is the 
ethical duty of all world citizens to make the 21
st
 century a century of peace and peaceful 
coexistence.  The United Nations accepted this responsibility by naming 2001 as the year 
of „Dialogue among Civilizations.‟  Khatami‟s call to investigate alternative policy 
designs that might prevent similar clashes to those quarrels which made the 20
th
 century a 
century of international wars and national conflicts inspired me to think of the practice of 
non-dialogue and policy of rhetoric between the United States and Iran.  In the past three 
decades, the absence of a meaningful dialogue between the U.S. and Iran has resulted in 
growing tension and diametrically opposed reactions to past and current events which 
continue to deepen the crisis between the two nations.  Instead of dialogue, the two 
countries issue blanket reaction statements and sling respective accusations toward each 
other, on every subject from support for terrorism on one hand to attempts of regime 
change on the other, creating an environment of mutual mistrust.  This history of mistrust 
has created a short-sighted paradigm which lays the foundation for the current dangerous 
situation between the two nations.   
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To change this paradigm, as a leading force in today‟s world, there may be a need 
for a stronger diplomatic effort by the American policy makers and leaders in the 21
st
 
century to consider a new approach toward international crisis, including the issue of 
Iran.  Such a new approach would change from the “clash of civilization” mentality 
advocated by Huntington (1993) toward reconfiguring new policies advocating 
engagement and discourse to resolve differences.  After all, to solve a conflict, it is 
necessary that one side gives up a little in order to break the chain of antagonism.  This 
study explores the historical roots of the conflict to set the stage for a new understanding.  
More specifically, based on the application of critical hermeneutic theory and using a 
participatory research process; I focus on creating a text which may uncover a new 
understanding for leaders and policy makers, allow them to see previously unknown 
aspects of this relationship, and move from the stage of mistrust to one of constructive 
engagement and dialogue.  As Habermas (1984) notes this stance calls for an orientation 
toward reaching an understanding.  
Background of Research 
 After decades of hostility toward each other, experts such as Haass and  
O‟Sullivan (2000), Takeyh (2002), McFaul, Milani, and Diamond (2006), Wilson (2007), 
and Zarif (2007) urge a paradigm shift in the US-Iran relationship.  These experts, in one 
way or another, suggest that the two countries need to begin a dialogue and engage in 
negotiation to resolve their problems peacefully.  In this research, my assumption, as 
indicated above, is that the United States may carry the major responsibility from the 
perspective of power.  In a hierarchal sense, this position of power delegates more 
responsibility to the holder to be more patient, forgiving, moderate and concerned with 
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the bigger picture.   This is not an easy process as the responsibility is given mostly to the 
Americans, but it is a necessary step to change the current adversarial paradigm.  In the 
past, the U.S. demonstrated its willingness to change the paradigm, as former Secretary 
of State Madeleine Albright (2000: 356), stated: 
Neither Iran, nor we, can forget the past; it has scared us both.  But the question 
both countries now face is whether to allow the past to freeze the future; or to find 
a way to plant the seeds of a new relationship that will enable us to harvest shared 
advantages in years to come, not more tragedies.  Certainly, in our view, there are 
no obstacles that wise and confident leadership cannot remove.  …  We want to 
work together with Iran to bring down what President Khatami refers to as the 
„wall of mistrust.‟  
 
Despite the understanding expressed by this statement, the official attitude toward Iran 
worsened when the Democrats left office.  To change the narrative of mistrust, a renewed 
new effort is needed to mitigate the damage sustained during the last eight years, when 
the two countries engaged in a very hostile relationship. 
 This wall of mistrust began in 1953 when, fueled by the assumption of a 
communist threat and a fear of a new nationalism that might threaten U.S. and British oil 
interests, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) joined with the British in a coup that 
replaced the elected government of Prime Minister Mossadegh with Zahede under the 
dynasty of Mohammed Reza Shah.  Under the Shah, the U.S. enjoyed good relations with 
Iran for many years, however the seeds of mistrust had been planted as the populace who 
suffered under the Shah looked at the U.S. as the cause.  This mistrust quickly germinated 
as the people objected to the Shah‟s mistreatment and took to the streets in protest.  
During the 1978-9 revolution, in the eyes of Iranians, the United States, as the supporter 
of the monarch, was as guilty as the Shah for their suffering.  After the revolution, when 
the United States gave shelter to Shah for health-related issues, the Iranians saw this 
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action as representative of U.S. desire for a figure head for future invasion plans.  The 
suspicion of all things American grew and fueled the storming of the U.S. Embassy, as 
many held the opinion that it was a CIA stronghold and they feared a return of monarchy 
and despotism.   
 When the revolution was usurped by the Islamic movement led by Ayatollah 
Khomeini, an Islamic government was established, the demonization of the U.S. was 
used as a unifying device, which is employed even to the present day.  This in turn has 
thickened the wall of mistrust among U.S. policy makers as their understanding of Iran is 
clouded by rhetoric of the new Iranian government and the opinion grows that Iran is 
filled with fanatics.  The fear of all things Islamic grew and culminated in President 
George W. Bush‟s proclamation of Iran as an „Axis of Evil‟ followed by the much touted 
atomic crisis.  
 Under this adversarial narrative, accusations between Iran and the United States 
became the norm in their relationship.  This accusatory environment, created by a shared 
mistrust between the two governments, has become the source of their demonizing the 
other.  In recent years, the old accusatory narrative, accelerated to a new level of 
dangerous rhetoric that can easily and quickly turn into a confrontation.  The dangerous 
adversarial rhetoric in Washington towards Iran and the controversial behaviors of Iran in 
the Middle East, including the harsh rhetoric towards the U.S. and Israel, makes the 
danger of a military confrontation an imminent possibility.   
 To begin to dismantle the mistrust which is the basis for the current paradigm, a 
change in understanding between the two is required.  The last 30 years with the U.S. 
policy of regime change, accusations, sanctions, and demonizing has proved 
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unproductive.  It is time for American leaders to look at past history with Iran, try to 
comprehend that country, and develop a new approach to transform this adversarial 
attitude to one of constructive engagement. Doing so provides an opportunity to further 
U.S. security and diplomatic interests, reversing a trend described by Brzezinski (2005: 
20) who argued an “anxious America, obsessed with its own security, could find itself 
isolated in the world, the focus of global hatred.  In the end, which scenario prevails 
hinges on a simple choice: Will America seek to dominate the world, or lead it?”  
 I believe there is much potential and opportunity for the United States to engage 
with Iran and improve their relationship.  A poll by Abbas Abdi (in Fathi 2005) illustrates 
that 74% of Iranians favor a dialogue with the United States.  The irony of this result is 
that the poll indicates that majority of Iranians are sympathetic toward the U.S. culture 
and support a relationship, even while the Iranian government adamantly opposes 
American influence.  A growing majority of U.S. citizens abhor the Gulf conflict and 
desire a less aggressive approach from their leaders.  But the grass roots base of both 
countries is threatened by the other country‟s antagonistic rhetoric and their own biased 
media, which create feelings of isolation and nationalism in each country.   
 Even though there is a need for both countries to reduce hostility, as a world 
leader, the United States‟ lead could make possible the exploration for new paths to 
peaceful coexistence.  Since Iran is a key country in the Middle East and viewed by many 
emerging countries as a champion opposed to American interference in the region, then a 
change of policy in US-Iran relations might create a new model for peace building based 
on dialogue.  This response to Khatami‟s call to ethic responsibility is strengthened by 
the urgency of not wasting the precarious but existing, pro-peace citizen base in both 
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countries which teeter on the blade of nationality and growing negative rhetoric, as the 
danger of military intervention increases and the stakes rise larger in a world grown too 
small for conflicts to be contained.  If we don‟t generate proper policy to address this new 
world order soon, it may become too late in the near future.   
 The current U.S. policy of military intervention in Iraq illustrates the unending 
disaster inherent in using force to resolve a dispute.  After almost six years of occupation, 
the Iraqis‟ future is dark and American‟s future in the region is unknown.  The tragedy of 
this military intervention is a testament to the importance of solving disputes through 
engagement and dialogue.  The six years of military conflict in Iraq incurred, and 
continues to reap, catastrophic costs in human life and national debt on both sides.  Iraq‟s 
infrastructure is destroyed, millions are homeless or refugees and the U.S. invasion 
instigated a call to arms of anti-American forces with the result that Iraq has become a 
war zone based on factions and issues that no longer are internal or inherently Iraq‟s.  A 
conflict with Iran would be even larger and more costly on all fronts than the one in Iraq 
has been.  Geographically, Iran is an important and influential country throughout the 
Middle East and is seen as a prototype by many emerging countries in regards to U.S. 
relations.  Military intervention might create negative reactions in the region and around 
the world and the world can not afford another conflict.  All of this has resulted in 
increased instability in an already unstable region.   
 The disastrous consequences of the Iraq war should be a lesson to avoid a new 
conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  As Sacks (2005: 113) notes, in “the short term, 
conflicts are won by weapons.  In the long run, they are won by ideas ….  We must turn 
the clash of civilizations into a conversation between civilizations.”   Khatami reflected 
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similar advocacy in his speech in 2000, observing that the art of capable leaders should 
focus on reducing the level of tension through dialogue rather than involving in 
disastrous conflicts.     
Significance 
 It is anticipated that this research may be significant because it addresses the 
critical issue of how to configure U.S. foreign policies in regard to Iran in the 21
st
 
century.  Throughout this text, I place more responsibility on the United States‟ side in 
order to deal with the current crisis.  I do this because I feel that the American position of 
leadership in the world, combined with its proclaimed value system, lays a larger degree 
of responsibility at their door.  My belief is that America has been and needs to be a role 
model for the rest of the world.  Therefore, it is important for American policy makers to 
walk as they talk, if they want American values to continue to be recognized, perhaps 
even appreciated around the world.  As former President Carter (in Gaddis 1986: 29-30) 
emphasized, our “belief in freedom of religion – our belief in freedom of expression – our 
belief in human dignity ….  These principles have made us great, and unless our foreign 
policy reflects them, we make a mockery of all those values.”  My goal is to see if there 
is a more appropriate way for the United States to take initiative to lead, based on its own 
principles.  As Nye (2005: 167) argues, if “a country represents values that others want to 
follow, it will cost less to lead.”  The U.S. may need to return to its inspiring tradition to 
lead the world economically, politically, and culturally based on its tradition of core 
values.  However, following these principles is one part of the foreign policy conduct and 
understanding the other side of the issue, Iran, forms the second part of it.  
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 In my conversation with Dr. Provence, the director of Middle Eastern Studies in 
the History Department at UC San Diego, he mentioned the lack of an appropriate and 
effective theoretical framework for dealing with today‟s international crisis in U.S. 
foreign policy.  According to him, the United States‟ foreign policy is still based on the 
Cold War mentality where one side raises the cost of competition so high that the other is 
unable to continue.  In this mentality, victory is accomplished through the defeat of the 
other side.  In the 21
st
 century, it may be wiser to turn from an emphasis on strategic 
might to one grounded in understanding the concerns of others.  This lack of a foreign 
policy based on understanding of others, indicated by Provence, is mentioned also by 
Gary Sick (1986) who believes the lack of understanding among the U.S. foreign policy 
makers may be the result of ignorance about Iran.  This ignorance, comes from a basic 
U.S. minunderstanding of Iran‟s motivations, their unique world view, the conflicting 
political pressure within the nation itself and the integral application of zahr and baten in 
personal, business and diplomatic relations.  Zahr, in Iranian culture, refers to a 
protective face one presents to those they mistrust and baten is the inner truth shared only 
when there is trust.  This ignorance may be resolved through what Dr. Provence called a 
need for new theory in the international arena and through what Khatami advocated as 
“dialogue among civilization” in his UN speech in order to engage, have dialogue, and 
reach a better understanding.  In this text, through my research and analysis, I also try to 
bring about a better understanding of Iran.  This may help the expansion of horizons and 
shift of paradigm in the U.S. foreign policy.   
 Should U.S. leaders and policy makers decide to engage with Iran based on 
principles and understanding, a new model for peace building may be developed.  
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Perhaps a constructive look at the US-Iran relationship may promote an alternative that 
sustains working relationships and creates a new horizon for international conflict 
resolution.  By engaging with Iran, a new understanding may be reached through a 
process of interaction rather than accusation and harsh rhetoric which strengthens the 
ideology of extremism in Iran and in the region.  Moreover, the conversations of this 
study may bring out alternative stories which may hold new ideas and explain histories 
and wisdom that therefore may not have been open to Americans, more particularly to 
American policy leaders, prior to this.  Significance may reside also in the potential 
dialogue at the international level at which the study‟s conversations were held over the 
past few months.  For this purpose, this document might be a medium for the leaders in 
both governments, but especially in the United States, to better communicate with their 
counterparts, understand their concerns, and meaningfully moderate their policies.   
Summary 
The US-Iran conflict is an example of a complicated post-modern crisis.  Despite 
the United States‟ consistent use of sanctions and harsh rhetoric to intimidate the Islamic 
Republic, Iran has grown to be an influential state in the Middle East and become a 
leader of anti-American influence.  Both countries engage in the demonization of the 
other, resulting in escalating tension.  Since the U.S. policy of intimidation has not 
resulted in any desirable outcome, this study tends to explore through conversations with 
experts the need for an alternative approach or a possible shift in paradigm.  A deeper 
understanding of Iran and Iranian actions and reactions may serve American policy 
makers and leaders to more effectively approach Iran and to ease the tension through 
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engagement and dialogue.  To begin this understanding, I will explore the background of 
Iran and the U.S. involvement into their story in the upcoming chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND OF RESEARCH SITE 
Introduction 
 This Chapter offers background information on Iran, including geography and 
natural resources, demographics, culture, history and politics, political power structures, 
and sanctions.  It provides information to help the reader better understand Iran as a 
nation, both as a people and a political system, to present a clearer picture of Iran‟s 
historical background in the last 200 years and to shed light on Iran‟s involvement with 
the U.S. in the last six decades.   
Geography and Natural Resources 
 According to Sullivan (2002: 11) “Iran is a crossroads connected politically, 
economically, diplomatically, culturally, militarily, and socially to many different 
regions.  It is the most important state, in many ways, in the [Persian] Gulf and in Central 
Asia.”  It is located in Southwest Asia and the eastern part of the Middle East.  The size 
of Iran is 1,648,195 squares kilometers which makes it the 18
th
 largest country in the 
world.  The Caspian Sea is to the north, Afghanistan and Pakistan are to the east, Turkey 
and Iraq are to the west, and the Persian Gulf is in the south.  Perhaps the most 
historically influential of its borders is the shared northern border with the former Soviet 
Union (now states such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan) and the past 
influence of communism.    
 The country is located in a rich oil and natural gas resource area in the Middle 
East, which made it attractive to western powers since the early 1900s.  According to 
Bellaigue (2005: 19), “Iran is the second-largest oil producer in the Organization of 
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Petroleum Exporting Countries and has the world‟s second-largest natural gas reserve.”  
In the early twentieth century, British oil exploration made the British a strong eco-
political force in the southern part of the country and an influential power on the Iranian 
government.  In the Northern provinces, the former Soviet Union was a primary player 
for oil and political influence to balance British power.  As a result, the two major powers 
battled for Iranian oil during much of the first half of the century.  After World War II, 
the United States stepped into the void created by Britain‟s loss of power within the 
Iranian political spectrum as Iran began to nationalize their oil fields.  However the 
Western need for oil and fear of communism became the controlling foreign policy 
factors and led to the C.I.A. led 1953 coup, which replaced Mossadegh with the Shah.  
After the revolution and rise of Islamic rule, combined with fear of terrorism and nuclear 
development by Iran, the U.S. has had a policy of embargos and sanctions.  These 
restrictions have not changed the behavior of the Iranian government, however, the 
sanctions make obtaining the needed contractors and technology to develop new oil and 
gas fields very difficult.   
Demographics 
            Iran is a diverse country consisting of people of many religions and ethnic 
backgrounds united by the Persian culture.  Limbert (1987: 19-20), U.S. embassy attaché 
and hostage during the embassy takeover in Iran, explains that “Iranian society resembles 
a mosaic or a Persian carpet in which varied languages, religions, and tribes, like distinct 
colors and textures, form an intricate yet coherent design.”  Persians, the founders of 
Ancient Persia, constitute the majority of the population, with ethnic groups including 
Azeris, Gilaki and Mazandarani, who reside in the north and northwest of the country and 
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scattered throughout Iran are a small percentage of Kurds, Arabs, Turks, Jews, and 
Armenians along with representations of other small ethnic groups. 
Religiously, Iran is not a very diverse society.  Limbert (1987: 29) illustrates that 
between “85 and 90 percent of the Iranian population adheres to a minority branch of 
Islam called Shi‟a, or, more precisely, he Shi‟at Ali (“party of Ali”).  About 10-15 percent 
of the world‟s Muslims belong to this branch of Islam; the rest, called Sunnis, are 
followers of the Sunna, or „tradition.‟”  Shi‟a Islam is the official state religion.  The 
Sunni Muslims are mainly Kurds and Balochis.  There is also a remaining two percent of 
non-Muslim religious minorities who are Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and Bahais.  The 
first three religions are officially recognized and protected, and have reserved seats in the 
Parliament.  However, there are restrictions upon the Bahais religious minority.  Despite 
the fact that they are Iran‟s largest religious minority, they are not officially recognized 
and are denied civil rights and liberties, access to higher education and employment.    
 According to Bellaigue (2005), Iran‟s population has reached almost 70 million; 
more than two-thirds are under the age of 30.  On this issue, Amuzegar (2003: 4) notes 
that the “government-encouraged baby boom of the early 1980s has now spawned a new 
generation, the Third Force, which sees neither the fundamentalists‟ concept of velayat-e-
faquih (the supremacy of Shi‟a jurists) nor Khatami‟s “Islamic democracy” as the answer 
to Iran‟s current predicament.”  This younger generation is vocal about reform and won 
the 1997 election for President Khatami, who ran on a youth favored reformist platform, 
and again in 2000 voted in a large majority of reformists‟ representatives to parliament in 
hopes of social, political, and economical reform.  Another factor in the younger 
population are the university women who compose more than half of incoming classes 
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and spearhead the move for women‟s rights.  Beeman (2005: 6) notes that women “are 
there and in every way, in every area of public life, and they‟re not going to go away.  
They are actually one of the strongest forces for reform in the country.”  The majority of 
second generation revolutionary Iranian youth want socio-political change and 
economical prosperity and, although their voices are subdued, they represent strong 
potential for dialogue within Iranian society.  
 Another group to consider is the expatriates, now living around the world, but 
with enduring identity and political ties.  In the U.S. alone, there are several claims of a 
first and second generation Iranian population of somewhere near two million, although 
the Census Bureau records a much lower number, probably because many Iranians living 
in the U.S. quit claiming Iranian ties after the hostage crisis.  Bozorgmehr (2000: 167) 
notes that the “combined presence of former college students and elite exiles accounts for 
the highly-educated, entrepreneurial and professional character of the Iranian community 
in the U.S.”  Iranians in the United States “have one of the highest levels of educational 
attainment among all immigrant groups in the US, ranking third in 1990, after Asian 
Indians and Taiwanese.”  The majority of this group desires a better relationship between 
U.S. and Iran and many still have strong connections with their home land.  The potential 
of this minority group in the United States may facilitate educational, cultural, 
entrepreneurial, and business involvement before any governmental involvement.    
 The final observation I draw from this discussion on demographics is that despite 
the animosity between the U.S. and Iran on the official level, on public level there exists 
a potential to develop dialogues and explore understanding.  Amuzegar (1999: 93) 
explains that the civil unrest in Iran in late 1990s “revealed that hostility towards America 
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… had not overriding priority for Iran‟s increasingly educated younger generation.  They 
seek a distinct identity, meaningful employment … more contacts with the outside world 
… and a clear hope for the future.”  This demographic is a growing political force with a 
desire for more open relations with the rest of the world. 
 Culture 
 The Islamic regime actually made the de-Islamization of Iranian society happen in 
a faster pace.  As Mohit (2001: 25) explains, “Iran is far less religious than twenty years 
ago.  It is an irony of history that one of the most fanatical religious movements should be 
the cause of such a great enlightened transformation.”  After three decades of living with 
the propaganda of the Islamic regimes and experiencing social and political restrictions 
and not having prosperity and freedom for a better future, majority of Iranians, 
specifically 70% youth, “find neither ideological, economic, or political reasons to 
support the ruling clergy” (2001: 23).  However, this new generation in Iran is extremely 
cautious about its approach to change the political system.  Instead of an extreme 
measure such a revolt or bloody clashes with the government‟s tough forces, they choose 
a peaceful, more effective, slower, but more fundamental process of change.   
 The rise of the reform movement in Iran in the late 1990s is a reflection of this 
generation‟s desire for a fair engagement with the rest of the world.  As Sullivan (2002: 
6) notes, “the great majority of the people … would like to see some improvement in 
Iran‟s relations with the U.S., and to see Iran leave its partial isolation imposed on them 
by the U.S.”  Beyond the ideological years of the 1980s, the top down approach of their 
government in the 1990s, this generation expressed its ideals in the late 1990s through the 
reform movement expressed and led by former President Khatami.  The youths believe in 
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merits of individuals, as in the United States, rather than any other form of advancement 
and “want to free the enormous material and human resources of the country from the 
grips of a pre-capitalist, reactionary regime supported by parasitic merchant-capitalist 
class” (Mohit 2001: 26).  The policy makers and government analysts need to be aware of 
the potentials that this generation represents in Iran.   
History and Politics 
Introduction 
 Iran was once the great Persian Empire which stretched across Asia and Europe.  
Limbert (1987: 46) notes that more “than twenty-five centuries of continuous existence as 
a nation have given Iran a rich and complex historical inheritance.”  The rule of Cyrus, 
around 650 B.C., was known for enlightenment, scholarship and the freedom of religion.  
Persian history is steeped with early poets and thinkers who were forerunners of 
modernity.  This leads us to wonder how such a country, steeped in the wisdom of the 
very ideas shared by modern Americans, could become one of the U.S.‟s major enemies. 
This section covers the decline of Iranian dynasties, the issue of Imperialism, Iran‟s 
Constitutional Revolution, the entrance of the United States in the Iranian political scene, 
and the subsequent CIA Coup, followed by the Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis.   
Dynasties, Constitutional Revolution, and Imperialism  
            Iran dealt with the concept of modernity in a direct sense during Qajar dynasty at 
the beginning of 19
th
 century, with the establishment of Iran‟s first modern college 
system and other modern reforms.  However, the Qajar dynasty coincided with the rise of 
imperial Russian and British power which led to repeated intervention, war and loss of 
Persian territories throughout the 19
th
 century.  Keddie (1981: 39) notes that “Russian and 
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British protection of the Qajars against revolts made Iran a country with very limited 
independence.  Iranian internal politics in the Qajar period are frequently shadow politics, 
with real politics often occurring not only … behind the scenes, but even beyond the 
seas.”   The corrupt and weak stance of the Qajar dynasty led to popular protests and 
eventually Persia‟s constitutional revolution in 1905 derived from the influence of 
European modernity on Iranian intellectuals and clerics who, according to Milani (2004: 
17), “forced the king to sign into law a new constitution that limited the power of the 
monarch and moved Iran in the direction of creating a modern democratic system.”          
Iran‟s first attempt toward democracy by establishing a parliament failed to put an 
end to Iran‟s feudal system as the country still lacked the infrastructure that could support 
a democratic process, such as political parties and institutions.  Milani (2004: 17) notes:  
democracy is more than just ideas; it requires and intricate network of institutions; 
it needs a civil society to act as a buffer between the power and the people.  [It is] 
in need of constant monitoring and mentoring; it requires a citizenry conscious of 
the perils that threaten democracies and willing to show the patience and tolerance 
necessary to sustain a democratic polity.   
  
The country was ripe for a military coup and was soon under the control of the head of 
the military, Colonel Reza, who later became Prime Minister and ultimately the King, 
Reza Shah Pahlavi.  Zirinsky (1992: 650-5) notes that Reza established an authoritarian 
government that valued nationalism, militarism, secularism and anti-communism 
combined with strict censorship and state propaganda.  As king, he ruled the country 
from 1925 to 1941, and was forced to leave by the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran.   
U.S. Entrance 
 In the late 1800 and first part of the 1900, the United States and Iran enjoyed a 
relationship based on a mutual interests.  Ansari (2006: 15-6) explains:  
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 The United States and Iran had enjoyed a formal commercial presence in Iran 
 since 1856 with the signing of a treaty … the United States had no desire to 
 become embroiled in the imperial politics of the Old World.  The treaty was 
 straightforward, reciprocal, and remarkable balanced, establishing diplomatic 
 missions ….  The Iranian parliament, impressed by American achievements and 
 convinced of her „anti-imperial posture (the American after all had thrown out the 
 British), decided that the United States offered the least politically sensitive and 
 most competent option for the procurement of administrative and financial 
 expertise.   
 
To help a very traditional/rural society, American missionaries such as Shuster were sent 
to Iran to create a treasury civil service, organize gendarmerie, and establish a taxation 
system.  At the same time, the United States tried to open up new territory in Iran which 
had traditionally belonged to Russian and Britain.  Nevertheless, because of the American 
aids and assistance, Iranians welcomed the newcomer, the United States, to enter their 
social and economical life.  However, the historical circumstances put the U.S. in a 
rivalry context with Russian and Britain, which led the U.S. to be more aggressive in 
order to win its hegemony game. 
U.S. Political Involvement in Iran 
Edward Said (1979: 4) writes that from “the beginning of the nineteenth century 
until the end of World War II France and Britain dominated the Orient and Orientalism; 
since World War II America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and 
Britain once did.”  This approach includes continuing the Western mindset of superiority 
toward the Oriental and following the dictates of national interests; such as opposing the 
spread of communism by the Soviet Union, expanding its sphere of influence and 
obtaining new economical incentives such as oil contracts in the region.   
As the new dominant western power, the United States supported regimes that 
could maintain stability in their countries and sustain security for the U.S. interests in the 
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region.  In Iran, the U.S. chose to support the regime of Mohammed Reza Shah, the son 
of the old deposed Colonel Reza.  As it is indicated in the Teaching Resource Center‟s 
(1997: 4-5) document, Iran, with its 1,250- mile shared border with the Soviet Union, was 
an important geopolitical point of resistance against the expansion of communism under 
Truman‟s policy of containment.  As a result of this policy, Iran played the role of 
gendarme for the U.S. in the Persian Gulf and in the broader spectrum in the Middle East.   
After the Second World War, interest within the United States about the Middle 
East escalated.  Said (1979: 295) notes that “with the exploitation of its oil, strategic, and 
human resources pioneered by Britain and France, the United States prepared for its new 
postwar imperial role.”  Through partnerships and trade in oil, arm sales, trade, and 
assistance programs the United States became dominant in the Iranian political scene.  
This facilitated both countries leadership policies.  In Iran, Mohammed Reza Shah could 
begin his modernization program and received aid from U.S. and for the U.S., Iran 
supplied oil for growing U.S. needs and Mohammed Reza Shah became a stabilizing 
factor in the region and a close informant on Soviet movement in the region. 
Iranian people, however, did not feel easy with the cultural dominance of the 
United States over their life.  Limbert (1987: 51) notes that perhaps “one explanation for 
the Iranians‟ unease in their recent contact with the West was the perception that 
Westerners … were impervious to Iranian cultural influence and that cultural exchange 
would proceed in only one direction.”  A nation with a majority of people who believed 
in simple values and traditions, the fast modernization exposed them to immoral 
materialistic world.  The pious Iranians citizens, which formed the majority of the 
country prior to the revolution, were overwhelmed by the speed of the development and 
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the dominance of the U.S. culture in Iran.  As Beeman (2005: 25) describes, this social 
class seemed to “had lost its spiritual core.  It had become poisoned–obsessed with 
materialism and the acquisition of money and consumer goods.”  As a result of these fast 
development policies conducted by the U.S. in Iran, the Iranian religious leaders were 
able to make “connection between the colonial policies of Great Britain and the 
subsequent economic and political activities of the United States” (Beeman 2005: 57).   
CIA Coup 
 In 1952-3, as the tension between Britain and Iran over Iranian oil share reached 
its peak, so did the pressure of British government on the United States government to 
join British to overthrow the democratically elected government of Prime Minister 
Mossadegh.  Dr. Mossadegh‟s government challenged the British Oil Company by 
nationalizing the Iranian oil industry and limiting the power of Mohammed Reza Shah on 
a national level.  As Kinzer (2003: 150-1) explains, the U.S. finally authorized a C.I.A. 
sponsored coup after Eisenhower became President and the suspicion of communism was 
added to the incentive of guaranteeing the flow of oil to its growing industries.   
According to Abrahamian (2001: 187), the U.S. overthrow of Prime Minister 
Mossadegh, the man who “captured the imagination of the people” destroyed the U.S. 
image for many Iranians.  Iranian people, as Kinzer (2003: 2) notes, “thought of 
Americans as friends, supporters of the fragile democracy they had spent half a century 
trying to build.  It was Britain, not the United States that they demonized as the 
colonialist oppressor that exploited them.”  After August 1953, there was no longer a 
difference between Britain and the United States, in fact many Iranians saw the U.S. as 
the government which prevented them from having a better future and embracing a 
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democratic society by “putting an end to democratic rule in 1953 and installing what 
became the long dictatorship of Mohammad Reza Shah” (Kinzer 2003: x).  
After the CIA coup, the Iranians‟ sense of unease was replaced by a sense of 
mistrust toward the United States.  Beeman (2005: 67) explains that the “United States 
became the Great Satan … the great external corrupter of culture and morality, supporter 
of illegitimate power, and destroyer of the natural bonds that bind men to each other in 
relationship of mutual benefit ….”  The CIA coup and unlimited support for monarchy 
between 1953 and 79 provided enough evidence to Iranians to see the United States as an 
imperialistic power that intends to satisfy only its own interests rather than being fair.   
As a result of this image of the United States, a sense of resistance to the U.S. 
policies was developed among Iranians.  Beeman (2005: 66) explains that in Iranians‟ 
mind, the “United States is the ultimate supporter of illegitimate authority in this case the 
Shah.  …  In the Iranian symbolic universe, this is the ultimate external corrupting force, 
and it must be resisted at all cost.”  In this context, the American support for the Shah 
damaged him, because the U.S. influence was viewed as illegitimate by most Iranians.  
Still, it is in this context that when Mohammed Reza Shah fled Iran in early 1979 and was 
permitted into the United States, supposedly for medical treatment, the event, in the 
minds of Iranians, was interpreted through the memory of 1953 coup.  In this context, the 
U.S. embassy in Iran was seen as a so called “spy house” and had to be neutralized to 
prevent any possible repeat of a coup. 
Based on the review of the past, this sense of resistance still exists among Iranians 
who do not see the United States‟ government as a legitimate force to dictate policies to 
Iran.  Beeman (2007: 4) argues that frankly, “from Iran‟s perspective, the United States 
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has no standing to make such accusations.  It is neither respected as a social or cultural 
superior, nor has it acted as an acknowledged patron of Iran or its people.”  In the past 29 
years, the U.S. has acted as a superior party and treated Iran as the inferior party by 
accusations, sanctions, and even military action such as supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq 
war.  The notion of what Said (1979) calls an imperialistic superior-inferior approach in 
international relations has not resulted in any positive regard for the United States.   
Revolution 
 
After the coup in 1953, the Shah arrested most of Mossadegh‟s cabinet ministers, 
supporters, and his military officers.  Kinzer (2003) explains that Mohammed Reza Shah 
banned Mossadegh‟s political parties and imprisoned or killed most of his prominent 
supporters.  The Shah‟s regime became despotic, oppressing opposition groups, 
attempting to fast-forward the modernization of the country without heed to the populace, 
and creating a feeling of resentment as Iranians saw the gap between the rich and the poor 
as the result of the regime‟s “preference for its wealthier citizens and for large economic 
enterprises.  They also resented the corruption and waste that was pervasive in the 
government and especially in the royal family.  All this dissatisfaction … was a 
predisposition for the revolution” (The Teaching Resource Center 1997: 4). 
According to the Teaching Resource Center document (1997: 5), when “Jimmy 
Carter proclaimed human rights as a major tenet of his foreign policy,” the Iranian 
opposition groups criticized the Mohammed Reza Shah‟s regime openly throughout 
1977.  The continuation of the Shah‟s policies and his disregard for Iranians turned the 
unhappy population into the mass protests on the streets during 1978, eventually forcing 
the Shah‟s departure from Iran and the victory of revolution in February 1979.  
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 The Iranian revolution was a break with the past.  After almost 150 years of 
foreign influence in Iran, Iranians now desired to re-establish a new relationship with the 
rest of the world.  The Iranian revolution, as Ansari (2006: 71) addresses, like “the 
French revolution … sought to reorganize the international order in its own image, 
liberating the oppressed through an export of its revolutionary ideals.”  This sense of 
liberation from superpowers after years of humiliation by Russians, British, and 
ultimately by the United States, led the Islamic Republic to show a “definitive break with 
the past, defined by the termination of relations with the United States.  This termination 
is defined by the seizure of the U.S. embassy in November 1979.”   
Hostage Crisis 
Although at the beginning the revolutionary government was a nationalistic 
secular government, their power collapsed when religious leaders, led by Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the charismatic Islamic cleric exiled by the Shah because of his political 
opposition, perhaps orchestrated, but definitely took advantage of the seizure of the U.S. 
embassy in Iran.  As is indicated in the Teaching Resource Center‟s document (1997: 7), 
the “takeover was seen as a move by the religious leadership to embarrass their [secular] 
government and prevent normalization with the United States, and it caused the collapse 
of the Bazargan government.”  Prime Minister Bazargan and other democrat liberals in 
his cabinet resigned in disgrace and Iran lost what little influence a secular government 
might have made possible.  The religious forces used the charismatic Ayatollah 
Khomeini to silence other secular voices within the country and to gain control from the 
government.  Khomeini  “Like most revolutionaries, Khomeini perceived that the best 
way to consolidate his regime at home was to pursue a confrontational policy abroad” 
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(Takeyh 2006: 19).  After the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, the Teaching 
Resource Center document emphasizes that “Khomeini had consolidated his power in 
Iran and the United States had severed diplomatic relations.”  Relations between the two 
countries were now either openly antagonist or chillingly silent.  Meanwhile, the Islamic 
Republic began to change the old structure of power in Iran and reshape it into a new 
desired form. 
Power Structure in Iran 
 In the early 1900s, the Iranian constitution was created and modeled after 
European democracies.  Amuzegar (2003a: 139) indicates that as “in most democracies, 
there are three independent branches – Majlis, the judiciary and the executive – in charge 
of enacting, supervising and implementing law and order.”  However, as Amuzegar 
further explains, that there are also three extra-democratic bodies that undermine Iranian 
power structure as democratic.  These bodies were added to the constitution after the 
1979 revolution in order to create buffers against any change proposal coming from any 
other body within the Iranian political system.  This section provides an overview of the 
power structure in Iran in order to better comprehend the complexity of the decision 
making process, and the real power holder, in the Islamic Republic.  It includes the all-
encompassing powers of the Supreme Leader and his councils, the restricted functions of 
the executive and legislative branches, and the potential of change as represented by the 
reformist and other socio-political forces.   
The Constitution and the Supreme Leader 
The political system of the Islamic Republic is based on the 1979 Constitution 
called the „Fundamental Law‟ and its revision in 1989, which sets up a power pyramid as 
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follows: Supreme Leader as head, followed by the Council of Guardians, the Expediency 
Council, and the Assembly of Experts, which overlook the performance of legislative, 
executive, and judiciary branches of the government.  To understand the system‟s top-
down decision-making process, it is necessary to understand the powers of the Supreme 
Leader, seen as the Islamic representative of God, who, as Mohit (2001: 20-1) notes, has 
“the last word and the veto power on any important national or international decisions 
made by the government.  He is not just the spiritual leader of the nation but also the 
ultimate political decision maker of the country.”  Virtually all power is under the control 
of the Supreme Leader, from declaring war, controlling the foreign policy, the judiciary, 
the media and the approval of some cabinet members.   
The Supreme Leader is accountable only to the Assembly of Experts, elected by 
the people by vote for eight-year terms.  The Assembly of Experts, as Amuzegar (2003a: 
139) notes, is “composed of 86 clergymen … in charge of appointing, supervising and, if 
need be, replacing the rahbar [Supreme Leader].”  As all of their meetings and notes are 
strictly confidential, the Assembly has never been publicly known to challenge any of the 
Supreme Leader‟s decisions.  They are two components of a system that are tied to each 
other and, as a result, do not challenge each other.     
Council of Guardians 
The most powerful body after the Supreme Leader is the Council of Guardians.  
The council is made up of twelve jurists, including six appointed by the Supreme Leader 
and six elected by the Parliament from jurists nominated by the Head of the Judiciary.  
Amuzegar (2003a: 139-40) explains that the irony of this undemocratic council is that 
“the judiciary chief himself is appointed by the rahbar, and is responsible only to him.”   
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He further explains that the Council of Guardians must “approve all bills passed by the 
Majlis [parliament] for conformity with the Constitution and the Islamic Sharia [law] 
before they become law … [and] vet every candidate‟s qualifications for national elective 
office.”   The powerful Council interprets the constitution and may veto Parliament if a 
law is deemed incompatible with the constitution.  As Kamrava (2007) explains, should 
disputes arise between Parliament and the Council of Guardians, a special group, called 
the Expediency Council, is in charge to resolve the dispute. 
As Amuzegar (2003a: 139) explains, the “council on expediency, composed of 
some three dozen or so ex-officio members and other officials appointed by the Supreme 
Leader.  This council is constitutionally in charge of resolving legal disputes between the 
Majlis and the Council of Guardians …,” and consulting with the Supreme Leader on 
important national interests.  The leader of the council is appointed by the Supreme 
Leader, which brings the power back once more to the Supreme Leader.  As it is shown, 
there is a circle in the Iranian political system that observes and controls the decision 
making process in the upper echelons, mainly by the Supreme Leader or his office.  In 
this complicated system, the power of executive branch is minimized to the management 
of the internal affairs of the country. 
President 
The Constitution defines the President of Iran as the highest state authority.  
Elected by public vote for a term of four years, the President can be re-elected for a 
second term.  Mohit (2001: 21) notes that the “candidates for the presidency, however, go 
through the filter of the Council of Guardians” who verify the candidate‟s allegiance to 
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the ideals of the Islamic revolution.  Through the means of the Council of Guardians, the 
Islamic Republic confirms the compatibility of the presidential candidate with the system.   
 The President is responsible for the implementation of the Constitution and for the 
exercise of executive powers under the supervision of the Supreme Leader.  As 
Amuzegar (2006: 72) notes, although the President is elected by the direct popular vote,  
he has to take “all his critical cues from the Supreme Leader.  He [has] neither the 
authority nor the independence to deliver on his promises without the Rahbar‟s [Supreme 
Leader] consent and approval.”  In this regard, Iran is different from many other states, 
where the executive branch has control of the armed forces.  In Iran, this is under the 
control of the Supreme Leader.  The President appoints and supervises the Council of 
Ministers and eight Vice-Presidents, who must be approved by the legislature.  Even 
though the President appoints the ministers of important ministries such as Intelligence 
and Defense, it is customary for the President to obtain explicit approval from the 
Supreme Leader before presenting them to the legislature for a vote of confidence.  In 
this context, as Amuzegar observes, even former Iranian President Khatami called “Iran‟s 
president a tadorak-chi (logistics manager) of the regime” shortly before leaving office.    
Parliament 
The Islamic Consultative Assembly has 290 members, who must be approved by 
the Council of Guardians before running for election.  The assembly of Majlis draft 
legislation, approve the national budget and ratify international treaties, but as Mohit 
(2001: 21) notes “since most of the decisions of the Majlis are subject to the Council of 
Guardians‟ veto, this body is mainly reduced to a mere consultative assembly.”  For 
example, when the reformist parliament was to investigate the operation of many 
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conservative agencies, as Gasiorowski (2000: 34) reminds, the Expediency Council 
announced that “parliament had no authority to investigate state agencies controlled by 
the leader, putting the security forces, the judicial system, the state-controlled media, the 
parastatal business foundations and other powerful bodies beyond public scrutiny.”  
Therefore, since the Republic desired to reduce the chances of challenges by a critical 
parliament, as Mohit (2001: 21) explains, it was “extremely important for the ruling 
clerics to fill the Majlis with friendly representatives.”   
The practice of the elimination of candidates in combination with holding 
seemingly free elections gives the appearance of a democratic political system in Iran, 
however only candidates with the Council‟s stamp of approval may run.  As Mohit 
(2001: 23) argues, the political elite by “giving the elections a veneer of democracy they 
sought to gain legitimacy for the regime.”  The people‟s vote, then, has only limited 
leverage in popular elections, such as the Presidential and parliamentary elections where 
the people‟s vote plays a key role, but only to the extent of choosing between pre-
approved candidates.  Even with these limited political options, it was this popular 
leverage that helped both the former reformist President Khatami to win in the 1997 
presidential election over his conservatives‟ rivals and the moderate representatives to 
win the parliamentary election in 2000.  This created a window of opportunity for Iranian 
progressive forces to enter the scene in hopes of reforming the system and the foreign 
observer of today would do well to pay attention to these elections. 
Conservative and Reformist in Iran 
The philosophy of religious conservatives in Iran derives from Plato and Socrates‟ 
idea of the philosopher in ancient Greek, which was adapted by Ayatollah Khomeini in 
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the figure of velayate faqih (Supreme Islamic Jurisprudent) and implemented in Iran.  
Milani (2005: 26-7) explains that for “both Plato‟s Socrates and for Khomeini, the ruler is 
not a servant of the public but rather its shepherd or guardian, and his legitimacy flows 
not from a social contract validated by the people through elections, but rather from a 
suprasocial or metahistorical phenomenon.”  As a result, conservative parties that are 
loyal to the Khomeini‟s legacy do not see the elections as a necessary means for leading 
the people.  “Islamic government, ordained by God and oblivious to public approval, is 
the only form of legitimate power; all other forms of power – secular, democratic, or 
despotic – are entirely illegitimate.”  In this context, for the conservatives, the Supreme 
Leader is the representative of God on earth and must be followed by people.  In their 
view, the people‟s vote has only a consultative function.   
On the other hand, there are Iranian moderates who follow the ideals of the 
Constitutional Revolution in 1905 to 1907.  The Iranian democrats have the experience of 
100 years of challenge with their undemocratic rivals.  There were many instances that 
Iranian democrats were defeated by their conservative rivals; the rise of Reza Shah as an 
authoritarian figure in post-Constitutional Revolution, the 1953 coup against 
democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh, and the decline of the 1979 revolution 
from a democratic revolution to a semi-totalitarian regime in post-revolution.  Despite all 
these defeats, the Iranian democratic movement is strong today.  Milani (2005: 33) 
expresses his optimism and notes that “the continued vibrancy of civil society, women‟s 
unrelenting struggle for recognition of their rights, the increasing employment needs of 
young people, Iranian society‟s urgent desire to join the modern world, and finally, the 
open rift in the ranks of clerical power,” are the positive elements for the Iranian 
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democratic movements.  Failure by outsiders to recognize the power of these movements 
results in misunderstanding of Iranian society today.         
Up until now, however, the Islamic Republic has not shown any flexibility to the 
will and desire of different ethnic, gender, and political groups in Iran and has continued 
to consolidate the power of Islamic elements within the country.  For example, to tackle 
the Khatami‟s reform initiative, the conservatives used whatever means in their power to 
neutralize the reformist efforts for change.  Nevertheless, the consolidation of Islamists 
within the country imposed further restrictions on the country from the outside world.    
Sanctions 
 Over the last 30 years, the U.S. has imposed a variety of sanction to punish the 
Islamic Republic for what the U.S. considers bad behavior.  As Amuzegar (1997: 31) 
notes, the “AMERICAN-DRIVEN sanctions against Iran were meant to transform the 
“backlash state” into a law-abiding, cooperative, and constructive member of the world 
community.”  The United States hoped that economic “hardship and fiscal austerity 
would demoralize the population and turn it against the regime.”  As Bill (2001: 89) 
argues, policy makers “from five administrations have sought to weaken Iran and 
diminish its credibility in the international arena.” After the hostage crisis, the United 
States gradually imposed sanctions against the Islamic Republic to punish and prevent the 
revolution from its expansion in the region.  Sullivan (2002: 4) argues that the purpose of 
the U.S. sanctions against Iran “was to help cut off outside financial and other help to 
Iran to redevelop its oil, gas, and other industries.  The underlying purpose was also to 
cut off funding and economic development that Iran could use to export its revolution, 
and to engage in terrorist activities.”  The most prominent sanctions on Iran, as Askari et 
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al. (2002: 57) point out, are “the restrictions on US-Iranian trade … in 1995 the 
prohibition of investments in Iran and extended to third countries who violated these 
investment restrictions in 1995 and the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996.”  
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these sanctions is under question.   
Despite all the restrictions that the U.S. posed against the Islamic Republic and 
the challenges created for the Islamic Republic to develop economically and renew its 
relatively old industries, the Republic survived the difficulties.  Sullivan (2002: 4) 
explains that the “increasingly warm relations between the EU, Russia, China, and others 
with Iran seem to be helping Iran go around many of the extraterritorial sanctions and 
laws imposed by the U.S.”  The Islamic Republic survived American economic sanctions 
because the country was able to establish and reinforce its relationship with other states 
that had different views of the Islamic Republic.  Sanctions did not limit Iran‟s 
economical development, nor did they stop the Republic‟s influence in the region.  The 
influence of the Islamic movements from Egypt to Pakistan inspired by the 1979 
revolution demonstrates how the Islamic Republic expanded its ideology in the region.  
While the sanctions may be costly for Iran, American companies paid a high price 
for these sanctions as their ability to trade or develop oil exploration with Iran was cut.  
As Ansari (2006: 143) argues, “Clinton‟s executive order put an end to any such 
exploratory economic tries, much to the satisfaction of America‟s competitors, who 
relished the prospect of an Iranian market free from American competition.”  American 
industrial companies are well-known for their relative cheap services all around the 
world.  The U.S. sanctions on Iran and the prohibition of the American companies from 
participating in the Iranian market created an environment where Japanese, Chinese, 
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Russian, and European companies could obtain lucrative contracts with no American 
competitors.  Thus, the sanctions had several unintended effects: Iran pays a higher price 
for doing business and U.S. companies have been sidelined, observing rather than 
participating in the lucrative contracts that others have obtained.   
In a high oil price era and with many clients to provide service to Iranian 
industrial needs, the Islamic Republic found itself without concern for the hostile 
countries.  As Ansari (2006: 231) notes, the new ultra-conservative Iranian president, 
Mahmmud Ahmadinejad, and his advocates in Iran believe that with “oil prices so high, 
there is no need for foreign relations that ultimately could only pollute the purity of the 
revolution and the perfection of the nation.”  Many friendlier countries such as China and 
Russia, with more sympathetic attitudes, can provide assistance to Iran.  The Iranian 
hard-liners in Iran who are considered the backbone of the Islamic Republic‟s political 
system do not see engagement with the U.S. as crucial for their survival.   
 The failure of the sanctions posed on Iran indicates the ineffectiveness of the 
forceful policies and illustrates the need for a different approach.  Bill (2001: 89) refers to 
the Atlantic Council report and argues the “U.S. sanctions and embargoes have failed to 
alter Iranian political behavior.”  As a result of this failure, Bill continues, “important 
voices in the U.S. foreign-policy establishment have concluded that it is time to attempt a 
fundamentally new approach.  In this plan, the emphasis is upon creative diplomacy, 
constructive engagement and calculated steps to rapprochement.”   Bill (2001: 98-9) 
emphasizes that the engagement with a powerful and influential country such as Iran is 
essential for the U.S. given “Iran‟s regional power position and its great hydrocarbon 
wealth and large population...”  According to him (2001: 91), the United States needs to 
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engage with Iran “whether the leader of Iran wears a turban, a military helmet or a 
baseball cap…” A refusal to engage with Iran may cost the United State a high price as 
the United States finds itself “increasingly alone” as Iran establishes “alliances between 
countries like Iran and China or Iran and Russia ...” and “these alliances take on an anti-
American flavor” (Bill 2001: 99).  The alliance between Iran and U.S. competitors may 
become even more costly than the economical and strategic damages incurred up to now. 
 This potential danger may be avoided by redefining the US-Iran narrative.  If the 
U.S. “were to lift the embargo, for example, Iran is likely to respond positively and 
constructively.” With improved Iranian relationships, the United States may be able to 
stabilize the region through Iranian help, procure raw energy from Iran, and American 
companies can benefit from Iranian vast market in need for foreign assistance and 
products.  Iran may also be able to ease the tension between the United States and the 
Muslim world in the region. 
Summary 
 This preceding conceptual entrée of this text is designed to allow the reader to 
observe Iran‟s geographical and economical potentials, socio-cultural structure, and 
layers of historical and political development in Iran, including the complex power 
structure in the Islamic Republic, and the non-functionality of sanctions against the 
Islamic Republic.  As Herda (1999: 127) notes, this Chapter was designed to configure a 
totality out of scattered events.  It illustrates the convoluted characteristics of Iran and the 
complexity of the US-Iran relationship.  This narrative description of the country‟s 
background is designed to help policy makers better understand Iran‟s standing and the 
motives behind Iranian actions.  A more meaningful grasp of Iran may help policy 
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makers to distance themselves from misrepresentation and false assumption and also may 
widen their comprehension about the tension between the two nations by providing a 
deeper understanding of Iran.    
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CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
This section reviews literature with varying emphasis which, when observed 
holistically, forms a new text to craft a fuller understanding of the narrative between the 
United States and Iran with the hope that an alternative course of action might arise 
between the two nations.  This Chapter includes six thematic frames that may help the 
reader to observe different perspectives in this relationship.  The review of literature 
attempts to recognize the layers of complexity involved and the issues of assumption and 
narrative that are essential for a comprehensive understanding of the conflict between the 
two states.   
The foundation of this study is the research question itself, which lays out the 
thematic parameters for this inquiry.  These cornerstones will house the topical 
framework that guide the construction of this project.  The first cornerstone laid is the 
study of cultural and political historians like Said (1994), Keddie (1981), and MacFaul et 
al. (2006) along with Kinzer (2003), Abrahamian (2001) and Shalom (1993), covering 
question of identity, origins of cause, political narratives and historical foundations.  This 
cultural and political research explores the constructs of the narrative between the U.S. 
and Iran and examines how misunderstanding formed a paradigm of mistrust.   
The second cornerstone is carved from bedrock anthropologists such as Geertz 
(1988, 2005) and Beeman (2002), who deal with the complexity of post-modern cultural 
conflict based on ideals of identity, ideology and independence compounded by the 
symbolic constructs of the „other.‟  As Beeman (2002: 2) argues, this anthropological 
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insight is needed to understand the dynamics of Iranians‟ culture and the “nature and 
persistence of the conflict.”   
The third cornerstone to frame this research is the study of the philosophic works 
of Ricouer (1983, 1992), Kearney (1998, 1999) and Gadamer (2004), involving 
interpretive research of the nature of mimesis, the power of imagination, and fusion of 
horizon by applying the understanding of founding events, forgiveness, and narrative 
identity.  These philosophic theories frame a critical hermeneutic approach to analyze and 
interpret the cultural, historical and political narrative between the two countries in order 
to refigure an alternative course of action.   
The fourth and final cornerstone to cement this structure in place is the social text 
of Iranian society, which is a complex hybrid of multiple narratives battling for 
supremacy which compose a national identity often at odds with itself and which presents 
a perplexing conundrum to Western understanding.  These opposing elements within 
Iranian society, and indeed, within the average Iranian, play an important role in any 
exploration which seeks to promote dialogue between the two civilizations.  This review 
of literature is motivated by a concern to deconstruct the existing antagonist narrative and 
configure a new foundation where the two nations can deal with their differences on a 
discursive level in order to alleviate the continuing paradigm of non-discourse and 
accusatory rhetoric.   
This diverse foundational literature was gathered by the desire for a meaningful 
text from which to draw a blueprint for the formation of a new and comprehensive 
understanding.  In this literature review, there will be six main thematic frameworks that 
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are necessary in understanding the sources of the current adversary paradigm between the 
U.S. and Iran and the possibility for an alternative.  These thematic frames are: 
 Orientalism as a Cultural Background 
 Founding Events that Formed National Memories 
 Narrative Identity Caught in the Permanence of Conflict 
 Understanding Post Modern Complexities 
 The Need for Dialogue  
 The Use of Fiction in Re-Figuration of Time 
 
Review of these themes illustrate how each of them is an aspect of a 
comprehensive sense and an adaptive course that help establish a new approach between 
the U.S. and Iran based on the pre-figuration of their past through reinterpretation and 
better understanding, and configuration of a new present based on an ideal future. 
Orientalism as a Cultural Background 
 Edward Said (1994) introduces the notion of Orientalism as a rebuttal to the 
writings about the Orient popular in the 1800‟s.  Said maintains that the Western writers 
portrayed an image of the Orient, which stretched from Palestine to India, skewed toward 
the exotic, strange and inferior.  This shaped Western thinking about the Middle East for 
two centuries and maybe even today.  In his opinion, Westerners perceive themselves as a 
superior civilization and this has become a mark of their approach when dealing with the 
countries in Orient, including Iran.  While in the past the French and British conducted 
their business with this mentality, in the middle of the 20 century, the U.S. replaced them.  
Farber (2005: 48) emphasizes: 
 England, after the war, was giving up on empire.  It had lost the desire, the will, 
 and the resources necessary for international primacy.  Its imperial presence was 
 fast fading from the Near and Middle East.  The United States, haphazardly and 
 with a different agenda, was just as quickly stepping into the breach.  Iran, which 
 had been for so long dominated by England, was one of the first nations in the 
 region to receive critical American attention. 
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The United States approached the Middle East with the same mentality of superiority as 
French and British and, unfortunately, became the new foreign dominant imperialistic 
force in the region.     
 In this new territory of the Middle East, the United States looked at Iran as a 
battle ground to fight the Soviet Union and stop the spread of communism.  To reach this 
objective, the United States ignored any concerns of the Iranian people.  As Farber (2005: 
71) notes, “the United States depended on their best friend in the Persian Gulf [the Shah] 
to spend billions of his new petro-dollars in the United States, combat Soviet communist 
influence in the region, and act as a force of stabilization, Westernization, and 
modernization in the Islamic World.”  Nevertheless, this approach was seen by Iranians 
as an unbalanced and unfair act towards Iran, for Iranians witnessed how the United 
States in return for this support, allowed the Shah unrestrained abuse of the Iranian 
people‟s basic freedom as he suppressed, imprisoned, exiled and executed those who 
opposed his policies. 
 As a result of this approach towards Iran, the Iranians opinion began to change 
towards the United States.  As Said‟s (1994) discusses in his book, Orientalism, the U.S. 
was seen only as a force which cared about its own concerns at the expense of locals.  
Farber (2005: 37) mentions that in the “1970s, for Iranians across the political spectrum, 
the United States figured as a kind of dues ex machina in the drama of their national life; 
it was an outside force that intervened as it wished, often without regard for the desires or 
even well-being of the Iranian people.”  For example, by overthrowing the Iranian 
democratically elected Prime Minister in 1953 and supporting an illegitimate Shah to stay 
in power, people not only viewed the Shah as a puppet of the United States, but also 
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considered the U.S. as the cause of their domestic political misery.  As Beeman (2002: 4) 
explains, now, the “United States was seen as inheritor of the mantle of colonialism 
carried out earlier in the 20
th
 century by Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union,” 
which was pointed out by Said (1994). 
 During this tense time, the Shah‟s agreement in autumn of 1964 to grant 
immunity for American military personnel in Iran worsened the situation.  The religious 
conservatives led by Khomeini saw the opportunity to attack the Shah and portray the 
U.S. as an evil force in the region.  Khomeini‟s (in Moin 1999: 121-2) speech was filled 
with harsh rhetoric against the U.S. government claiming the “point is that we are 
fighting against America.  We must …attack the regime so that the whole nation will 
realize that this Shah is an American agent and this is an American plot.”  The U.S. 
conduct in Iran began to increase the hostility of the religious in Iran.  By giving this 
inflammatory type of speech, Khomeini not only portrayed himself as the main 
opposition leader to oppose the Shah, but also pictured the United States as an 
imperialistic force in Iran.  “America, Khomeini exhorted, propped up the Shah, 
demonstrating the cynical hypocrisy of a nation that claimed to champion freedom but 
supported only repression…The charge had just enough truth to weaken the Shah and to 
demonize the United States in Iran” (Farber 2005: 86).  After the revolution, when the 
Shah was accepted into the U.S., Farber (2005: 188) notes, the “new regime anxiously 
awaited signs that the superpower would soon subvert their revolution.”  This was how 
asylum for the Shah was interpreted by Iranians and explains the climate of fear which 
created the hostage crisis and the beginning of a US-Islamic Republic cold war.   
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 American conduct fueled Iranian retaliation in 1979 by the hostage crisis.  This 
event, then, provided a context for the U.S. policy makers to behave aggressively against 
the Islamic Republic.  As Ansari (2006: 27) notes, the “coup revealed America‟s 
influence and malevolent ambitions in Iran.  The immense sense of betrayal that was felt 
– and cultivated for later generations – cannot be understood outside the context of a 
relationship that had been thought to be positive and benign.”  On the American side, the 
hostage crisis should be looked at in the same historical context.  Americans were 
confused about the anti-Americanism coming from Iran in the post-revolution era.  As 
Farber (2005: 189) explains, the Americans always believed that “their culture and their 
nation (as well as their military) represent the future of all of humanity.”  In Americans‟ 
view, the U.S. which helped Iran to develop and modernize did not deserve to be treated 
as the “Great Satan” in the post-revolutionary era.  Farber (2005: 188) concludes that the 
“Iranian public‟s memories of American actions and the American public‟s general 
ignorance of U.S. policy in Iran were so asymmetrical as to preclude mutual 
understanding.”  The different cultural perspective towards each other was developed and 
the two countries entered an era of antagonism.     
 For this research, the concept of pre-figuration introduced by Ricoeur (1983) is 
vital to the understanding of the past in a new light and possibly to take a new course of 
action for the present.  The root cause of the problem understood through Said‟s (1994) 
theory sheds light on the historical framework between the two countries from a different 
perspective.  This first phase of mimesis, mimesis1, understanding the past in a new way, 
includes recounting of the past to portray a different historical setting for the current 
environment.  Under this Ricoeurian concept, there is a need to return back and interpret 
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differently the relationship between the United States and Iran; recognize the background 
which created a biased basis of interaction; and unfold a different understanding thus 
employing the first step of mimesis1. 
Founding Events that Formed National Memory 
 Ricoeur (1996: 7) introduces the idea of “founding events” and refers to them as 
historical events that remain in the historical memory of the people.  In his opinion, this 
historical memory then “prevents cultures from allowing themselves to be recounted 
differently….”  Once this notion is formed in the historical memory of a people, those 
people tend to be blocked in their horizon of past memories.  They tend to think only 
within the framework of their stagnated historical cycle.  They become victims and 
prisoners of those memories as they can not move beyond that dogmatic way of thinking.  
The CIA coup of 1953 and the Hostage Crisis of 1979 are two such founding events in 
Iranian American history which as Ricoeur (1996: 7-8) mentions have frozen the identity 
of the other into repetitious celebrations of blame which are used deliberately and form 
barriers preventing the two nations from seeing beyond these negative historical events.   
 As Ricoeur (1988: 187) notes, these “events, which are said to be „epoch-
making,‟ draw their specific meaning from their capacity to found or reinforce the 
community‟s consciousness of its identity, its narrative identity, as well as the identity of 
its members.”  The 1953 CIA coup influenced dramatically the identity and 
consciousness of Iranians and provided a foundation for their hostile reactions towards 
the U.S.  The subsequent events completed this cycle.  As Ansari (2006: 70) notes: 
The events of 1953 were a foundational moment in the construction of US-Iranian 
relations and transferred Iranian suspicions from the historic Anglo-Russian axis 
towards the Americans.  The events of 1979 crystallized this tradition.  The 
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revolution of 1979 bound Iran and the United States in an intimate ideological 
relationship, defined by a collective and shared traumatic experience. 
 
The political developments between former Presidents Clinton and Khatami‟s 
administrations indicate the depth of the problem caused by these founding events.  Even 
though former Secretary of State Madeline Albright (2000: 356) apologized for the U.S. 
role in the coup, Khatami‟s political elites were not able to use the apology as an 
occasion to move beyond this stagnated memory.  The incapability of the Iranian 
administration to forgive the U.S. government and use Albright‟s apologize indicates 
how profound the influence of 1953 coup was within Iranian political spectrum and how 
the pride of the Iranians is to create such an unwillingness to move beyond the past.   
 The seizure of the American embassy resulted in American politicians using Iran 
as a scapegoat for the past 30 years.  In the United States, Iran became an easy mark for 
condemnation.  Whenever an American foreign policy in the Middle East went wrong, 
Iran was to be blamed.  As Ansari (2006: 112) notes, political “disagreements could be 
set aside because blaming Iran was now a bipartisan affair to which all Americans could 
subscribe, Republican or Democrat, politician or bystander.  Iran had transcended regular 
politics and become a myth, part of political folklore.”  This is a direct result of the 
American embassy seizure in Tehran and the holding of American diplomats for 444 
days, for this picture continues to play as part of American historical memory.  However, 
the result of such a stagnated paradigm of viewing the other prevents what Ricoeur 
(1996: 7) describes as the engagement and normalization of a relationship and instead 
holds each side prisoners of their views.  Rejecting a plea for forgiveness is a serious 
decision on the part of anyone or any nation.  It goes both ways. 
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 The import of these two events is understood through the research of political 
historians like Abrahamian (2001), Shalom (1993) and Kinzer (2003), who explore how 
the 1953 Coup created such outrage and sense of intrusion for Iranians as to grow 
resentment so large that it led to the birth of anti-Americanism in Iranian political 
narrative.  Similarly, research by Conover, Mingst and Sigelman (1980) found the 
Hostage Crisis resulting from the Revolution negatively changed the American view 
about Iran and Iranians were subsequently seen as dangerous and ruthless.  This vital 
memory still colors the American perspective.  As Takeyh (2006: 116) argues, the 
“emotional legacy of the Mossadeq coup and the hostage crisis, and the bureaucratic 
paralysis in both countries, have led to a relationship that seems immured in its pattern of 
antagonism and suspicion.”  These two events established the beginning of an area of 
hostility for the two sides and the long-term hostile policies towards each other that were 
developed in the last 30 years.  As a result of CIA 1953 coup, Americans became 
notorious for their foreign policy of interference in Iran.  On the other hand, as a result of 
the Hostage crisis in 1979, Iranians were labeled by Americans as irrational and fanatic.  
These are labels that the two countries still use to describe and to demonize each other.     
  The current status between the United States and Iran illustrates how remaining 
stagnated within the national memory of hostility can be dangerous.  Within this train of 
thought Sacks (2005: 113) notes that if “we can forgive others, and act so that others can 
forgive us, then we can live with the past without being held prisoner by the past.”  The 
United States and Iran represent a case where the two entities have not been able to 
forgive each other and remain in the arena of revenge rather than moving toward 
tolerance as a result of not overcoming the founding events in the past.  The 1953 CIA 
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coup in Iran caused the hostile action of the hostage crisis in Tehran which helped create 
antagonism among American politicians.  After 30 years in post-revolution Iran, the two 
countries remain explicitly hostile toward each other.   
Narrative Identity Caught in Permanence of Conflict 
 In my research, I thought the challenge might be whether Ricoeur‟s (1992) theory 
of narrative identity, which is used on an individual level, can be applied to the narrative 
identity in an international relationship between two nations.  Even though Ricoeur‟s 
narrative identity theory is designed for individual identity, as Kearney (1996: 182) 
observes, narrative “identity operates at the level of both individual and communal 
identity.”  The two nations can be identified as two individual entities that operate in 
relation to each other.  My objective is to apply Ricoeur‟s narrative identity theory to an 
international problem: more specifically, to examine why Americans and Iranians have 
resisted each other for so long without any opening for possible engagement.  This theory 
helps me to see the sources of resistance and the forces for change within the narrative 
identity of these two countries in relation to each other.   
Understanding the notion of permanence in time, introduced by Ricoeur (1992: 
116), allows an analysis of the permanence of conflict which exists between the U.S. and 
Iran for more than five decades.  Each narrative identity, as Ricoeur (1992) explains, is 
constituted by two dimensions, the idem and the ipse, which are in constant dialectic with 
each other.  Idem, or sameness, represents the sedimentation which remains frozen in 
time, the part of identity that remains permanent through time.  Applied to the US-Iran 
relationship, this dimension has taken hold of their national identity and does not allow 
them to move beyond the existing paradigm.  The second dimension, ipse, or selfhood, 
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represents innovative dimension of their identity, the dimension that is oriented towards 
change.  In the last 30 years, neither seems willing to explore the ipse, or selfhood.   
Especially important to this research is the understanding that the two sides are 
caught by their sameness, remaining in a state of mistrust, non-discourse and angry 
rhetoric as is evidenced by the media from both countries and the scholars who have 
followed the political history of the two states‟ relationship.  As Ricoeur (1992: 115-25) 
argues, idem identity tends to sustain status quo and resists change.  This dimension of 
narrative identity traps each of the two countries in permanent hostility and does not 
allow them to go beyond their current norm.  By understanding the narrative identity of 
the two countries in terms of idem and ipse, I seek to see if there is any possibility to 
encourage change within the notion of narrative identity based on promoting and 
strengthening the ipse identity represented by innovative forces in the two countries. 
Being caught in the idem dimension of their narrative identity may determine how 
they look at each other.  Ansari (2006: 82) argues that often “what we choose to see 
supports our perceptions, even if they are misconceptions.  Unwilling to reassess our 
mistakes or to assume responsibility, it is easy to ascribe blame to the „other,‟ and the 
more incomprehensible the „other,‟ the better.”  The demonization narrative has been the 
main story between the two governments in the last three decades.  In both camps, this 
comes from a matter of convenience.  In America, the politicians don‟t want to seem 
weak on the issue of Iran.  Ansari (2006: 132) emphasizes that politicians in the U.S. are 
“unwilling to risk valuable political capital in an election year by appearing to be soft on 
Iran.”  In Iran, the politicians demonize the U.S. to increase their control and crash down 
the domestic opposition and democratic movements.  For example, Khomeini used the 
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hostage crisis to crash down internal opposition groups and to create an international 
crisis to be the main focus of the nation while consolidating his own power in Iran.  This 
mentality in two camps has worked as a barrier to open discussion of issues between the 
U.S. and Iran and strengthened the current stagnated narrative.    
External factors are other elements in this narrative of hostility.  Whenever there 
was a chance for engagement, other interested parties around this matter played a 
destructive role.  Ansari (2006: 166) argues that “many regional countries, having 
benefited form the rupture in Iran-US relations, were deeply antithetical to the loss of 
investment, prestige, and importance that would result from a rapprochement between the 
United States and Iran ….”  As a result, as he continues, extensive “efforts were made to 
remind Washington of Tehran‟s continued enmity towards the Israeli state and prevent 
any reassessment of U.S. relations with Iran” (2006: 184).  Countries such as Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan justify their defense budget and their U.S. economical and 
military assistance by exaggerating the threat of Iran to Washington.  These countries 
which benefit from the antagonism between the U.S. and Iran have not been very 
sympathetic to the idea of engagement.  This external aspect of the American-Iranian 
relationship, which in many ways is out of their immediate control, makes engagement 
more challenging.   
The U.S. approach towards Iran reflects a negative American perspective in 
regard to the Islamic Republic.  Ansari (2006: 3) argues that for the U.S. administrations, 
“Iran is not simply a problem, it‟s the problem.  It‟s not just a member of the Axis of 
Evil, but the founding member, the chief sponsor of state terrorism, or to use a more 
recent characterization, the central banker for terrorism.”  Under this circumstance, Iran 
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became a taboo where no politicians dared to look at the issues constructively.  Within 
this framework, the U.S. policy towards Iran followed a narrative of hostility, which was 
the norm.  President Bush‟s speech in the State of Union in 2002 where he placed Iran 
among the Axis of Evil is interpreted within the same school of thought.   
Nevertheless, the harsh approach by the U.S. not only did not help the U.S. court 
a friendlier relationship with Iran, but also destroyed moderate elements within the 
Iranian political system who could have been a more reliable ally with the U.S. in the 
long term.  Ansari (2006: 189) explains that “Iranian policy makers were left bewildered 
by the axis of evil speech and proved far more critical of their own foreign policy 
establishment than that of America.”  After President Bush‟s speech, former Iranian 
reformist President Khatami, who had put all his effort to reconcile Iran with the western 
world, and had some relative success to convince European countries, became the target 
of the criticism of the hardliners who make the policy.  This speech weakened the 
position of Khatami in Iranian domestic policy when he faced harsh criticism from 
conservatives about his soft approach towards the United States.  Such destructive 
narrative in the U.S. has worsened the situation both in Iran and between the two 
countries.  Further, such harsh rhetoric caused the rise of President Ahmadinejad in Iran 
who continues to oppress Iranian democratic movements inside the country and conduct a 
very aggressive foreign policy outside of it.   
Understanding Post Modern Complexities 
 By considering Ricoeur‟s (1996: 7) proposal that the “identity of a group, culture, 
people, or nation, is not that of an immutable substance, nor that of a fixed structure, but 
that, rather, of a recounted story,” the US-Iran complex narrative has the potential to be 
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changed in a more constructive way due to the possibility of a new interpretation.  The 
narrative identity theory will form a basis of observation to analyze the dialectic between 
the two countries in the past and present time and will be considered as a potential 
dialectic that can generate possibilities.   
 That said, the creation of a new narrative faces Geertz‟s (2005) challenge of 
understanding the post-modern complexities presented to nations with multi-ethnic 
identities, various narrative concerns, and the often opposing priorities at the international 
level, which represent complex national and international post-modern issues.  “The end 
of colonialism altered radically the nature of the social relationship …,” therefore, to deal 
with these problems, we need to have a post-modern approach (Geertz 1988: 131).  
Simple positivistic and military calculations may not be fit to deal with the complexity of 
issues today.  Understanding the concerns of others in the international arena is a vital 
element of diplomacy in foreign policy making.   This aligns well with Gadamer‟s (2004: 
306) concept of „fusion of horizon” which argues that in “the process of understanding, a 
real fusing of horizons occurs …” where the two sides may expand their restricted 
perspectives of the other‟s views.  
The meanings of the issues and events in the American-Iranian cultures may 
become clearer by observing how they read the hostage crisis in 1979.  Since, as Nye 
(2005: 170) explains, the objective is to better understand the other side of any given 
issue, the “first step in making a better case is a greater understanding of how our policies 
appear to others ….”  The presence of the U.S. in Iran and the hostage crisis were seen 
and interpreted in two completely different ways in the two countries.  Americans saw 
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the event as a clear hostility by irrational religious extremists towards the U.S. diplomats 
in Iran.  Farber (2005: 154) notes: 
The American mass media portrayal of everyday Americans suffering at the 
hands of foreigners – Islamic foreigners, in particular – resulted in a widespread 
public misunderstanding of American foreign policy.  Thus, the American mass 
media coverage of the Iran crisis helped persuade Americans to see themselves as 
victims of “terrorists” who irrationally hate “us,” rather than to recognize that 
Iranians had attacked the U.S. embassy in response to American policy in Iran. 
 
When the media and politicians simplify the event as an irrational act by foreigners and 
look at it through that glass, they act superfically.  The complexity of the world today 
requires a much deeper analysis of events to understand them fully.   
 On the other hand, the hostage crisis had a totally different meaning for the 
Iranians.  In his analysis, Farber (2005: 155) explains that Iranians 
saw the U.S. embassy officials they had captured as representatives of the 
American government, which had subverted their political system, supported a 
dictator who had tortured and killed dissidents, and sought to destroy their 
revolution.  Where the American people saw individuals and their families, the 
Iranian revolutionaries saw a superpower that had always treated their nation, 
their culture, and their religion as expendable pawns in a bigger game.   
 
In such a circumstance, the hostage crisis for Iranians was completely a legitimate action, 
because it was an act of protest against a superpower who sought to destroy the legacy of 
a nation.  By the seizure of the embassy, Iranians wanted to signal their discontent with 
the American foreign policy of interference in Iran.  By determining Iran as an evil and 
irrational country, the Americans‟ view remained on the surface rather than representing 
deep understanding of the issue.  This pattern of simplistic view towards Iran, 
unfortunately, still is alive and common among American policy makers and leaders. 
 President Bush‟s State of the Union address in 2002 exemplifies this, because the 
speech simplified the issue to a minimum level of discussion.  Brzezinski (2005: 16) 
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describes the U.S. foreign policy in recent years as “a notion that is always congenial to 
an aroused public mood, but whose black-and-white view of the world ignores the shades 
of gray that define most global dilemmas.”  From Milani‟s Lost Wisdom (2004), we find 
that there are many narratives in Iran that deal differently with the concept of modernity 
represented by the West.  There is the narrative that describes conservatives in Iran as 
people who do not want to deal with modernity at all.  There is the narrative of moderate 
religious that does want to provide a moderate image of Islam and is open to the concept 
of modernity based on a moderate interpretation of Islamic laws.  There is also the 
narrative of Iranian secular democrats that wants to have a democratic political system 
and to have a fair relationship with the West.  The awareness about these different 
existing movements in the Iranian society helps to better understand the complexity of 
Iran as far as it relates to the US-Iran adversarial narrative.  The awareness of these layers 
in the Iranian society would help American policy makers to be more effective in dealing 
with the question of Iran. 
 If the United States desires to remain a leading country in the world, it may need 
to change its policies from leading by force to leading by example in order to win the 
hearts of others.  As Nye (2005: 167) notes, the “ability of a country to attract others 
arises from its culture, its values and domestic practices, and the perceived legitimacy of 
its foreign policies.”  For a long time, the United States had been a leading country in the 
world as an example and inspiration to others.  In the past few years, U.S. foreign policy 
declined to lead through the force of its military strengths.  Brzezinski (2005: 19) notes 
that power “and force alone are not sufficient to preserve American hegemony ….  
Coercion creates new antagonists but does little to prevent them from” growing and 
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causing further problems.  In dealing with the question of Iran, the United States may 
better be off, if it starts to understand Iran, Iranians‟ needs, and their behavior rather than 
threatening them with the policy of regime change, sanctions, and military attack.  Since 
Iranian people have sympathy for the American culture, a more diplomatic, culturally-
aware, and comprehensive approach towards Iran may attract Iranians even more.  As 
Ury (2005: 180) indicates, the “goal should not be to end conflict but to transform it, to 
change its form from violence and warfare to dialogue ….” 
Need for Dialogue 
 Former United Nations Secretary, Kofi Annan (2005: 95) claims that dialogue 
“provides a vehicle for advancing cooperation.”  In response to Samuel Huntington‟s 
(1993) call for a “clash of civilization,” on the same line as Annan, former Iranian 
president, Khatami (2000), calls for a “dialogue among civilizations,” and invites all 
nations, including Iran and the U.S., to discuss their differences in order to reach 
understanding.  This was a completely different approach from that of Huntington, who 
suggests that nations would be ultimately forced to resolve their disputes through clashes.  
Intellectuals like Takeyh (2002) and Saunders (2001: 41-2) urge for a paradigm shift 
between the U.S. and Iran as they see the positivistic-military approach as a wrong and 
fruitless way to address and change deep seated “human conflict across ethnic, religious, 
cultural, or even civilizations‟ divides.”  The relevance of this scholarly call for 
systematic dialogue with parties involved in a confrontational mode in order to create a 
shift in paradigm aligns with Kearney‟s (1998: 208) „power of the common.‟  Through 
imagination, language, dialogue, and discourse function as the medium to generate the 
dynamic of the discourse from confrontational to normal and transform relationships.  
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The perspectives of these scholars reinforce my view that dialogue between the two 
nations may create the understanding proposed by Ricoeur (1992) and unfold the 
possibility of change spoke of by Kearney (1998), then perhaps the two sides may leave 
their fixed and unmoving positions and possibly see the other perspective as suggested by 
Gadamer (2004) in his concept of “fusion of horizons.”  
 Ricoeur (1992) talks about the relationship of self and other which constitute their 
narrative identity.  According to his theory, a relationship between two separate entities is 
defined by how they interact with each other.  The divisive language of hostility and 
antagonistic actions from one side may fuel further hostility and even violence in the 
other camp.  As former Secretary of United Nations, Annan (2005: 96) notes, hostile 
“rhetoric is all too often the precursor to hostile acts, and hostile acts have a way of 
escalating into violence, conflict, and worse.”   
  Khatami‟s initiative for dialogue with the other was valuable because it indicated 
the beginning of a constructive era in Iran‟s behavior.  Ansari (2006: 154-5) argues that 
to “use the language of international relations, Khatami essentially discarded vulgar 
realism and introduced a measure of constructivism into Iran‟s foreign policy strategy.  
The culture of mistrust had to be deconstructed and replaced by a more suitable edifice.”  
For almost 18 years after the Iranian revolution, Iran was portrayed as an irrational and 
aggressive country in the West.  Khatami opened a new chapter for Iran and its 
relationship with the western world.  To establish Iran within the international 
community, as Ansari (2006: 162-3) continues, “Khatami decided these issues could best 
be addressed by placing them in an overall framework of reconciliation.  He labeled this 
the “Dialogue of Civilization,” a direct response to the pervasive thesis of a “Clash of 
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Civilizations,” emphasizing the importance of cultural, meaningful communication.”  
Unfortunately, the hardliners in the United States dismissed Khatami‟s proposal for 
dialogue, not knowing that, as a result of their miscalculation, they would face an ultra-
conservative Iranian president who would take a very harsh position towards the U.S.  
The United States may need to open up a line for dialogue since dialogue has 
proven to be the most effective way to resolve critical issues in the international arena.  
Recent change of the U.S. approach with countries such as Libya and North Korea in 
regard to their nuclear programs is a clear proof about the power of dialogue and how it 
can work toward changing the dynamics.  If dialogue occurs, through a process of 
interaction, the U.S. may be able to engage Iranians on a variety of critical topics.  Up to 
this point, as Ansari (2006: 213) explains, for both sides, “engagement was an act of 
treason.  It was a view that dove-tailed neatly with the perspective of American hawks, 
who likewise considered any form of compromise with the Islamic Revolution 
tantamount to treason.  Engagement would, by necessity, affect the nature of the 
Revolution …” because it opens up and connects Iran to the outside world.  A normal 
relationship with the rest of the world, which is the desire of moderates in Iran, can 
empower them in Iranian domestic politics.  As far as concerns the U.S., dialogue could 
be an effective way to tackle hard-liners in Iran, help the moderate narratives to flourish, 
and open up possibilities.    
As for my research, the question is whether there is a possibility for change in this 
hostile and restricted paradigm.  What would be the function of my text in this quarrel in 
the international arena?  Ricoeur (1981) and his concept of re-figuration of time through 
fiction may help me to encourage my reader to interpret the relationship between the U.S. 
 55 
and Iran in a new light and consequently, to interpret the responsibilities of leaders in this 
same light. 
The Use of Fiction in Re-Figuration of Time 
 Ricoeur‟s (1988: 185-95) notion of reconstruction of time in narrative through 
fiction highlights the potentials that exist in the history of the US-Iran relationship, which 
were ignored under the hostile status of the two countries in the past three decades.  My 
text works as a fiction to realize such potentials, for as Ricoeur (1981: 296) argues, “the 
world of fiction leads us to the heart of the real world of action.”  Although the research 
in this text may seem idealistic, such idealism is a necessary antidote to the current 
paradigm.  As Michael Province at the University of California in San Diego emphasizes, 
the United States lacks a comprehensive updated foreign policy for the 21
st
 century which 
could be materialized through imagination in a fictional work to liberate itself from its 
current outdated paradigm and further, as Ricoeur (1988: 191) notes: 
one of the functions of fiction bound up with history is to free, retrospectively, 
certain possibilities that were not actualized in the historical past, it is owing to its 
quasi-historical character that fiction itself is able, after the fact, to perform its 
liberating function.  The quasi-past of fiction in this way becomes the detector of 
possibilities buried in the actual past. 
 
In this text, my aim is to offer a new approach, based on the understanding of the other 
players and their concerns rather than condemning them, in hope of reaching consensus 
and long lasting agreements.  My fictional work invites leaders and policy makers to 
move beyond the restricted paradigm that was the dominant approach in the 20
th
 century, 
where the approach was primarily one of looking at the relationship in terms of strategic 
planning, regional hegemony, and military intervention and instead proposing an 
approach that avoids the mentality that caused the opportunities of the past to be ignored.   
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Leaders from both countries have expressed understanding that the current 
paradigm needs to change, yet these occasions were lost under the shadow of antagonism.  
For example, one lost opportunity occurred when President Clinton made an overture 
toward making amends (Farmanfarmaian and Zonis 1999: 33) when he said: 
I think it is important to recognize, however, that Iran, because of its enormous 
geopolitical importance over time, has been the subject of quite a lot of abuse 
from various Western nations.  And I think sometimes it‟s quite important to tell 
people, look, you have a right to be angry at something my country or my culture 
or others that are generally allied with us today did to you 50 or 60 … years ago. 
 
On the Iranian side, former President Khatami wasn‟t able to take former President 
Clinton‟s message of sympathy for Iranians and use the occasion to break through the 
past and create new ties because of the foul taste left by the coup and current political 
mindset in his own country. These understandings never materialized as meaningful 
dialogue because the two countries remained prisoners of their hostility towards each 
other.  The hope is that the reconstruction of their history through this fictional work may 
provide a chance for policy makers to look at missed opportunities and learn from the 
past, which may help them to realize a constructive narrative.  Although my story cannot 
change the past, the hope is that this fiction and its meaning may have the power to 
refigure the past and shape a better future.     
Summary 
 In the review of literature, the political, anthropological, hermeneutic, and socio-
cultural elements serve as a comprehensive framework to analyze the historical 
background, national identity, complexity of Iranian society and the US-Iran relationship, 
and the need for dialogue to deal with this post modern conflict.  The complexity of the 
issue requires a meaningful dialogue to understand the conflict and try to approach the 
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problems differently.  In the review of literature, I wove these different aspects together 
in order to represent the multiplicity of aspects involved in this conflict.  Without paying 
attention to these different layers, and by simplifying the problem as a „good vs. evil‟ 
confrontation, it may not be possible to comprehend fully the issues.  To create a 
meaningful narrative, I apply below Ricoeur‟s (1988) concept of emplotment in my re-
figuration of time between the U.S. and Iran.  With this concept, I illustrate how I 
reconstruct the US-Iran relationship in a new way in order to generate a new 
understanding.  This approach may help to better understand Iran‟s history, national 
identity, and the complexity of Islamic Republic in relation to the United States.   
I provide the background of the country and literature review to present a 
background for this research topic and different views in regard to this issue.  Since the 
aim is to reveal a new way of thinking by the end of this research, it is helpful to examine 
the past history of these two nations.  As Ricoeur (1988: 191) discusses, “in order for us 
to be disposed to believe [in the possible alternative], the probable must have a relation of 
verisimilitude to what has been.”  The review of the past enables me to find potentials 
that existed in the past, but were never actualized.  Based on these potentials, my 
alternative proposal is the result of a more interpretive review of this past which forms 
the narrative identity of the two countries.  Now, it is time to move to the next Chapter to 
illustrate the research process.   
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH PROCESS 
Introduction 
  The process in this research weaves critical hermeneutic philosophy with my 
exploration of the US-Iranian hostile relationship.  This section is based on the idea that 
interpretive theory is a relevant source to enlighten the data that are obtained through 
research conversations.  This section presents the theoretical foundations for the research 
analysis, the conceptual framework for conducting the research, the research protocol for 
data collection, data analysis‟ process as it relates to this study, pilot study, and summary.  
The research process is a cornerstone of my entire research project, connecting themes of 
the country‟s background, literature review, and data with the critical hermeneutic theory 
represented by Ricoeur (1983, 1992), Kearney (1998), and Gadamer (2004).   
Theoretical Foundation 
Introduction 
The theoretical foundation serves as a framework for interpretation and discussion 
of aspects of interpretive theory for the research analysis.  This section is based on the 
belief that critical hermeneutic philosophy offers an appropriate theoretical basis to 
illuminate the data gathered from the research conversations.   
In this section, elements of interpretive theory are used that appear most relevant 
as research categories for the analysis of the current tension between the United States 
and Iran.  These theories also create a framework for new alternatives of change.  
Theorists such as Ricoeur (1983, 1992), Kearney (1998), and Gadamer (2004) are 
employed for the interpretation of the data.  In the first section Ricoeur‟s concept of 
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mimesis1 is applied to review and reinterpret the past; mimesis3 is used to reach a better 
understanding for generating new possibilities; and I use mimesis2 to imagine the ideal 
possibilities which may enable leaders to envision an alternative course of action for the 
present in this U.S.-Iran relationship.  To understand and move beyond the past, however, 
it is necessary to apply Ricoeur‟s (1996, 2004) concepts of “founding events” and 
“forgiveness.”  Founding events help the reader to better comprehend the foundations of 
mistrust between the two states and forgiveness helps to break through the past barriers.  
The on-going back and forth within the three stages of mimesis forms the narrative 
identity of the US-Iran relationship.  Kearney‟s “power of imagination” reinforces 
Ricoeur‟s mimesis3 and shows how imagining an ideal future can be conceptualized to 
alter the current paradigm between the two nations.  Finally, Gadamer‟s concept of fusion 
of horizon provides a forum to create a proper environment to enlarge views and expand 
understanding where new prospects can be reached for engagement; as a result of this 
maturity, change from an adversarial narrative toward one of understanding may occur.   
Mimesis 
Ricoeur (in Kearney 1998: 242) uses narration as a construction of meaning in 
time and defines “narrative as the synthesis of the heterogeneous, that is, the capacity to 
re-describe reality by combining elements dispersed in time and space into some kind of 
coherent pattern.”  To combine these dispersed elements in time and space into a 
comprehensive narrative, he uses the concept of mimesis, which is moving backward and 
forward in time in order to obtain a new meaning out of the events.  Kearney (2004: 131) 
aligns with Ricoeur saying that narration preserves “the meaning that is behind us so that 
we can have meaning before us.  There is always more order in what we narrate than in 
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what we have actually already lived; and this narrative excess … of order, coherence and 
unity, is a prime example of the creative power of narration.”  Furthermore, Ricoeur 
(1981: 180) defends his construction by explaining that “mimesis is not a copy: mimesis 
is poiesis, that is, construction, creation.”  As defined thus, mimesis is an innovative 
reconstruction of the time in narration.  Ricoeur elaborates, using the definition to 
understand the development of events before the conclusion of them.  Ricoeur (1983: 67) 
argues that to “understand the story is to understand how and why the successive 
episodes led to this conclusion ….”  The concept of mimesis is useful for the analysis of 
the U.S. and Iran relationship because it helps to illustrate the present stalemate by better 
understanding the past episodes in order to refigure a new relationship.       
In reconstructing time in narrative and obtaining a meaning out of it, Ricoeur 
(1983: 53) establishes three stages of mimesis to cover past, present, and future: 
In constructing the relationship between the three mimetic modes I constitute the 
mediation between time and narrative.  Or to put it another way, to resolve the 
problem of the relation between time and  narrative I must establish the mediating 
role of emplotment between a stage of practical experience that precedes it and a 
stage that succeeds it. 
 
Ricoeur offers the concept of mimesis1 as referred to the past, pre-figuration; mimesis2 as 
referred to present, configuration; and mimesis3 as referred to future, re-figuration.  The 
purpose of mimesis can be summarized by saying that the potential for change lies in our 
ability to recognize, understand, and redress what has happened, and to create new 
structures and ways of thinking and interacting in the future.  
Mimesis1 
Mimesis1 aims at establishing a new relationship between self and the other 
through a new interpretation of the past.  Ricoeur (1981: 152) notes that “it is a self and 
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another, posed in psychological terms, that interpretation pursues; interpretation always 
aims at a reproduction, a Nachbildung, of lived experiences.”  He counts on this 
possibility because he believes the identity is a dynamic entity that develops itself 
through retelling over time.  Ricoeur (1996: 7) argues that the “identity of a group, 
culture, people, or nation, is not that of an immutable substance, nor that of a fixed 
structure, but that, rather, of a recounted story.”  By recounting a past history, a narrator 
may be able to portray the same past in a new light derived from a different perspective.  
This new perspective may generate new understanding and provide momentum for a new 
course of action in the relationship between the two selves.  In the case of this text, 
through a re-construction, I aim to generate a new narrative for the U.S. and Iran based 
on a new look at their pasts.  To reinterpret the past in a new way, however, a light needs 
to be shed on past events.   
Founding Events 
 There are historical events that do not easily fade from a people‟s memory.  These 
events become a source of stagnation for the people who experience them.  Ricoeur 
(1996: 7) refers to these events as founding events which are:  
the influence exercised over the collective memory … the repeated 
commemoration and celebration of which tend to freeze the history of each 
cultural group into an identity which is not only immutable but also deliberately 
and systematically incommunicable.  
 
The shock of the founding events is so intense, important and unsettling that the import 
remains in people‟s historical memory.  As a result of the gravity of this memory, it 
becomes a part of their identity, in a way that the remembrance of these events prevents 
people from envisioning new possibilities.  This rigid formation of cultural identity can 
stop a people from moving beyond their horizon and shifting their paradigm.  If this 
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rigidity becomes a tradition, it can cause further restrictions for future generations to 
move beyond their respective norm.  The concept of founding event is crucial for my 
research analysis since both the United States and Iran are caught up in such founding 
events: the CIA 1953 coup in Iran and the 1979 American hostage crisis in Tehran.    
 However, there are alternatives to break through such a limited horizon.  
Recounting the same event in a different way provides an avenue of release from the 
chains of the founding events.  Ricoeur (1996: 8) suggests that these founding events can 
be recounted by the cultures involved and notes that in “this exchange of memories it is a 
matter not only of subjecting the founding events of both cultures to a crossed reading, 
but of helping one another to set free that part of life and of renewal which is found 
captive in rigid, embalmed and dead traditions.”  Through telling and exchanging of 
stories and interpreting differently, it may be possible to move beyond clichés and 
overcome the horror of founding events within a tradition.  Participatory research 
conversations provided me this opportunity to discuss this with experts from both sides 
and reflect their views in this text.  Both the U.S. and Iran desperately need to move 
beyond their rigid position based on their experienced founding events in order to open a 
new chapter in their relationship.  To move beyond the established norm, however, 
forgiveness may be a necessary step. 
Forgiveness 
 Ricoeur (1996) explains that forgiveness is a necessary element to diminish the 
effects of founding events from the historical memory of a group or a nation.  
Forgiveness comes through a process of retelling and exchanging stories of the past.  
Ricoeur (1996: 9) explains that forgiveness is “a specific form of the revision of the past 
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and, through it, of the specific narrative identities.”  By recounting and retelling the past 
events, the groups involved in the events may see the events in a different manner, which 
may provide them a new way of thinking, acting, and a reduction of the events‟ gravity.  
By exchanging their perspective of those events, the groups involved in this process may 
see and comprehend the other‟s position and in doing so, begin to understand the 
suffering of the other.  
Ricoeur (1996: 9) adds that “the exchange of memories must no longer be 
investigated through the perspective of glorious deeds but rather through this new 
perspective of suffering.”  For the groups involved in the events it “is necessary this time 
to proceed from the suffering of others; imagining the suffering of others before re-
examining one‟s own.”  Before taking positions and justifying actions, one needs to 
imagine how other people suffer from one‟s actions.  This observation may move parties 
from their rigid position to develop empathy for the other.  In the case of US-Iran, instead 
of accusation, it may be more constructive if the United States as a world leader, 
recognizes the suffering of Iranian people in the post 1953 CIA coup, which prevented 
Iran from developing into a real democracy.  In addition, forgiving Iran because of its 
wrong doing in hostage crisis, not only illustrates a world leader‟s generosity, but also 
may lead Iran to see the suffering of the Americans during American diplomats‟ captivity 
and admit their wrong doing in the embassy assault.  These interwoven interactions may 
open possibilities for a more empathetic and meaningful engagement. 
Mimesis2 
 Ricoeur‟s concept of mimesis2 refers to the act of emplotment of the unrealized 
potentials of the past in order to configure a new narrative based on those missed 
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potentials.  Ricoeur (1983: 53) explains that mimesis2 functions as mediation between the 
past and the future in configuring a present by act of emplotment.  Mimesis2 intervenes 
between a past that we already lived and a future that we desire to live in: 
the very meaning of the configurating operation constitutive of emplotment is a 
result of its intermediary position between the two operations I am calling 
mimesis1 and mimesis3, which constitute the two sides [l‟amont et l‟aval] of 
mimesis2.  By saying this I propose to show that mimesis2 draws its intelligibility 
from its faculty of mediation, which is to conduct us from the one side of the text 
to the other, transfiguring the one side into the other through its power of 
configuration. 
 
In a literary sense, mimesis2 is conducted by the author who, by emplotment of lived past 
events, seeks to configure a story that never had a chance to be actualized.  The stage 
between prefiguring a past and refiguring a future composes the configuration of the 
present; the action that is taken in present time based on the past experiences with a look 
to the future ideals.  It is my intention to shed light on the past history of the U.S. and 
Iran by finding potentials for configuration of a new narrative that best serves the two 
nations and satisfies my responsibility as the author.   
Mimesis3 
Mimesis3 refers to the text and reader‟s imagination and the ideal world they want 
to live in.  Ricoeur (1983: 71) argues “I shall say that mimesis3 marks the intersection of 
the world of the text and the world of the hearer or reader; the intersection, therefore, of 
the world configured by poem and the world wherein real action occurs and unfolds its 
specific temporality.”  Herda (1999: 77) comments that in mimesis3 the “researcher and 
participant here are interested not in what is behind the text, but what the text opens for 
future possibilities.”  Mimesis3 is therefore the stage where the reader in front of the text 
may reach new horizons that were not options before.  It is the readers in front of the text 
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and their imagination that may lead them to refigure these existing ideal choices.  Herda 
continues that it “is an intersection of the text and the reader and creates an imaginary 
world we might inhabit.  If we cannot imagine … we can never live in a world different 
from the current conditions.”  As the researcher, I carry the responsibility of creating a 
text by a new emplotment for my reader who by “the act of reading is thus the operator 
that joins mimesis3 to mimesis2.  It is the final indicator of the refiguring of the world of 
action under the sign of the plot” (Ricoeur 1983: 77).  There is satisfaction for the author 
if his imagination, represented in his text, can generate his reader in front of the text to 
imagine new possibilities.  Should this text help the readers figure out new possibilities, it 
can be claimed that the stage of mimesis3 worked.   
Narrative Identity 
The idea of forgiveness involves a re-seeing of the self in the other, of picturing 
one self as the other.  As Ricoeur (1992: 3) notes, as “long as one remains within the 
circle of sameness-identity, the otherness of the other than self offers nothing original.”  
As long as the United States and Iran remain captured by biases of their founding events, 
the narrative identity of the two nations remains constant, and forgiveness will not occur.  
Within the notion of identity, Ricoeur (1992) recognizes two poles that play important 
roles in his concept of narrative identity.  He distinguishes “sedimentation” and 
“innovation” as two dimensions of narrative identity and names them respectively idem, 
sameness, which is permanent in time, and ipse, selfhood, which appropriates itself to the 
changes over time.  Ricoeur (in Kearney and Dooley 1999: 8) stresses that the “difficulty 
of being able to deal with changes through time is one reason why identity is so fragile.”  
The identities of the U.S. and Iran rest in the tradition of mistrust.  However Ricoeur 
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(1991a: 429) emphasizes that the “shaping of a tradition in effect rests on the interaction 
between the two factors of innovation and sedimentation.”  Today the sedimentation 
dimension of the two countries‟ identity is dominant within the notion of their narrative 
identity, the process of innovation is discontinued, and the renewal of the identity is 
paralyzed.  To change the stagnation, their narratives need to be recounted and the events 
must be refigured.   
The Power of Imagination 
The idea of the power of imagination derives from Kearney‟s (1988: 370-1) 
notion that the “poetic imagination would nourish the conviction that things can be 
changed.  The first and most effective step in this direction is to begin to imagine that the 
world as it is could be otherwise.”  Looking at the stagnated relationship between the 
United States and Iran, Kearney‟s concept of the power of imagination inspired me to use 
this concept for my research, imagining that things can be otherwise than they have been 
in the past three decades between the U.S. and Iran.   
As Kearney (1996: 185) notes, “narrative imagination opens us to the foreign 
world of others by enabling us to tell or hear other stories.”  Imagination is a necessary 
element to conceptualize an ideal alternative for the future.  It can help us to expand our 
horizons and circumnavigate impasses that block us.  Kearney (1998: 226) notes that it 
“is the schematizing power of imagination which opens the possibility of some kind of 
unified horizon for our diverse action.”  If we think and act different than the established 
paradigm, our new thoughts and actions might generate different possibilities, or as 
Kearney (1998: 228) explains, “to unrealize repressive realities in favor of emancipator 
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possibilities.”  In the past 30 years, inaction has only resulted in a stagnated relationship.  
If the aim is to alter this sedimentation, then imagination may have an important role.   
Imagination can be as simple as little stories that people share with each other, 
which can generate larger scale movement in our interconnected world.  Kearney (1998: 
228) describes imagination as little stories that we tell, that  
are recounted, invented, heard, played out.  It is a culture where the people does 
not exist as a Subject, but rather as an accumulation of thousands of little 
histories, futile and serious, and which permit themselves to be drawn together to 
constitute larger stories ... to form what one calls the culture of a civil society. 
 
Narrating alternative stories of the U.S. and Iran relationship may provide enlightenment 
for the reader as a new way of thinking about the issue at hand.  In my conversations, 
each one of the discussions with my participants is a little story that is to be shared, that 
can shed light on one aspect of the U.S. and Iran relationship, that may open up a new 
possibility, and which may help my reader configure a new course of action.  The hope is 
that the summation of these stories, at the end, may provide an alternative that is strong 
enough to challenge the current status quo.  
To change our horizons, we need to attend to these counter narratives which  
Kearney (1998: 251) thinks “serve an ethical-critical purpose as alternative stories to the 
official stories, as truncated or subversive narratives that brush history against the grain 
and put the dominant power in question.”  Our stories can challenge the official story of 
the two states which are stagnated with the policy of status quo.  If we don‟t take 
initiatives, as Kearney (1998: 228) warns, the “status quo reigns supreme for as long as 
we refuse our utopian capacity to imagine things being other than they are.”  Since the 
official story of the US-Iran relationship has been a stagnated narrative of blame and 
hostility toward each other in the last three decades, there is a pressing need to imagine a 
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new narrative that might help to challenge the existing norm and change the current 
course of action.  
The Fusion of Horizon 
 Gadamer (2004) introduces the notion of “fusion of horizon” as an expansion of a 
person‟s perspective towards the others expressed either by an individual or in a text in 
order to enlarge a person‟s view.  He (2004: 301) first defines the horizon as “the range 
of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point.  
Applying this to the thinking mind, we speak of narrowness of horizon, of the possible 
expansion of horizon, of the opening up of new horizons, and so forth.”  Within a 
horizon, there are individuals whose vision is limited and those who can see into the 
remote possibilities.  Gadamer continues: 
A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence over-values what 
is nearest to him.  On the other hand, “to have a horizon” means not being limited 
to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it.  A person who has a horizon 
knows the relative significance of everything within his horizon, whether it is near 
or far, great or small. 
 
A fusion of horizon, therefore, can be the orientation of individuals, or groups, to move 
towards the other‟s perspective which may enable the individual to develop new insights, 
new understandings, and a more expanded perspective.  Gadamer (2004: 302) adds that 
the fusion of horizon is a “means to get to know the horizon of the other person” or 
group.  It is expanding one‟s field of vision, and way of thinking.  He (2004: 304) 
continues that to “acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at 
hand – not in order to look away from it but to see it better, within a larger whole and in 
truer proportion.”  The inclusion of another horizon makes one‟s own horizon larger 
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rather than causing its loss.  As a result, through the fusion of horizon people enrich their 
perspective by orienting themselves with the other‟s standpoint.   
In the last three decades, the United States and Iran demonstrated their 
incapability to move beyond their antagonistic paradigm.  The two countries are 
restricted by their dogmatic views toward each other and remain prisoners of their short 
sighted views.  Their political biases do not allow them to see the other‟s perspective.  
Gadamer (2004: 304) notes that if “we put ourselves in someone else‟s shoes, for 
example, then we will understand him – i.e., become aware of the otherness, the 
indissoluble individuality of the other person – by putting ourselves in his position.”  
With a constructive look into their past history, the U.S. and Iran need to comprehend the 
legitimate concerns of each other.  As a country with leadership standing in the world, a 
possible U.S. initiative not only will show the U.S. capability to extend its hand and 
enlarge its horizon to include the Iranian‟s, but also may encourage Iranians to do the 
same and abandon their harsh rhetoric.  As Sacks (2005: 112) notes, by doing so, the U.S. 
shows that its “world has become bigger because it now includes you.”  The minimum 
success is to neutralize the Iranian conservatives who always chose a hostile course of 
action against the U.S. and never played a constructive role in decreasing tensions.    
The concept of fusion of horizon serves as a theoretical cornerstone to encourage 
the U.S. and Iran to leave their dogmatic views towards each other and enlarge their 
current restricted horizons.  The idea of a fusion of horizon, Ricoeur (1981: 62) explains, 
“implies a tension between what is one‟s own and what is alien, between the near and the 
far.”  The US-Iran tension may be the result of historical misunderstanding, driven from 
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their otherness with each other, which may be resolved if the two sides expand their 
perspectives to embrace the other‟s.   
Summary 
To engage the two nations together in order to expand their insight, dialogue is 
the first crucial step to reach minimum degree of understanding.  In response to 
Kearney‟s question, Ricoeur (in Kearney 2004: 120) answers, the “challenge is to bring 
conflicts to the level of discourse and not let them degenerate into violence; to accept that 
they tell history in their own words as we tell our history in our own words, and that these 
histories compete against each other in a kind of competition of discourse.”  I used the 
concepts of mimesis, founding events, forgiveness, imagination, and fusion of horizon as 
my theoretical foundations because these concepts can provide a context to assist a 
transition from a confrontational to a discursive level between the United States and Iran 
in this critical time.   
The Conceptual Framework for the Research Process 
Introduction 
This section introduces the conceptual foundation of the protocol for data 
collection and analysis.  The proposed theoretical framework for this research is 
interpretive formed by a critical hermeneutic orientation to participatory inquiry drawn 
from Herda.  As Herda (1999: 9) explains, critical hermeneutic participatory research: 
is a position to which one is summoned ….  To recognize the summons is to 
recognize the nature of critical hermeneutic participatory research.  This 
recognition transforms the manner of approaching the issues we investigate and 
the position of the researcher.  The researcher moves from a position of neutral 
observer or social advocate to a position of being within a transformative act with 
others.   
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In this tradition, Herda (1999: 2) claims, the “work of participatory research is a text 
created by the researcher and the research participants that opens the possibility of 
movement from text to action.”  The focus of this partnership of researcher and research 
participants, creation of text, and movement towards action distinguishes the critical 
hermeneutic research from more traditional research modalities in American academia.   
Research in Critical Hermeneutic Tradition 
 The nature of critical hermeneutic participatory research is grounded in the 
relationship with the other throughout the research process and the new way of thinking 
and understanding that may occur from the relationship.  Herda (1999: 4-5) notes: 
Participatory research can chronicle the events, goals, means, people, and 
consequences of our lives.  It can also develop a story as a whole that opens up 
new ways of thinking and acting ….  Research is a shared process of 
understanding and possible action with those in the research population as well as 
a vehicle by which we can recognize our potential and our mistakes. 
 
By conducting a research conversation where both researcher and research participant are 
led by the topic at hand, through partnership, imagination, and act of emplotment, a new 
understanding may arise.  However, the critical hermeneutic tradition involves a change 
in assumptions, which requires a reinterpretation of self, the other, and the surrounding 
narratives.  Herda (1999: 90) explains in “critical hermeneutic research, our attempt is to 
bring biases out into the open, not to technically reduce or control them.”  The 
understanding that may rise from this new orientation is what Gadamer (2004) calls 
fusion of horizon as documented above. 
 In the critical hermeneutic tradition, the role of researcher is always evolving as 
compared to the static quality of more traditional research modalities in American 
academia.  Herda (1999: 87) clarifies: 
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The role of the researcher is far different from than a collector of data, an expert, 
and neutral player, or a partner in a dialogue.  The researcher‟s orientation toward 
the research event as a whole gives opportunity for one to become a different 
person than before the research took place.  It sets the researcher in a reflective 
and imaginary mode, thus opening new ways to think about the … problems that 
drew one to research in the first place.    
 
In interpretive participatory research conversations, the researcher encourages 
participants to be fully involved in the research.  As they are engaged with the research 
topic and their conversation progresses, they may both gain insights and develop new 
understandings that may expand their horizons. 
Summary 
 As Herda (1999) explains, the aim in the participatory research conversation in a 
critical hermeneutic tradition is to change the positivistic paradigm that has influenced 
research in the applied fields and social sciences for many decades.  In interpretive 
participatory research, the researcher does not consider the participant as an object that is 
supposed to be examined.  Instead, both researcher and participants try to reach new 
understandings of the research topic through a process of interaction and conversation.  
Research Protocol for Data Collection 
Introduction  
At the core of any research process, there is the collection, presentation, and 
analysis of data.  The integrity and systematic thoroughness of the data collection process 
follows a procedure that is authentic to the tradition within which the research took place.  
Therefore, there can be a line of continuity between the research topic, categories and 
questions, the collection and presentation of data, and analysis.  This section includes the 
data collection guidelines, research categories and guiding questions, research timeline, 
entrée to Iran, research participants, research journal, language, and summary.   
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Data Collection Guidelines 
Data were collected through research conversations with participants from 
scholarly institutions or government sectors who are active on some level with American-
Iranian affairs, be it research or leadership.  Since the intent of this research is an inquiry 
to understand better the US-Iranian relationship and to pursue a dialogue that may 
promote a more beneficial working relationship, conversation partners were selected to 
represent the varying perspectives involved in exploring the issue.   
Informal and formal conversations, which lasted between 45-60 minutes, were 
conducted in English, and in some cases in Farsi, recorded, and transcribed into a written 
text for analysis.  General topics of the conversations were provided to participants in 
advance for their reflection.  However, the specific questions were not communicated to 
them in order to leave space for the participants‟ originality of thoughts.  Herda (1999: 
98) notes that often “the second or even third conversation is carried out in a more 
creative mode whereby the conversant can think about ways to address the problem.”  In 
some cases, further conversations did take place to address the uncovered area of the 
research.  Additional conversations addressed critically the issues missed during the first 
conversation.   
Research Categories and Guiding Questions 
 The preliminary research categories and leading questions were designed 
according to the theoretical framework, background of country, and review of literature.  
These categories and questions served to collect data from participants during the 
research conversations.  Herda (1999: 103) explains that  
As one goes through a review of literature, one needs to think about developing 
certain categories that will help serve as parameters for the research project ….  
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The researcher has the responsibility to make a decision about which categories 
will shape a research project.  This is an important decision because categories 
play a dynamic role in the research.  They carry the project forward, serve as 
markers for inquiry, provide the circumference of conversations, and serve as 
points or themes for discussion in analysis. 
 
Philosophers such as Ricoeur (1983, 2002), Kearny (1998), and Gadamer (2004) attracted 
my attention because I discovered that their theoretical circle provided an efficient 
theoretical support to deal with the crisis that exists between the United States and Iran.  
 The research categories were designed to retain the same tone throughout various 
research conversations to maintain consistency in the research, while the research 
questions were modeled for generating conversations rather than for the purpose of 
soliciting answers.  The questions were changed as new understanding rose throughout 
the research process in order to further and to deepen the critical value of the research as 
shown in Table One, see page 75.  For my questions, I followed Gadamer‟s (2004: 368) 
premise where questioning “opens up possibilities of meaning, and thus what is 
meaningful passes into one‟s own thinking on the subject.”  For this research, the 
conversations were a part of total data set including documents, observations, my own 
experiences, and journal entries.  
RESEARCH 
CATEGORY 
RESEARCH GUIDING QUESTIONS 
Mimesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Founding 
Events 
 
 
 Why have the U.S. and Iran not been able to engage in a way 
that moves the relationship in a positive direction? 
 If the two countries once had peaceful tradition, why have they 
abandoned this tradition?  How did they reach this point? 
 Historically, what are different social and political movements in 
Iran?  Can you describe these pro and anti-American movements 
in the past and present?  
  
 What is the history of the two countries in the past?  What are 
the important events?  What was the influence of these events on 
the relationship of the two countries? 
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Narrative      
Identity 
 
 
 
 
Forgiveness 
 
 In the narrative identity theory, there is a constant relationship 
between the “self” and the “other.”  How can this 
interconnectedness be applied to the U.S. and Iran relationship?   
Could you describe how the potential within the social 
movements in Iran?  
 
 In this hostile relationship in international arena, is there any 
space for the concept of “forgiveness?”  Is there a possibility that 
they can move beyond this antagonistic narrative?  How? 
 
The power of 
imagination 
 How can we generate new options to exit the current impasse in 
the US-Iran relationship? 
 What options to this crisis do you see? 
 What alternative ways of thinking can be implemented?  
 What role can academia play to generate alternatives way of 
thinking and acting?  How? 
 What are the challenges for the implementation of these ideas? 
 Is there a way that we can influence and convince policy makers 
to implement these ideas?   
 
Fusion of 
horizons 
 Is an engagement possible between the U.S. and Iran? 
 How is it possible to change this stagnated paradigm and break 
from its confines? 
 What are the challenges to a meaningful dialogue and 
engagement?  
 Why should they engage, if accusing is easier and beneficial? 
 How is it possible to create new orientation towards 
engagement?   
 
Table One.  Research categories and guiding questions  
 
Timeline for the Research 
 
 The primary research time was between the months of May and November 2008.  
I conducted six conversations with the experts in the field in the United States and two 
conversations in Iran.  My conversation partners are introduced in Table Two, see page 
77.  My trip to Iran was during summer 2008 where I conducted two formal 
conversations with a researcher and freelance journalist and a graduate student in political 
science who have focused extensively on matters related to foreign policy and 
specifically on the US-Iran relationship and are knowledgeable about my research topic.   
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 Prior to my trip to Iran, I made arrangements with four potential candidates in 
Iran, but was only able to have conversations with two of them in the summer of 2008.  
Two government officials did not participate as they initially indicated. 
Research Participants 
The main data for this research were gathered in a total of eight formal research 
conversations with professionals engaged in academia, government agencies, and NGO‟s 
who are involved with the US-Iran conflict.  Since the intent of this research is to provide 
compelling data for policy makers to think about shifting the current antagonistic 
paradigm between the U.S. and Iran, conversations partners were selected based on their 
knowledge and awareness of the US-Iran relationship in the last half of a century in order 
to provide a deeper insight to this research.  I originally proposed certain conversational 
partners, but some changed due to their availability.  Six of my research participants live 
in the U.S. and two live in Iran.  In one way or another, they have been involved with the 
political aspects of the two countries during the last 50 years.  
Name Title Organization Language 
Dr. Abbas Milani Prof. of Iranian Studies 
 
Stanford University CA English 
Dr. William Beeman Prof. of Anthropology 
and Middle Eastern 
Studies 
 
University of 
Minnesota 
 
English 
Dr. Hooshang 
Amirahmadi 
 
Prof. of Planning and 
International 
Development & Director 
of Center for Middle 
Eastern Studies 
State University of 
New Jersey 
English 
Thomas Pickering Ambassador 
 
Retired English 
Dr. Hamid Dabashi Prof. of Iranian Studies 
and Comparative 
Literature 
 
Columbia University 
 
Farsi 
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Dr. Gary Sick Professor of Political 
Science and Iran Expert 
 
Columbia University 
 
English 
Mr. Abbas Abdi Researcher Freelance Journalist 
(Iran) 
 
Farsi 
Mr. Babak M. Graduate Student in 
Political Science 
University of Tehran 
(Iran) 
 
Farsi 
Dr. Michael 
Provence 
Prof. of History University of 
California at San Diego 
 
English 
(informal) 
Table Two.  Chart of official conversation partners. 
 My pilot study conversation partner, Dr. Milani 
at Stanford University, (figure 1) has written extensively 
on the US-Iran relationship.  Abbas Milani is a research 
fellow and co-director of the Iran Democracy Project at 
the Hoover Institution.  In addition, Dr. Milani is the 
Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University and a 
visiting professor in the department of political science 
where I met him for our conversation.  His expertise is 
US-Iran relations and Iranian cultural, political, and security issues. 
Dr. Milani is a former Professor of History and Political Science and Chair of the 
Department at Notre Dame de Namur University and a Research Fellow at the Institute of 
International Studies at the University of California at Berkeley.  Milani also served as an 
Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Law and Political Science at Tehran University and 
was a Member of the Board of Directors of Tehran University's Center for International 
Studies from 1979 to 1987. He was a Research Fellow at the Iranian Center for Social 
Research from 1977 to 1978 and an Assistant Professor at the National University of Iran 
 
Dr. Abbas Milani  
Figure 1 
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from 1975 to 1977.  He is a member of the American Association of Political Science, the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, and the Association of Iranian Studies.  
Dr. William O. Beeman (figure 2) was my second conversation partner.  I talked 
with Beeman during his trip to California in December 2007.  Beeman is Professor and 
Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the 
University of Minnesota.  Beeman‟s research 
includes the language styles and socio-cultural 
patterns in Iran and traditional theatre in 
the Middle East.  He spent time in Iran in order to 
conduct research for his book, Language, Status, 
and Power in Iran.  He also has a very insightful 
second book on Iran, The “Great Satan” vs. the 
“Mad Mullahs.”  This second book not only 
showed his depth of knowledge about Iran, but also was eye opening for me to better 
understand the cultural differences between the United States and Iran.  Currently, his 
research topics are philosophic anthropology and peasant and nomadic societies in the 
Middle East, particularly Iran and the Persian Gulf region.  
 Dr. Hooshang Amirahmadi (figure 3) was my third conversation partner.  
Amirahmadi holds a Ph.D. in planning and international development from Cornell 
University and is a professor of the Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public 
Policy, at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, where we held our conversation.  
Amirahmadi has served as director of the University's Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 
 
Dr. William O. Beeman 
Figure 2 
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as chair and graduate director of his department at the Bloustein School, and as the 
University Coordinator of the Hubert Humphrey Fellowship Program.   
 Amirahmadi is the founder and president of the American Iranian Council (AIC), 
a research and policy think-tank devoted to improving 
dialogue and understanding between the peoples of Iran 
and the United States.  Amirahmadi is also a founder of 
the Center for Iranian Research and Analysis and served 
as director for many years. He was a candidate for 
President in the Nine Presidential Elections in Iran in 
June 2005, but the conservative and religious Guardian 
Council disqualified him for his dual Iranian-American 
citizenship.  He is also the president of Caspian 
Associates, Inc., an international strategic consulting firm headquartered in Princeton. 
 Ambassador Pickering (figure 4) served as U.S. 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and as the 
President of the Eurasia Foundation, a Washington, 
D.C. based organization that makes small grants and 
loans in the new states of the former Soviet Union.  
Ambassador Pickering held the personal rank of Career 
Ambassador, Permanent U.S. Representative to the 
United Nations, the highest in the U.S. Foreign Service 
from March 3, 1989 to May 1992.  I conducted my 
conversation with Pickering over the phone due to his busy travel schedule. 
 
Dr. Hooshang Amirahmadi 
Figure 3 
 
Ambassador Thomas Pickering 
Figure 4 
 
 80 
 Pickering also served as Executive Secretary of the Department of State and 
Special Assistant to Secretaries William P. Rogers and Henry A. Kissinger from 1973 to 
1974.  He is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the Council 
on Foreign Relations.  In a diplomatic career spanning five decades, he has served as U.S. 
Ambassador to the Russian Federation, India, Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.  Ambassador Pickering also served in Zanzibar and Dar 
el Salam, Tanzania.  Pickering visited Iran in the past and currently collaborates with 
American Iranian Council to promote peace and engagement between the U.S. and Iran.  
 My next research participant was Dr. 
Hamid Dabashi (figure 5).  Dabashi is the Hagop 
Kevorkian Professor of Iranian Studies and 
Comparative Literature at Columbia University 
in New York, the oldest and most prestigious 
chair in Iranian Studies.  I met Dabashi in the 
University of Columbia.  He also taught and 
delivered lectures in many North American, 
European, Arab and Iranian universities.  A committed teacher for nearly three decades, 
Professor Dabashi is a public speaker around the globe, a current affair essayist, and a 
staunch anti-war activist.     
 
Dr. Hamid Dabashi 
Figure 5 
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 Another research participant was Dr. Gary 
Sick (figure 6) who was a member of the National 
Security Council during the former President 
Carter‟s administration during the hostage crisis in 
1979-80.  Sick and I spoke together over the phone 
very early one morning.  Sick is an American 
academic and analyst of Middle East affairs, with 
special expertise on Iran, who served on the U.S. 
National Security Council under three presidents.  
He has authored three books and is perhaps best known to the wider public for voicing 
support for elements of the October Surprise Conspiracy theory regarding the Iran 
Hostage Crisis and the 1980 Presidential Election.   
 Sick served on the staff of the National Security Council under presidents Ford, 
Carter, and Reagan, and was the principal White House aide for Persian Gulf affairs from 
1976 to 1981, a period which included the Iranian revolution and the Hostage Crisis.  He 
is currently an adjunct professor of International Affairs at Columbia‟s School of 
International and Public Affairs, and a senior research scholar at SIPA‟s Middle East 
Institute.  In addition to his professional duties, he sits on the board of directors of Human 
Rights Watch, and serves as founding chair of the Advisory Committee of Human Rights 
Watch-Middle East. 
 Abbas Abdi (figure 7) is one of Iran's most influential reformists.  I met with Abdi 
in the privacy of his home in Tehran.  He was the first person to storm the United States 
embassy in Tehran, along with other students, during the early years of the Iranian 
 
Dr. Gary Sick 
Figure 6 
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Revolution in 1979.  In the following years, he 
became a critic of the political establishment of Iran.  
He was a supporter of President Mohammad 
Khatami‟s reform plans, and one of the most 
influential figures in the reformist camp after 1997. 
He ran into legal trouble after the Invasion of Tehran 
University Dormitories in which the police attacked 
the dormitory of the university because of student 
protests following Abdi's article in Salam newspaper. 
Later he conducted a poll asking Iranians if they 
supported resuming government dialogue with the United States. When Abdi and the 
other pollsters pushed results reporting 75% in favor, they were jailed.  Abdi spent 
several years in prison as a result. 
 Mr. Babak (figure 8) was my last 
conversation partner and we met at his house in 
Rasht.  Babak is a graduate student in political 
science at the University of Tehran, with a focus on 
Middle Eastern studies.  He desired to remain 
anonymous throughout this research.  Babak is in 
his last year of his MS program.   
 More information on each participant is provided within the presentation of data 
in Chapter 5.  Sample invitation and thank you letters for the participants are included as 
Appendices B and C.  Consistent with ethnographic research protocols, I anticipated that 
 
Journalist Abbas Abdi 
Figure 7 
 
Mr. Babak 
Figure 8 
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participants might refer me to additional conversation partners.  As these additional 
conversations helped to deepen insight on the research topic at hand, I integrated this data 
into my research. 
Entrée to Iran 
 I traveled to Iran in July and met with my conversation partners in August 2008.  
Because I lived in Iran until 2001, I had the chance to reach my conversation partners 
through former college classmates who live in Iran and helped me to contact these 
experts.  I resided in Tehran for one week in order to conduct and complete my 
conversations.  In addition, I sat in a seminar which was offered during my stay which 
was focused on the US-Iran relationship in the last 50 years.  By attending, I learned 
more about Iranian perspective on the relationship of the two nations.  I also visited the 
former American embassy in Tehran, which became a museum to exhibit the foreign 
interference and is open to the public.     
Language 
Conversations with Dr. Milani, Dr. Beeman, Dr. Amirahmadi, Ambassador 
Pickering, and Dr. Sick were conducted in English.  These conversations were done in 
the U.S.  Conversations with Dr. Dabashi, Mr. Abdi, and Mr. Babak were conducted in 
Farsi, and then translated into English.  For the purpose of accuracy, and the opportunity 
for different ideals, all transcripts were sent to the participants for their review.   
Observations 
 A research journal was kept throughout the research process as a means of 
recording observations, insights, reflections, challenges, and thought developments.  
Herda (1999: 102) notes that any “changes and new understanding recorded by the 
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researcher enrich the text as a whole and give depth to the research project.  The 
researcher‟s log or journal is integrated into the text that gives birth to the matter of the 
text, which in turn unfolds new worlds” or insights that help both researcher and reader to 
develop new understanding.  The journal helped me step back and distance myself from 
the text and appropriate myself to new perspectives developed in the unofficial setting of 
my personal reflection time.  Please refer to Appendix E for my journal of personal 
reflections.     
Summary 
 This summary illustrates the process through which the data were gathered 
through conversations for the research analysis.  Prior to the conversations and upon the 
study of the background of research site and literature review, I developed a set of 
questions related to the hermeneutic theory that could address the less known aspect of 
the US-Iran relationship.  The timeline for research, including entry into Iran and 
interaction with participants, are reflected in the observations section, along with the 
language used to communicate with participants, and the cultural influences of those 
participants.  In the observations section I also reflect on many of the meaningful aspects 
of this interpretive participatory research approach that I might not have experienced in 
more traditional research modalities in American academia.  This section also clarifies 
the experience and the procedure that researchers undergo in an interpretive participatory 
tradition.  The next section introduces step by step the data analysis process in an 
interpretive participatory research process.     
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Data Analysis‟ Process 
Introduction 
 Herda (1999: 98-9) notes that analysis “is a creative and imaginative act.  In data 
analysis the researcher appropriates a proposed world from the text.”  She describes an 
overall plan for data presentation and analysis which results in the creation of three 
overlapping texts.  The first text is formed by the research itself, conversation transcripts, 
the country background and literature review.  Presentation and analysis of data create the 
second and third round of texts that are generated by the researcher.  Ultimately, the 
analysis of my research conversations creates a two stage process of understanding the 
problem differently and appropriating a new vantage point.  In this section I set the stage 
for data presentation and analysis, the pilot study, and the researchers‟ background. 
Setting the Stage for Data Analysis 
Fix the discourse by transcribing recorded conversation 
Recorded conversations were transcribed as soon as possible after each 
conversation to create a text.  This text distanced the researcher and his reflections were 
recorded in the research journal.  Review of the text and my research journal allowed me 
to appropriate myself to the text and many times I reached a new understanding.   
Pull out significant statement, develop themes and place them within categories 
 The text created from the conversations was reviewed, noting significant issues 
and categorized according to the research categories initially proposed.  Revisions 
indicated by the analysis were made.   
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Substantiate the themes 
 In order to create a faithful reflection, the research conversations were recorded 
and were transcribed.  These quotes were cross referenced with the data from the country 
background, literature review, and political narratives and analyzed under the research 
categories to provide insights.   
Examine the themes from a theoretical perspective 
 The convergence of theoretical themes and research categories are noted in order 
to analyze the patterns and perspectives between the data observations, outside 
documentation, and personal log regarding the issue of mistrust between the United 
States and Iran. 
Provide opportunity for continued conversation with participants  
 Each participant was provided with a copy of the text created by the conversation 
along with a brief analysis to allow the participants to understand how the text was 
understood by the researcher and allowing them the opportunity to comment. 
This created an occasion to have second or third conversation with some of participants. 
Set a context for the written discussion 
 The context of the discussion included political, cultural, historical aspects of 
Iranian society and the United States‟ and Iran‟s relationship.  Sometimes, the personal 
background stories of participants shed light on the research topic. 
Discuss the grouping of themes 
  Since all research categories were related to overlapping aspects of the research 
topic, themes that surface from the data fitted within more than one research category.  
Research categories that best fit the research topic were chosen first.  Then, appropriate 
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questions were designed within each category that helped the progress and development 
of conversation and creation of text.  The goal was to create themes and sub-themes that 
shed light on the research topic on a theoretical level which could best help understanding 
of the research problem. 
Discuss the research problem at a theoretical level 
 To prepare for a secondary analysis, relevant theoretical concepts from critical 
hermeneutic theory that applied to my research were chosen and developed.  The 
theoretical foundations, data, and studies related to research topic were interwoven 
together and discussed at theoretical level to create a narrative.    
Find the implications for new insights and direction 
 Implications relating to the understanding of the US-Iran past history, their 
current status, alternative thinking, the possibility of finding common ground, paradigm 
shift, and taking new course of action were raised as appropriate to the participants 
throughout the course of this research study.  As the reflective process brought new 
insights, implications emerged.    
Bring out those aspects of the study that merit further study 
 Since the research on the subject of post-modern US-Iran conflict was exploratory 
and hermeneutic in nature, it was expected that additional issues would come to the 
surface which merited further study and discovery.  These new findings could open new 
directions for further research.  
Give example of learning experiences and fusion of horizon 
 Participatory research in a critical hermeneutic tradition can be described as a 
learning experience for both researcher and participants.  They interact and discuss the 
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research topic in a context which may provide them new insights.  Throughout this 
process, the horizon of both researcher and participants are expanded.  As new 
understandings emerge, these new lessons will be highlighted to stimulate imaginative 
implications and illustrate reconfiguration of new course of action.  These new 
understandings are noted in the data analysis section below in Chapter Six. 
Pilot Study 
 
 No matter what field of study I start in higher education, my research always 
returns to the enduring question of non-discourse, or worse outright enmity, between my 
homeland of Iran and my adopted home of the United States.  It is rational that my study 
and initial pilot of my research topic are aimed less toward the preemptive containment 
policy of „power politics‟ espoused by Huntington (1993) and more toward the refiguring 
narrative of „a dialogue among civilizations‟ of Khatami (2000).   
 Propelled as I am by my background of growing up during the Iranian Revolution 
and the subsequent years of internal upheaval and external hot and cold relations with the 
United States, it was no surprise to find myself on the manicured grounds of Stanford 
University one sunny October day in 2007 to meet with Dr. Abbas Milani, the resident 
Iranian specialist and my first conversation partner.  Milani first came to my attention as I 
researched the need for a paradigm shift between the U.S. and Iran.  His article, Win-Win 
U.S. Strategy for Dealing with Iran, caught my attention and I soon discovered he taught 
at nearby Stanford.  I spent the week before our meeting devouring and then dissecting 
his book, Lost Wisdom, where Milani credits the Persian legacy of poets and intellectuals 
as having created an early national background of openness to „others‟ and the adoption 
of the ideals of freedom and democracy, the same basic principals on which the United 
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States was later formed.  In his book, Milani claimed the two countries share a wisdom 
that has been lost.   
  As Herda (1999: 127) notes “in telling a story about the transcriptions and the 
experiences of data collection, the point is to discover a plot.”  The plot of the master 
narrative between Milani and myself involved the questions his book provoked in me, 
questions based on the thought that lost wisdom might be found.  Imbedded in the idea of 
wisdom is the idea of something old, something founding, a tradition that can be handed 
down, and a language to live by.  However, without a retelling, traditions can be lost.  
Milani stressed that there are two narratives; the leadership of each state and the narrative 
of the people.   
 Milani‟s comments reinforced Ricoeur‟s (1992) description of the relationship 
between self and other where the actions of „self‟ influences the „other‟s‟ reaction and 
creates a dialectic between the two.  I considered Banisadr, the first president of the 
Islamic Republic (1981), and his claim that the extreme right wings of both countries 
help each other by the antagonistic positions that they took to demonize the other.  For 
example, when President Bush places Iran in the „axis of evil,‟ President Ahmadinejad 
calls the U.S. the „Great Satan,‟ thus perpetuating antagonistic dialectic.  Milani thought 
Ricouer was absolutely right and mentioned that our “behavior toward whoever the 
interlocutor is helps create the reality ….  I think it is absolutely correct that the radicals, 
the dedicated radicals here in this country and in Iran, want the war” and create an 
antagonistic reality.   
With Milani describing the official sides of the two countries, I wondered if there 
was hope for moderation in their ideologies.  Milani said we can‟t change the minds of 
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radicals who are absolutely certain about their own beliefs, but we can lessen the damage 
“and the way you can do this is to minimize the chance that the radicals would have their 
day, where the voice of reason and moderation will win out, …  It is hard, but it can be 
done.  If it can be done in anywhere, it can be done in a democracy.” 
 The transcription of my conversation about wisdom, people and leaders‟ 
narratives, and the bi-polar demonizing myth of „self and other‟ with Milani unfolded a 
new perspective on the power of action.  I saw how Milani was very passionate about the 
idea that every one of our actions counts to either agitate or calm reactions from our 
„other‟ because of our interconnectedness with one another.  This reminds me of how 
much potential every single narrative, including mine, has in offering alternatives to the 
master narratives of the leaders in the two nations.  This learning experience encouraged 
me to continue my research in hope for fulfilling my personal responsibility as a citizen.   
During the pilot study, I faced the reality of having a professional conversation 
with an expert in the field and found myself uneasy at the beginning.  Before going to 
meet with Milani, I read two of his books and several articles to prepare appropriate 
questions.  However, I though I spent too much time introducing each question because I 
was fearful in facing this expert.  After this conversation, what I realized was that a 
conversation could be conducted with questions without large introductions.  If I gave up 
control over the way the conversation went, then there would be room for a truer fusion 
of horizon. 
For the Institutional Review Board of Protection of Human Subjects‟ permission, 
and the complete transcriptions of all research conversations please refer respectively to 
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Appendices A and D.  For the research conversation‟s questions, refer to Table one in the 
section labeled Research Protocol for Data Collection. 
Researcher Background 
Some background information may help my reader may better understand why I 
came to pursue this research topic.  I believe the socio-political changes in Iran in the late 
1970s and early 1980s shaped my identity.  I was born and raised in Iran.  As a child, I 
witnessed the Iranian revolution in 1979.  The revolution brought a new reality into 
Iranian lives.  The dramatic change of power in the government, the conflict between 
different factions within the revolutionary government, the execution of the opposing 
groups by the new Islamic government, the Iran-Iraq war, and the socio-political and 
cultural changes shaped my personality.  They created significant experiences for me as 
an adolescent.  There was turmoil in the society and everybody‟s life was affected by the 
events.  Those who opposed or disagreed with changes became the victims of the 
ideological government.  People experienced pain by the new reality.  Reflecting on 
others‟ pain became the substance of my life.  I am more sensitive to my surroundings.   
After high school and during the Iran-Iraq war, I fulfilled my military service for 
two years.  In the last month of my service, I was injured by a landmine and hospitalized 
for three months.  For a period of six months, I used a wheelchair to move.  Then, I was 
on crutches for almost two years.  My healing process lasted almost three years.  I 
directly, and my family indirectly, suffered from this unjust war.  I can imagine the 
suffering of all humans who experience directly or indirectly from military conflicts.  My 
healing process was a long period of reflection upon the inhuman aspects of politics 
where the suffering of people is not considered.  I realized the uselessness of that conflict 
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for Iranians and Iraqis.  People on both sides were affected from those eight long years of 
conflict.  The healing process helped me to realize that conflicts bring more suffering 
than they heal.  Perhaps, this was the main reason I became interested in this research 
topic.  I realized awareness is the best way to oppose unwanted conflicts. 
In 1992, I won a scholarship from the Italian embassy in Iran and went to Italy to 
study language and culture.  Upon my return to Iran in 1994, I entered the University of  
Tehran and started a bachelor program in Italian Studies.  In 2000, I won a scholarship 
from the Italian embassy in Iran and attended the Department of Cultural Studies at the 
University of Siena, Italy, for four months.  In 2001, I moved to the U.S.  Upon my 
arrival in San Diego, I taught Italian language at University of California at San Diego for 
a year.  In 2002, I was admitted to the Italian Graduate Program at University of 
California at Los Angeles and finished my Masters in 2004.  I began my doctoral 
program at University of San Francisco in 2006, where I finally returned to my original 
passion, focusing on the topic of my interest, and fulfilling my ethical responsibility to be 
an advocate of peace and non-violence as opposed to the policy of military intervention 
to resolve a dispute. 
Summary  
Since the antagonistic narratives worsened the situation between the United States 
and Iran in the last three decades, this research is an attempt to provide an alternative 
approach to deal with the crisis between the two nations.  Geertz (2005) notes that people 
need to change their way of thinking in dealing with international crisis in a post modern 
world.  The orientation of finding quick solutions will not solve complex problems.  Both 
the military intervention mentality and the “either with us or without us” orientation used 
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by President George Bush in his State of Union address in 2002 proved to be ineffective 
in the last 30 years of dealing with a complex case such as the relationship between the 
U.S. and Iran.  A critical hermeneutical approach, which is grounded on the 
understanding of the other, may result in a better alternative.  This new approach, 
however, requires willingness to engage with the other, respect, patience, consistency, 
and most importantly forgiveness.  As Milani indicated in his conversation with me, both 
countries have these values in their traditions; therefore, they have the potential to recall 
them in this difficult time.  As Milani shared his story with me, I thought about Kearney 
and his concept of “life as narrative.”  Kearney (2002: 133) notes, “life is always on the 
way to narrative, but it does not arrive there until someone hears and tells this life as a 
story.”  In my next Chapter, I introduce the stories of my other seven research 
participants who shed light on different aspects of the US-Iran relationship and raise 
possibilities for alternative stories to tell. 
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CHAPTER V 
DATA PRESENTATION AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
In addition to the pilot study conversation introduced earlier, in this Chapter I 
present seven other formal conversation partners who contributed to this research.  
Located in two different parts of the world, the United States and Iran, these experts 
provide a unique perspective on my research topic, new insights regarding the unknown 
aspects of this quarrel, and participation in the process of text creation.  The purpose of 
these conversations with experts was to create a forum where different issues between the 
U.S. and Iran could be discussed.  As Herda (1999: 129) notes “solving problems 
requires discussion and conversation with others to reach a conclusion grounded in action 
about what things mean and the way things are done.”  Throughout these conversations, 
there were themes that were developed which are presented here in the form of vignettes 
using the themes of post-modern complexity and lack of understanding, Iranian narrative 
identity, political culture as the structural problem to prevent relationship development, 
the necessity of dialogue, the dilemma of the Islamic Republic, and the need for 
leadership.  These themes relate to my research categories, which are mimesis, founding 
events, forgiveness, narrative identity, the power of imagination, and the fusion of 
horizon, and guide this chapter as presented under each title. 
Post-Modern Conflict and the Lack of Understanding 
My conversation with Dr. William O. Beeman focused on the post-modern 
characteristic of the US-Iran conflict.  I came to learn about Beeman (2002, 2005, 2006) 
by reading his articles Iran And The United States-A Case Study In Postmodern Culture 
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Conflict, Rafsanjani Victory Probable, But Not Certain, In Iran‟s Real Election, How To 
Talk The Talk With Iran, and his book (2005) The “Great Satan” Vs. the “Mad 
Mullahs.”  I soon learned that Beeman spent time in Iran to conduct his research, the 
result of which became his earlier book (1986) Language, Status, and Power in Iran.  I 
believed his familiarity with Iranian culture, his cultural awareness, and his continuous 
research on Iran made him a prime conversation partner.  Therefore, I contacted him 
through his personal blog and he promptly answered and agreed to have a conversation 
with me about my research topic.  Our conversation covered a range of themes from the 
post-modern characteristics of this conflict and founding events as the basis for the wall 
of mistrust between the two countries which caused the rise of hard-liners and their 
discourse as the dominant course of action in the narrative identity of the two countries.  
Other themes included the lack of respect in dealing with each other, misunderstanding of 
the other which created a restricted paradigm, and the rise of Iranian youth as potential in 
Iran who, with their sympathy for the western world including the U.S., may be able to 
bridge the differences between the two countries and ease a possible engagement.   
 In our conversation, Beeman called the US-Iran tension a post modern crisis of 
complex non dialogue and indirect relationships damaging both nations.  He stated: 
The reason I called this a post-modern conflict, is that because of the nature of the 
communication between the United States and Iran, we actually don‟t talk to each 
other.  Everything is done through the media, through public discourse, rather 
than any kind of direct talk, or direct negotiation.  
 
The lack of dialogue in the US-Iran relationship has caused the two sides to communicate 
from a stance of nationalism and mainly through the public arena of media.  When I 
further asked Beeman how he sees the daily harsh rhetoric between the two nations, he 
explained that a sense of national pride did not allow either side to have flexibility 
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towards the other which is needed in negotiating sessions.  As a result, the fear of looking 
soft pushed the officials of the two nations to use harsh language in order to look tough to 
their constituencies on their respective national stages.  The result has been the rise of a 
negative mode of communication and ultra-complexity of the cultures which caused the 
loss of opportunities in the past three decades.  From a geopolitical view, after the fall of 
the Shah, the United States lost a very strategic and important ally in the Persian Gulf.  
From an economical perspective, American companies are banned from participating in 
vast Iranian projects.  On the Iranian side, Iran became almost an isolated country in the 
international scene and underwent many sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the UN 
Security Council, which caused Iran‟s economy to deteriorate in the past three decades.   
During my conversation with Beeman, we discussed the ineffectiveness of the 
policy of containment and non-dialogue with Iran.  He emphasized that “you absolutely 
can not do anything with anybody in Iran until you have a relationship with them.  …  
And if you are ghahr with somebody, you don‟t talk to them directly, but you do all this 
sort of accusations, you know, and you never get together.”  To emphasize the 
ineffectiveness of the policy of containment and non-dialogue as a punishment for the 
Islamic Republic, Beeman concluded that “I would think that nothing is going to happen 
until we are in a situation that we establish some kind of relationship with each other.”  
To explain his rationale, Beeman referred to how the lack of direct dialogue hindered the 
comprehension of the real issues between the two states and the officials of the two 
countries only ended up condemning and demonizing each other through the media. 
One cause for the policy of non-dialogue comes from the negative image derived 
from the historical events in the relationship of the two countries.  When we talked about 
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the 1953 CIA coup and the 1979 hostage crisis, Beeman pointed out that these “two 
events are very interesting, because if you play them side by side, you see that each of 
these two events actually embodies the same crime and that is the violation of national 
sovereignty.”  Both Iranians and Americans feel their national sovereignty was abused by 
the other.  Iranians felt that their democracy was stolen with the help of the U.S. coup as 
the Shah eliminated opposition groups and Americans felt diplomatic relations were 
disdained and abused by the hostage crisis.  These events had negative influences in the 
historical memory of Iranians and Americans and became “founding events” in 
accordance with Ricoeur‟s (1996) definition.   
These founding events, then, became the foundation for antagonistic discourse 
between the two countries.  Hardliners in each county began to condemn and demonize 
the other which escalated the problem to a much larger scale dispute.  In this text, since 
the focus is more on the U.S., I asked Beeman if he had any insight on the American 
discourse towards Iran.  As Beeman explained, in the United States, hardliners “are trying 
to say that anybody who wants to treat Iran as an equal partner in a dialogue is somehow 
to be attacked.  This is precisely the government line for the neo-conservatives.”  
Through their influence in the media and based on the negative image making, hardliners 
encourage American policy makers and institutions to continue a hostile discourse in 
dealing with Iran.  Organizations such as “American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee or 
AIPAC… [is] certainly one of the major founding sources for these individuals who are 
trying very hard to convince the U.S. government to take a hostile posture with regard to 
Iran.”  This kind of approach creates a short sighted paradigm where the wall of mistrust 
grows taller between the two countries.   
 98 
The firmness and inflexibility of groups such as AIPAC represents the notion of 
firmness in national identity or what Ricoeur (1992: 124) calls the notion of idem identity 
in the concept of narrative identity, where the “permanence in time” element of identity 
prevails over the more flexible and change-oriented element of national identity.  In the 
last three decades, this groups‟ firmness of position blocked any attempt for the 
resolution of the issue between the two states.  Under this circumstance, Ricoeur (1992: 
3) continues, as “long as one remains within the circle of sameness-identity [idem], the 
otherness of the other than self offers nothing original.”  As long as the United States 
demonizes the Islamic Republic, the Iranians will not be ready to embrace even positive 
moves by the United States.  As a result of this approach, the two countries remained in 
the phase of hostility for almost 30 years and, as Beeman emphasized, “I would think that 
nothing is going to happen until we are in a situation that we establish some kind of 
relationship with each other,” to promote change and open a line for a dialogue. 
The result of a hostile discourse and non-dialogue with Iran was an approach 
based on a misunderstanding of Iran among American leaders and policy makers.  The 
lack of dialogue prevented a meaningful understanding of Iran‟s motivations behind its 
actions.  This misunderstanding caused the U.S. to approach Iran with a Cold War 
mentality and to seek regime change in Iran.  The American leaders concluded that by 
imposing difficult condition on Iranians, they might break down the country and cause a 
pro-American uprising.  Beeman explained: 
I think the problem is that the United States government has a very simplistic 
view ….  They know that the young people in Iran and Iranian population have 
generally a positive view of American culture.  But, they assume, because the 
Iranian population is favorable towards the United States therefore, they are going 
to be susceptible to calls on the part of the United States to overthrow their own 
government.  This is one of the very simplistic things that the American officials 
 99 
have been trying to promulgate.  For instance, they think if Iran can be shocked 
by- for example dropping bombs- this is one of the things that they thought about 
it, or if Iranian people can be made uncomfortable enough through economic 
sanctions, they will rise up and overthrow the clerical establishment.  Now, I 
heard this from many, many American officials, and every time I hear this I am 
amazed frankly by the stupidity of this scenario.  These are people, who don‟t 
know anything about how the Iranian government is constructed, or how the 
Iranian constitution works, and the idea that somehow you make people miserable 
and then they rise up and overthrow their leaders as a result, is an extremely 
foolish notion.  The Iranian people may not always like their leaders, but they 
love their country.  When you love your country, even if you don‟t like your 
leaders, you try to improve things; you don‟t try to destroy things.   
     
This, Beeman suggested, is why the United States implementation of regime change 
policy and sanctions against the Islamic Republic did not result in an uprising of Iranians 
against their government.  The misunderstanding of how the Islamic Republic works and 
the ineffectiveness of U.S. policies became clear as the Islamic Republic survived the 
chaotic post-revolutionary era, came out of an eight year bloody war with Iraq, survived 
the American sanctions and regime change policy, gained experience in the regional and 
international arena in how to deal with challenges, and became a more influential country 
in the region.    
 To change this negative dynamic, Beeman expressed that a respectful approach 
and appropriate language for the other must be restored between the two states.  In his 
belief, “whereas the United States and Iran both agree on the need for respect, they don‟t 
agree on each party deserving respect from the other.”  This mentality creates a common 
hostile rhetoric where, as Beeman (2005) notes, the Iranian side frequently called the 
U.S. the “Great Satan” and where the Americans treated Iranians as “Mad Mullahs.”  To 
prevent further damage and reduce the current tensions between the two states, Beeman 
emphasized, “one important point in trying to improve the relationship between the 
United States and Iran is to establish an ethic of mutual respect between the two 
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countries.”  Here, he continued, the effort should be to use a respectful language in order 
to establish a collaborative communication channel:   
If you read my earlier book, Language, Status, and Power in Iran, you see that 
my point about how language is used in Iran and in Iranian discourse is that one 
of the things that is the hallmark of discourse in Iran is the ability to reframe an 
argument.  Specially the ability to reframe a social situation, so it becomes more 
formal or less formal, more „baten‟ and less „zaher,‟ this is a very great ability on 
the part of Persian speakers. 
 
The complexity of the Iranian way of communication requires a deep understanding of 
how they convey their message and how they receive messages from others.  Intimidating 
rhetoric used by Americans proved to be ineffective in scaring their Iranian counterpart, 
and only proved to be damaging.  For example, the pre-conditions that the U.S. imposes 
before the beginning of any talks with Iran is only one ineffective way of communication 
which hurts the Iranians sense of pride and makes them more resistant in their standings 
with the U.S.  Ahmad and Forst (2005: 9) argue that “progress is impossible without 
respectful dialogue,” and respect is shown by the way the parties interact with each other.  
In the US-Iran relationship, as Beeman advocated, the only legitimate way to deal with 
Iran is to use an ethic of respect towards the other without imposing any pre-conditions.  
I finished my conversation with Beeman with a sense of the immediate need to 
develop a better understanding of Iran and to approach it differently.  As he noted, the 
lack of direct communication and interaction in the last 30 years created an environment 
where Iran has not been understood correctly.  To break down this non-dialogue and 
misunderstanding, immediate talks should occur between the two states.     
To begin talks, however, there is a need to review the past relationship and 
understand it thoroughly in order to find out the areas of misunderstandings and the areas 
of potentials that may help the realization of a new course of action.  To review the past, I 
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reframed my questions for my next conversation partner in a way to gain more historical 
insight about the US-Iran relationship.   
Iranian narrative identity 
 My next conversation partner was Dr. Hooshang Amirahmadi.  I learned about 
Amirahmadi (2007) when I read his report on the US-Iran relationship called In Search 
Of Understanding and Dialogue.  Later, I discovered that Amirahmadi is a prominent 
academic who seeks engagement through dialogue between the United States and Iran.  
Most importantly, I found out that Amirahmadi did not settle for discussing this dispute 
on a theoretical level in academic setting, but has taken action by establishing an 
organization, the American Iranian Counsel, to lobby leaders and policy makers in both 
the U.S. and Iran for a possible engagement.  Learning more about him on the American 
Iranian Counsel and his personal website and by reading his articles led me to contact 
Amirahmadi because I believed he would be a meaningful conversation partner due to his 
theoretical and practical activity.  He promptly answered and agreed to participate in a 
conversation with me, which illustrated his readiness for taking action in any process 
which may lead to a possible step towards engagement.       
 My conversation with Amirahmadi provided a historical perspective on why 
Iranians behave a certain way in dealing with the United States.  It is his belief that even 
though the American and Iranian governments had a fair relationship prior to the 1953, 
when Americans provided aid and assistance to the Iranian government, the dynamics of 
the relationship in the Iranian view changed dramatically after the CIA coup.  
Amirahmadi mentioned that the “coup certainly marked a new era in US-Iran and 
American-Iranian relations.”  This change was due to the unconditional U.S. post-coup 
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support for the monarchy in Iran, even though the king abused his power and oppressed 
and executed the opposition groups.  Amirahmadi explained that during: 
the era of the Shah, Iranians were not very much interested in US-Iran relations 
because they felt that the relations were not equitable or fair, that is relations were 
not seen as based on a solid, mutual-benefit ground.  People were concerned that 
the Shah‟s government was not a legitimate government being that the U.S. had 
imposed that government on the Iranian people and the country through the 1953 
coup against the democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossaddeq.   
 
 This unconditional support for the Shah from 1953 to 1979 changed the 
perspectives of Iranians about the U.S.  In this period, the United States was seen as a 
country with its own agenda such as fighting communism and stopping its influence in 
the region by supporting Shah against it.  To do so, however, the U.S. ignored any wrong 
doing of the monarch such as the oppression of opposition groups in his domestic policy, 
which fueled an anti-American narrative in Iran.  Amirahmadi noted: 
With the coup, the U.S. and Iran entered into the second period in US-Iran 
relations.  During this period, while the governments came increasingly closer to 
each other as allies, the Iranian people became much more anti-American.  During 
the Cold War years, the younger Iranians, the more radical Iranians, and the more 
nationalistic Iranians, religious and secular, became increasingly anti-American.  
… America for the first time entered the Iranian political culture as an imperialist 
power bent on exploiting and dominating the country.  After the coup, it was not 
just the Communists who were anti-American, but also an absolute majority in the 
nation.  That was a major change in the US-Iran relationship. 
 
The United States, which had been seen as a progressive country that helped Iran in the 
first half of the 20
th
 century, now became the figure of an arrogant foreign force in Iran.  
This conceptual development in the Iranian mind aligns with what Edward Said (1994) 
called the notion of the United States as an imperialistic country in the Middle East.  
Previously, Britain and Russia, with their political games in Iran, were considered as 
imperialistic figures.  Now, it was the United States who replaced these previous super 
powers.  As a result, an Iran that potentially could have remained a friendly country 
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instead became distinctly anti-American.  These developments led the opposition groups 
to sharpen their criticism of the Shah and the U.S., and to come into the streets of Iran to 
protest against these two figures during 1978.   
Once Iranians realized the assistance and unconditional support of the United 
States for the Iranian monarch, anti-Americanism became a part of their protest.  
Amirahmadi pointed out that  
The revolution in 1979 had basically two goals.  One was to fight the dictatorship 
of the Shah and to establish democracy, and the other one was to fight the 
domination of America and create an independent Iran.  Freedom and 
independence were the two slogans of the revolution.  Independence was directed 
toward the U.S. domination and freedom was directed toward the dictatorship of 
the Shah.  That is how the Iranian revolution became very much integrated into 
this idea of anti-Americanism that preceded it. 
 
The political oppression imposed by Shah and ignored by the U.S., the memory of the 
1953 coup, the 1964 immunity act for the U.S. military personnel in Iran approved by 
Shah, and the Shah‟s exploitation of the Iranian traditional culture created a strong anti-
Shah wave with a taste of anti-Americanism among Iranians.  The revolution and the 
defeat of the Shah and his main supporter, then, gave Iranians a sense of pride in their 
new found independence.  As Amirahmadi explained, from an impartial perspective, the 
Iranian revolution and its anti-U.S. rhetoric may be interpreted as a move by a nation in 
search of its freedom from a dictator and independence from a dominant foreign force.   
Amirhmadi stressed the anti-American narrative reached its peak when Iranian 
revolutionaries took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran, which was the beginning of open 
hostility between the two states.  Iranians saw the 1979 admittance of the Shah into the 
United States for medical treatment as another attempt by the U.S. and Shah to re-
establish the dictatorship and they feared another occurrence similar to the 1953 coup 
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plot.  This interpretation motivated the extreme elements of the revolutionaries to move 
from anti-American rhetoric into anti-American action.  Amirahmadi pointed out: 
A turning point in the post-revolution came when the young Islamic radicals took 
American diplomats and embassy employees in Tehran hostage for 444 days. 
Subsequent developments simply reinforced the hostility and created a situation 
between the U.S. and Iran that I have in a few places called "a spiral conflict;” a 
conflict that regenerates itself, a conflict that grows even when the two sides try to 
be nice to each other.  
 
Americans looked at the hostage crisis as the violation of international law against their 
sovereignty by Iranians and this is the source of their hostility towards the Islamic 
Republic.  The subsequent events only increased the tension between the two countries.  
On one hand, Iran‟s holding of the hostages for 444 days, the increase in the Anti-
American rhetoric, the use of anti-Israeli rhetoric as a close ally of the U.S., and the 
Iranian support for Islamic groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas in the region increased 
the Americans doubt about the nature of the regime in Iran.  On the other hand, events 
such as the failed hostage rescue mission conducted by the Carter administration, support 
for Saddam Hussein during Iran-Iraq war, policy of regime change towards Iran, and the 
U.S. led multi-level sanctions against Iran have increased the level of antagonism against 
the U.S. among Iranians, resulting in what Amirahmadi calls a spiral conflict. 
 However in late 1990s, after years of antagonism, there was a change in discourse 
within the Islamic Republic in how to deal with the rest of the world.  Iranians illustrated 
their willingness for a change by choosing the former reformist President Mohammad 
Khatami into office in 1997.  Amirahmadi looked at this moderation as a potential that 
still exists in Iran.  He noted: 
Today, the pro- and anti-Americans are in the minority while a large majority has 
developed a more nuanced position about the U.S.  They are neither for nor 
against the U.S.  They want to have good relations with the U.S., a relationship 
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that benefits both nations.  I must also add that the Iranian people have, as a 
whole, become more positive about the West.  They do not think of the West or 
the U.S. in terms of imperialism and the like categories as in the past, and have, 
generally, a positive view of the global community.  They like Europeans, 
Canadians, Americans, Latin Americans, and everybody else. 
 
As the Iranian population is still young and in search for a better democracy and a better 
relationship with the rest of the world, including the United States, they represent a vast 
potential that exists in Iran.  The positive tendency of Iranian youth towards the West 
should be looked at as an asset that needs careful attention among the policy makers and 
leaders in the U.S.  As Beeman (2005) notes, this generation will enter in the Iranian 
socio-political scene in the next five to ten years.  By taking an inclusive approach, this 
young generation could be developed as an asset for collaboration in the future.   
Based on the potentials in the Iranians‟ society, Amirahmadi suggests that the 
way to deal with Iran is to work on mutual interest and expand understanding instead of 
focusing on the differences.  The current hostility is the result of the last three decades of 
antagonism and harsh rhetoric between the two governments.  Amirahmadi emphasized 
the importance of working on mutual interests:  
They should stay more with the issues that bond them rather than the issues that 
divide them.  If they begin to do these things, I think the relationship can quickly 
improve.  I said it quickly improves because the infrastructure for improvement is 
there; the people are not hostile to each other in the two countries, the 
governments are.  So, the infrastructure of the people is healthy.  The market is 
there, the investment opportunity is there, the economical opportunities are there.  
All kinds of opportunities for cooperation and coordination … are there. 
 
Even common sense tells us that a policy of rapprochement, instead of 30 years of 
containment, may be more effective in dealing with Iran.  The question remains as to 
whether the United States is willing to use common sense in dealing with Iran.  In one of 
his presidential rallies in Pennsylvania on October 29, 2008, now President Obama 
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expressed his commitment to implement reason in the U.S. foreign policy arena in 
dealing with other countries.  He said he would change the dominant ideological basis of 
the current U.S. foreign policy into a common sense policy.  If he implements his 
campaign promises and if his understanding of “common sense” translates to the same 
approach advocated by the experts in this study: to soften the language, use respect, 
engage rather than antagonize; then the potential for a positive response exists in Iran.  
The missing part is to implement the common sense to have a dialogue, bridge the 
differences, and engage in order to benefit from a mutual relationship.   
 Amirahmadi‟s brief review of the past history of the two countries‟ relationship 
hopefully helps us better understand the development of hostility between the two states 
in the past 55 years.  This review of the past for a new understanding aligns with 
Ricoeur‟s (1984: 54) notion of mimesis where he says “[w]e are following therefore the 
destiny of a prefigured time that becomes a refigured time through the mediation of a 
configured time.”  By reading Amirahmadi‟s story, there may be a new understanding of 
the past with a look at the possibilities for the future which may lead us to end up in a 
better course of action in the present.   
At this point, however, the question remains as to why the two countries cannot 
change the current hostile narrative as Amirahmadi proposed.  The story of my next 
conversation partner, Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, addresses the cause of this 
hostility. Pickering pointed out the necessary action to go beyond this current hostile 
narrative to reach a common ground.   
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Domestic politics, forgiveness, and courageous leaders 
 I learned about Pickering through my third conversation partner Amirahmadi.  
After my conversation with Amirahmadi, I translated two of his articles from Farsi into 
English and developed a working relationship with him.  During that period, I asked him 
if he knew anybody who could share their insights on the US-Iran relationship with me.  
Amirahmadi introduced me to the former Ambassador Pickering and arranged my contact 
with him, which I followed up by sending an email and requesting a conversation about 
my research topic.  Pickering kindly accepted my request and I sent him a set of guiding 
questions for his review prior to our conversation.  During our conversation, there were 
themes that emerged as I tried to deepen my understanding of this crisis between the two 
countries.  The themes included domestic politics as a barrier for engagement, 
forgiveness and trust building as necessary components to move beyond the current 
hostility, and courageous leaders as necessary for shifting the paradigm. 
 One of the reasons why the two countries have remained in this antagonistic 
paradigm may derive from the restricted parameters within which the leaders of the two 
countries perform.  Pickering pointed out that the leaders of the two countries have been 
prisoners of their own domestic political framework.  He said: 
I think a lot of it had to do with the political environment inside each country.  To 
some extent, the reluctance of the leadership in each country to take a chance 
within the context of that political environment of making a forward move that 
would be seen perhaps as being weakness in the face of the confrontation with the 
other.  [These leaders worried] whether in fact the other country was truly ready 
to take some forward steps or was only seeking to use engagement as a way of 
perhaps levering from the other side more concessions rather than being 
genuinely interested to find a win-win agreement.  In these kinds of cases the fact 
that is certain is that to make progress both sides have to find the way to make 
concessions.  … leaders don‟t like to take the risk that they would get involved in 
a situation making concessions, the end result to which would be all the benefits 
for the other side and no benefit for them.     
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Under this circumstance, leaders chose not to risk exposure, but rather to demonize the 
other and gain political popularity within their constituencies rather than recognizing the 
legitimacy of the other and go against the political norm in their respective countries.  
Pickering continued, saying this dilemma “is in fact something that becomes an 
emotional issue which tends to stand in the way of reality and maybe an ability to use 
diplomacy to achieve national interests as opposed to merely being a kind of resistant 
party in a set of difficulties.”  In the US-Iran case, Pickering‟s point is clear.   
For instance, during his presidential campaign, when President Obama announced 
he would sit down with Iranian leaders to negotiate and advocated that leaders should talk 
even to their enemies, he was criticized sharply by both parties in Washington as being 
naïve in his approach towards Iran.  As a result, in his first press conference as the 
president elect in November 7, 2008, when he was asked to respond to the congratulatory 
letter for his election from the Iranian president, he followed the established norm of 
creating pre-conditions to discourse, quoting the need for Iran to agree to “no nuclear 
weapon development [for Iran and] a cessation of aiding terrorist groups” (Cillizza, 2008: 
1).  Although there is no solid proof about Iran‟s development of nuclear weapons or 
their support for terrorist groups, this language struck me as accusatory and reminded me 
of the antagonistic rhetoric we have heard from leaders over the past 30 years.  If this is 
Obama‟s pattern, then the opportunities may be ignored again.  The power of the political 
establishment caught in the prevailing paradigm seems to restrict even Obama, who 
presents himself as a messenger of change, if his first press conference as president elect 
was any indication of his approach.  The question is if there is a real possibility for 
changing this hostile paradigm.   
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A level of forgiveness may be necessary before this paradigm could be shifted.  
Pickering described the role of forgiveness as an important and positive move forward 
from antagonism to engagement: 
I think an ability to accept apology and an ability to accept the sense that the other 
side recognizes that it might have made a mistake is the beginning of forgiveness.  
…  It is also true that at least, in some societies, being able to put historical 
barriers behind one by in fact having a conversation about regret, apology, and 
change are all part of the process.   
 
After the passage of time and as the wounds of hostile actions lose their strength within 
the historical memory of nations, opportunity grows for the parties involved in a conflict 
to forgive the other.  Obama‟s advocacy for change creates an encouraging atmosphere 
for forgiveness.  Enough time may have passed to allow both Iran and the U.S. to forgive 
what happened.  This hopeful atmosphere, however, has not always existed. 
 In Pickering‟s opinion, forgiveness is one of the more difficult responsibilities 
that leaders shoulder, for, as Ricoeur (1996: 11) describes:  “forgiving is not the exercise 
of an easily granted forgiveness – that which once again is reduced to forgetfulness – but 
the difficult practice of responding to a request for forgiveness.”  Obama will need to be 
ready to recognize every opportunity, direct or indirect, which may come his way.  For 
example, the Iranian president‟s congratulatory letter to president elect Obama could be 
interpreted as a way for putting the past behind and opening up new possibilities.  If 
Obama does not acknowledge this letter and refuses to capitalize on this opportunity by 
opening even a small line of communication, another opportunity will be lost, repeating 
the paradigm of the past three decades.  The change of perspective needed here is for 
leaders on both sides to not look at forgiveness as a sign of losing pride or showing 
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weakness; on the contrary, forgiveness shows their capacity as leaders to forgive the 
other side for a bigger purpose.   
This perspective of forgiveness requires courageous leaders able to act.  The 
process will not be unchallenged.  As Pickering emphasized, disagreements “exist often 
in diplomacy and it takes serious leadership to be able to overcome them.”  However, 
before the leaders can make any effort in moving forward, Pickering emphasized, 
dialogue and talks are a crucial medium to expand area of interests.  “Obviously, the ideal 
set of circumstances is win-win.  And how you can portray that to the other side as an 
opportunity is a serious challenge.  And to some extent you have to have discussion in 
order to be able to do that.”  In his opinion, leaders need to take initiative to discuss their 
differences and create opportunities for further engagement.  Pickering provided an 
example of leadership for dissolving tension between the U.S. and China in the past: 
One of the things, that I think, was most useful when we first started to speak to 
the Chinese was that both the U.S. side and the Chinese side, Dr. Kissinger and 
Zhou Enlai, wanted to speak about each other‟s views of the international scene, 
the world at large, the aspiration and the role and place of their country and how 
that related to the other side.  To me, that kind of dialogue is enormously 
important and could very constructively set the stage for then talking about 
critical issues.        
 
Once the U.S. and Iran can trust each other on less threatening issues and create a 
positive atmosphere by focusing on shared values and mutual interests, it may be possible 
to further the talks and include critical issues between the two countries.  Under such a 
positive circumstance, the other party is encouraged to become involved in the process 
and be more constructive and take their own positive steps.  Obama once expressed his 
willingness to engage in talks with non-friendly countries, including Iran.  He is the 
President of the United States now and the question remains whether he, as the leader of 
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the most influential country in the world, is willing to initiate talks as he advocated 
during his presidential campaigns.  His initiation of talks with Iran could disarm the 
Islamic Republic when they justify their hostility by recalling the U.S. intention over 
many years to change the regime in Iran.   
 Although Pickering mentioned the political system as the challenge for a possible 
engagement, by referring to some historical experiences, he was optimistic about the 
possibility for engagement.  In his opinion, there is a need at this stage for courageous 
leaders who can forgive, build trust, and take initiatives to move beyond the hostile 
discourse that became the norm in the last 30 years.  Pickering‟s idea coincides with 
Ansari‟s (2006: 241) advocacy for courageous leaders and how to move beyond the 
restricting paradigm: 
To surmount this culture and to overcome the consensual momentum will require 
 leadership of extraordinary imagination, vision, and courage.  America in 
 particular must think in terms of not only winning the war but winning the peace, 
 by recognizing that Iran-US relations in the twentieth century have been defined 
 as much by collaboration as confrontation, even after the Islamic Revolution of 
 1979, and that compromise has and continues to be possible.  A preoccupation 
 with conflict is blinding us to the opportunities for the future.  
 
For my next conversation partner, however, the challenge of bypassing the difficulties in 
this relationship is enormous.  Dr. Hamid Dabashi at Columbia University focused on the 
structural problems in the American and Iranian political systems as a barrier to progress.   
Political Cultures as the Structural Problem 
 I learned about Dr. Dabashi when I listened to his discussion with another 
academic on an Iranian radio station broadcasted in the U.S.  Dabashi attracted my 
attention due to his vast western philosophical knowledge, awareness about Iranian 
culture, his accomplishments as a professor and his publications on Iran.  I thought 
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Dabashi would bring value to my research because he could discuss the US-Iran conflict 
on a philosophical level.  I emailed Dabashi and asked for a conversation with him and he 
kindly agreed to do so.  The concepts such as political culture as barriers in the two 
countries, constitution of enemy, and post-modern complexity of this relationship with its 
different players were among the dominant themes throughout our conversation.     
 In Dabashi‟s belief, the political structures in the two countries were the main 
barriers to the normalization of relationship between the two nations.  In his view, the 
two governments are restricted by the political systems within which each performs.  On 
the political cultures in the two countries Dabashi pointed out that  
countries from a strategic and positional perspective are defined  in a specific 
political culture.  For example, in the American political culture Israel is defined 
as a friendly country, an ally, and a country that protects the U.S. interest.  Now, 
you can discover as many Israeli spies as you want who spy on the U.S., …, steal 
American top secret documents, yet, despite when these facts are discovered, 
which contradicts the nature of a friendly country, nevertheless, there is no change 
in the assumption about Israel in the U.S.  On the other hand, Iran is defined as an 
enemy in this culture.  Now, it does not matter that Iran helped the U.S. in its 
military attack against Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, it does not matter 
how Iran let the U.S. air force to use its national air space, or it does not matter 
how much shared interests from an strategic perspective they have in the Persian 
Gulf; these realities, do not change the negative picture that is given to Iran.   
 
Dabashi believed this political culture in the U.S. has created an illusion for the American 
government which has prevented it from dealing with Iran on the basis of realities on the 
ground.  He also acknowledged that the same political culture exists in Iran which does 
not allow Iranian politicians to release themselves from this restricted paradigm:    
In Iran, they made Israel as an enemy meaning that they pictured Israel as the 
enemy of Iran.  But, the reality is that during Iran-Iraq war, the Islamic Republic 
imported weapons through Israel which is a friendly act from the Israeli side.  
Nevertheless, despite Israel helping Iran, still, the negative picture of Israel in the 
Iranian political culture does not change. 
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To explain what it means to be involved in this type of relationship, Dabashi emphasized:  
“What I want to say is that, here, we are not performing within a real framework.  The 
whole thing is based on a false premise.  And these false premises are major parts in these 
political cultures.”  In regard to my research topic and how the two states antagonize each 
other, Dabashi explained that “the American political culture is all based on the concept 
of enemy.  One time, this enemy was Taliban, then Iraq, and now is becoming Iran.  In 
Iran, there is the same story.  Now, the constitution of enemy is clearly dominant in the 
Iranian political culture.”  Dabashi‟s points about the structure of political culture in the 
two countries illustrated the challenges that exist in bridging the two sides of this conflict.  
To understand better the root cause of this structural problem, I asked Dabashi how and 
why political cultures are involved in the acts of antagonizing and demonizing.     
 Dabashi noted that these types of political cultures need what he called “the 
constitution of enemy.”  He clarified that he borrowed the term from German political 
philosopher Carl Schmitt (2007) who believed the concept of the constitution of enemy 
has a philosophical root in the survival of each political culture.  Dabashi noted: 
the democratic institutions that exist in the United States look at the constitution 
of the enemy as a theoretical concept.  This is a philosophical concept when you 
constitute an enemy.  Carl Schmitt believes that until you create an enemy, 
wisdom can not be created in a political culture.  Advancing wisdom in a political 
culture, as Schmitt states, depends on the constitution of enemy.   
 
As Dabashi explained, through the constitution of enemy, the hardliners in the U.S. and 
Iran were able to antagonize each other and further their own policies on their national 
stage.  The United States presents Iran as an enemy and justifies its various expensive 
military programs in relation to the Iranian threat.  The establishment of a missile defense 
system in Hungary proposed by President George W. Bush to defend NATO allies from a 
 114 
possible missile attack by Iran, which was argued in late 2007 and early 2008, is the latest 
case.  On the other hand, Iran makes the same argument against the United States by 
saying that the U.S. intends to overthrow the Islamic Republic.  This U.S. policy allows 
the Islamic Republic to militarize the internal situation in the country, increase its own 
defense budget to counter the Americans antagonism, and oppress any democratic 
movement within the country which resists for a more democratic society, all of which 
undermine a belief that the U.S. intends to overthrow the government.  Still, the contrary 
beliefs remain.  The two countries entered and remain in the paradigm of the constitution 
of enemy because it not only allows them to justify their restrictive policies and self-
serving agendas, but also to create a philosophical argument to counter the other side‟s 
arguments and actions.   
The failure of the two countries to establish a relationship in the past three 
decades illustrates Dabashi‟s point.  Despite the notion of constitution of enemy, the U.S. 
and Iran had talks on several occasions in the last decade alone, but were not able to 
develop those talks into engagement.  Talks about how to deal with Taliban and Al Qaeda 
in Afghanistan prior to the U.S. attack on Afghanistan or occasional talks in Iraq over the 
security of that country represent these opportunities.  When I asked Dabashi about why 
the U.S. and Iran were not able to advance these random talks into deeper engagement, he 
pointed out that this is “because they are involved continuously in the constitution of 
enemy.”  He added that, “we see this method in both countries that are facing each other.  
So, there is this stubbornness in both countries and its direct damage is the global 
comprehensiveness of both cultures.”  This structural problem of creating enemies to 
further their own policies, which creates a paradigm of fear and the ability to fund that 
 115 
fear, has already damaged the reputations of the two countries for they no longer base 
their actions on the mutual respect and understanding of each other, the values and ethics 
that form the foundations of both countries and on which they were both founded.  For 
the last 30 years, Iran has been called a sponsor of terrorism and the U.S. became the 
symbol of a unilateralism in dealing with international crisis, especially in the last eight 
years.   
In addition to the existence of a political culture which leads to the constitution of 
enemy, Dabashi also emphasized that the post-modern complexity is another element that 
negatively influences the US-Iran relationship.  In Dabashi‟s opinion, the conflict 
between the United States and Iran is not independent from other players in the regional 
and international scene.  There are many regional and international players who have 
interests in the US-Iran relationship and influence this relationship in the direction that 
promotes their own interests.  He noted:   
In the international relationships, it is not possible to limit the US-Iran 
relationships only to the relationship between these two countries.  The 
relationships are like a chess game now.  Moving pieces in this game changes the 
relationship among many other pieces.  … the reality of the current international 
relations is that we can not think about the international issues from a national 
perspective anymore.  … we need to think regionally, then, ultra regional.  For 
example, think about the relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela, which is 
located in the American continent.  The US-Venezuela relationship is influenced 
by the Iran-Venezuela relationship.  …  We need to stop seeing this problem from 
a dual relationship between the two countries and two cultures.  Instead, we need 
to see the international political scene as a chess board.   
 
What Dabashi mentioned in our conversation aligns with what Geertz (1988) called the 
impossibility of looking at the world in the terms of black and white.  There are many 
players in this interrelated world and their interests and influence must be considered for 
better understanding of the US-Iran conflict.  Dabashi emphasized that it would be a 
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mistake to look at the US-Iran relationship only in terms of these two countries and noted 
that “we should not ignore the role of countries such as Israel and Pakistan.  Countries 
like Israel, as Pakistan, their interests and their existence depends on the hostility between 
the U.S. and the countries in the region.”  Dabashi continued by providing an example 
about the American Israeli Public Affair Committee, where “there are 70,000 members 
that are constantly working to inflame the fire between the two countries.”  The survival 
of these organizations and their respective countries depend upon the hostility between 
the U.S. and a country like Iran.  By exaggerating the threat of Iran, for example, an 
organization such as AIPAC aims to justify further monetary and military assistance from 
the U.S. to Israel.  While Dabashi is pessimistic about the political cultures in the two 
countries and the game played by the players in the international arena, he sees existing 
potentials between the two nations.   
 At the end, Dabashi provided a message of hope in our conversation towards 
these existing potentials in the civil societies of the two countries; from people in 
academia to people on the street.  He pointed out: 
The relationship that normal people, experts, and people like professor Beeman 
and others see in regard to the US-Iran relationship is a cultural perspective that 
are observed by the people, like us, who are interested in cultural matters.  We are 
from that culture and are living here.  In case of Mr. Beeman, he belongs to this 
culture but he conducts research about that culture.  We hope for a friendly 
relationship between the two countries and the two cultures.  …  Right now there 
is an antagonism in the official relationship between the two countries, still, the 
Iranian youth, but not just the youth, are interested in America, American culture, 
American literature, American music, and American pop culture.  …  [For 
example] even after the September 11, 2001, as you know, the young people [of 
Iran] gathered in Mohseni square to show their solidarity with the Americans.   
 
These potential groups from both countries, who want to interact and strengthen their ties 
with each other, are the opposite of the hostility that exists in the nature of the political 
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cultures with the two countries.  While Dabashi acknowledges the existence of the 
opposing groups in the two nations, those who benefit from the status quo and those who 
desire a better relationship, there is hope that although the strength of the people in the 
face of the political structure is limited, nevertheless, the people can depict a better future 
with their own messages.  Kearney (1998: 227-9), ultimately, confirms that it is the 
power of narrating different stories by others that can challenge and re-realize the official 
story of the state and perhaps provide alternatives.  
 My conversation with Dabashi worked as an eye opener for me.  I was amazed by 
the depth of his insights on the structural problem in front of a possible engagement 
between the two nations.  His description of the problem not only illustrated the impasse 
of the two states, but it also imposed a dilemma in front of me as a researcher who tries to 
realize a better course of action as an alternative to the current hostility.  As I faced this 
dilemma and thought about how to seek a resolution for this impasse, I also worked on 
designing a different set of questions, to engage my next conversation partner, so that 
together we could tackle the structural challenges and hopefully move beyond the 
dilemma.  When reflecting on my questions, I thought I needed to reframe them in a way 
that encourages my partner to discuss the necessary measures that need to occur to 
encourage the emergence of alternative stories to challenge the official narrative.  With 
this in mind and despite being a little nervous about my conversation with Dr. Gary Sick 
due to his rank in the Carter administration, I prepared to talk and seek his insights on the 
issues between the U.S. and Iran.   
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The Necessity of Dialogue and Hopeful Signs 
 
 I was introduced to Dr. Gary Sick by one of my earlier conversation partners, Dr. 
Amirahmadi.  He asked me if I was interested in having a discussion with Sick about my 
research topic.  I knew of Sick, due to his very crucial position in the former President‟s 
Carter administration as a member of his National Security Council during the hostage 
crisis in 1979-80 and his extensive publishing on Iran.  I was very grateful and contacted 
Sick by email and he agreed to have a conversation with me about the topic of my 
research.  The main themes we discussed included the necessity of dialogue, current 
status between the US-Iran, how to create an understanding between the two, and the 
possibility for a different course of action.   
 The establishment of communication and beginning of dialogue are crucial steps 
to break down the stagnated paradigm of non-dialogue in this relationship.  Sick 
emphasized that it “is, however, the political side that has prevented the two sides from 
coming to really communicate with each other.”  To be released from this phase, the 
medium of dialogue is needed to change the dynamics.  Sick argued: 
I think both sides have legitimate concerns about the other.  That would be, in 
fact, a basis for any kind of negotiation.  Those concerns would have to be dealt 
with directly and that is why I personally think that direct negotiations between 
the United States and Iran are very good idea. 
 
For Sick, the result of 30 years of policy of non-dialogue resulted in missed opportunities 
and further misunderstanding of each other for the two nations.  He believes that at the 
current time, “the possibility is there, it just has not been developed thus far.”  At this 
point, as many other of my research partners emphasized the importance of dialogue, I 
realized the significance of Khatami‟s call for “dialogue among civilization” as the 
medium to reduce further conflicts and tensions, which may otherwise bring catastrophic 
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consequences.  Sick was another research partner who saw the need for dialogue and 
emphasized the importance of this specific time for the beginning of talks to stop the 
crisis from escalation.   
Sick believed that there has been a change in the discourse between the two 
countries in the recent time.  He described the conferences in Iraq over the security of the 
country during 2007-08 and in Europe over the status of the US-Iran relationship in 2008 
as positive signs that might change the dynamics of the hostile relationship between the 
two countries.  He noted: 
So, things are not necessarily staying the same and I think there is real sign.  Plus, 
do you know, Senator Obama has talked about having direct negotiation with 
Iran, which is something that no presidential candidate had ever said before.  So, I 
think there is some change happening and I see also in Iran a greater willingness 
to even talk openly about having a diplomatic relation for instance with the 
United States.  So, I think things are moving maybe not very fast and it may not 
be permanent, but there are some hopeful signs as well as non-hopeful signs. 
 
While the two countries never had an official or public discussion in the last 30 years, 
recent developments indicated that there may be a change in their approaches towards 
each other.  On one hand, as Sick emphasized, “what we are seeing right now is the U.S. 
becoming a more and more active participant in the discussions that have been going on 
for some time between Iran and Europe.  …, the United States has been taking more and 
more of active view toward negotiation and diplomacy over [the last] two years.”  On the 
other side, the Iranian government has showed interest in talking with the U.S.  In fact, 
the current Iranian president, Ahmadinejad, expressed his willingness to talk directly to 
the U.S. president on several occasions.  So with the U.S. via Obama indicating a 
willingness for dialogue and with Iran making overtures to initiate talks, this seems to be 
a breakthrough in the tradition of non-discourse, what Sick calls „hopeful signs.‟ 
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 The question is how to develop what Sick called positive signs into meaningful 
talks and actual engagement.  This may be a daunting task, considering that in President 
Obama‟s first press conference after being elected, he met President Ahmadinejad‟s 
proposal to talk with the same preconditions as the previous administrations and, as of 
yet, no formal response has been made.  Considering how previous talks disintegrated 
into occasions to accuse and demonize each other continually, there is the realist fear that 
the two nations will never be able to rise above the demonizing discourse.  Sick believed, 
along with Amirahmadi and Pickering, that courageous leaders are needed to transform 
the hostility and hesitation into dialogue and engagement, creating incentive to move past 
the complex incentives that exist to do nothing.    
I would argue that the hard facts include the dangers of continuing hostility.  That 
is a hard fact and it is one that many of the senior policy makers actually are 
concerned about.  So, I don‟t think that it is a matter of finding a secret way to 
influence policy makers.  I think being out in front and making the arguments that 
what the benefits might be are arguments in themselves ….  
 
According to Sick, the time is now for leaders to take action.  He believed there are 
encouraging signs on both sides that show the willingness of both governments for talks.   
For him, the fact that the officials from the two countries met over the issue of 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and even in Europe over the Iranian nuclear issue to discuss their 
issues, could be interpreted as encouraging development between the two countries.  
These positive signs may be the beginning of a break down in the wall of mistrust 
between the U.S. and Iran and may guide the two sides into more meaningful dialogue.  
Then, there might be hope that these new developments may change the hostile dynamics 
that have existed between the two for a long time.   
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Based on the hostile history between the two countries and the many missed 
opportunities, at the end of our conversation the question for me was whether we were 
being too idealistic about the possibilities.  I wondered if what Sick called positive signs 
and a hopeful spectrum were supported with facts.  Sick noted that “I would argue that 
the hard facts include the dangers of continuing hostility.  That is a hard fact and it is one 
that many of the senior policy makers actually are concerned about.”  Then, when I asked 
Sick how could we advocate the shift of paradigm and possibly influence the leaders and 
policy makers, he mentioned “I don‟t think that it is a matter of finding a secret way to 
influence policy makers.  I think being out in front and making the arguments that what 
the benefits might be are arguments in themselves and they seem to be having some 
success.”  Even though the task of bridging and engagement seemed to be difficult, at the 
end, what Sick reminded me was what I had heard many times from my other research 
participants: the power of single stories that we can produce to minimally influence and 
change the dynamics of the official stories of the two states.  On a personal level, I 
realized even my writing could generate a new narrative where common sense and shared 
stories could be a part of a larger scale campaign for advocating a peaceful resolution of 
this crisis.    
 After my conversation with Gary Sick, I made contact with my conversation 
partners in Iran to finalize our meetings.  Out of five contacts, two of them responded to 
my emails and kindly agreed to share their perspectives and experiences with me.  While 
on the plane to Iran, I thought I had to really appreciate the good will of my two 
participants to talk with me on a critical subject due to the risks they faced in Iran.     
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The Dilemma of the Islamic Republic 
 Upon my arrival to Iran, I called Mr. Abbas Abdi to set an appointment for our 
conversation.  Now a researcher and freelance journalist in Tehran, Abdi began as a one 
of the original student idealists during the 1979 revolution and participated in the hostage 
taking of Americans.  Years later, disillusioned with the dogmatism of the political 
system, Abdi became a strong supporter of the reform movement prior to and during 
Khatami‟s presidency.  He was imprisoned, as indicated above, for his political activity in 
Iran, which included conducting a poll that showed around 80% of Iranians expressed 
their desire for a closer relationship with the United States.  He warmly invited and 
received me at his house in Tehran, Iran, on August 18
th
, 2008, where we had a two-hour 
long conversation.  In our meeting, themes that were developed included the structural 
problem in the US-Iran relationship as the main obstacle, the Islamic Republic‟s dilemma 
in dealing with the U.S., and the role of Iranian-Americans in the U.S.   
In dealing with the United States, the Islamic Republic faces a dilemma which is 
not encouraging as far as it concerns the two nations‟ engagement.  Similar to the strong 
concerns expressed by Dabashi, Abdi believed there is a structural problem in the US-
Iran relationship that does not allow the two nations to normalize.  However, Abdi looked 
at the problem from a different perspective than Dabashi: 
The main reason is because the two countries can not sum up their own requests 
and claims.  Their game became a zero-sum game.  In reality, Americans have a 
specific interpretation of the international order and want to impose this system on 
Iran.  On the other hand, the Iranian government does not recognize this global 
order as defined by the United States.  … their opposition to each other derives 
from the way they see the game.  And their game has become a zero-sum game.  
 
What Abdi calls the zero sum game resonates with what Dabashi calls the firm political 
structure in the two countries which constitute enemy.  In this paradigm, no country 
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initiates engagement, instead they continue animosity by entrenching and finding 
strength in their own claims.  This is clear as we look at the tentative talks over 
temporary issues between the two countries.  These talks never moved beyond quick 
resolutions spurred by a pressing need, i.e., the Taliban and Iraq.  It is this characteristic 
of a zero sum game that keeps temporary talks from developing into engagement.  As 
Abdi‟s emphasized: 
Their claims interfere with the other one‟s claims.  Of course, there have been 
instances that their game was played differently and positively.  Nevertheless, 
whenever there was a step forward, after that temporary positive step, they would 
return two steps backward.  The reason why they can‟t establish a relationship 
returns to this structural problem.   
 
This is why Abdi disagreed with Pickering and Sick when they saw signs of hope.   
Abdi argued there are two dilemmas on two levels for the Islamic Republic.  The 
first one is that if the Republic engages with the U.S., it contradicts its own values: 
As you know and many other experts agree, the United States and Iran have many 
common interests in the region.  Nevertheless, despite these common interests, 
and because of this characteristic of their belief system, they can not collaborate 
continuously with each other.  …  Now, why do they behave this way?  It is clear 
that America defends this international system because their interests are in it.  
And, the Iranian side can not think of giving up its own position in regard to this 
international political order. 
 
Abdi continued that this is a contradiction that the Islamic Republic faces and has not 
been able to resolve: 
They can‟t even say that they don‟t accept this international order.  They go 
around it and say it indirectly, but the root of the problem is this.  Until they 
recognize such a system, they can not establish a relationship with others.  When 
they accept it, the consequences are going to be much larger and will not be 
limited to the Iran-US relationship any more.  …  This is one important point that 
nobody pays attention to.  For example, many people think that the Islamic 
Republic does not want to negotiate.  I am not saying that they want to do so, but 
even if they desire to do so, they are not able to do so. 
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Abdi stated that “if Iran gives up, in the domestic policy, it will be a very costly option 
and move for Iran.  Then, they will face consequences that may weaken the position of 
conservatives inside the country.”   
This brings the second level of concern for the Islamic Republic to the forefront.  
If the Islamic Republic engages with the United States, it may become the subject of 
further scrutiny by the international community.  As Abdi emphasized:  
The Islamic Republic feels if it starts to engage and normalize, it needs to 
completely change its path.  Improving the relationship with the U.S. means 
accepting the international order and, automatically, giving up from 30 years of 
their own position, the belief is that if this happens, the Islamic Republic may face 
difficult challenges in their domestic policy.   
 
The internal dilemma and challenge for the Islamic Republic is that the opening of a 
relationship with the United States would subject the Republic‟s internal affairs, such as 
human rights, freedom of press, and other socio-political freedoms, to a deeper scrutiny 
by the United States and the rest of the western world.  In other words, the Islamic 
Republic does not engage because it realizes that engagement has consequences that 
would put the Republic‟s control under threat, because foreign pressure for a more open 
society may create new possibilities for Iranians in their fight against the state ideology.   
The delicacy of the circumstances in Iran, therefore, requires that the American 
leaders and policy makers be more careful in their approach to the Republic.  Employing 
experts who are aware of the concerns of the Islamic Republic may make the engagement 
easier and reduce irritation to the Islamic Republic, that is, reducing the threat of internal 
political interference and regime change; abdicating the pursuit of the U.S. hegemony in 
the region, recognition for the Islamic Republic as a legitimate government and its 
acceptance into the global community.   
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 Abdi‟s source of pessimism originates from his own disillusionment in the 
Islamic Republic.  As a young man, Abdi believed in the ideals of the Revolution and 
participate fully in the process, even to the storming of the U.S. Embassy.  However, as 
the Revolution was taken over by the more extreme elements within the formation of 
Islamic Republic, he became disillusioned when he saw the suppression of the 
Revolution‟s ideals of political and social freedom, including human rights and freedom 
of press.  Exercising the freedom for which he fought, Abdi criticized and publicized his 
objections regarding the direction to which the country was headed.  For this, he was 
arrested and, as we know, spent years in prison.  Even though, disillusioned Abdi saw a 
small spot of potential that might help change the direction in the two countries‟ 
relationship.  He cited the Iranian community in the U.S. as a possible catalyst for 
changing the dynamics of this relationship if they are able to provide a better 
understanding of Iran to Americans:   
Of course, this requires that these Iranians be familiar with the Iranian internal 
affairs and be allowed to take part in this matter.  In this case, if they are allowed 
to actively engage with this issue, they can provide a proper image of Iran and 
form a lobby in the United States.   
 
It may be that Iranians, like myself, will be able to help explain the motivations that 
isolate Iran and infuriate the western world, factors like the fear of power loss and the 
need for equality and respect as a nation. 
After my conversations with Dabashi and Abdi, I realized the enormity of the 
challenges in front of the two nations and their people who work to positively influence 
the two states for a peaceful resolution of their disputes.  Abdi‟s point also reminded me 
of my own challenges as a researcher who seeks to figure out an approach which may 
lead to a peaceful dialogue between the two.   
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Nevertheless, although Dabashi and Abdi stressed the challenges of influencing 
the discourse of the two states, however, each of them had a message of hope where I 
could find potentials for generating a new narrative for an alternative course of action.   
Abdi‟s final, hopeful message encouraged me even more because he referred to the 
significance of Iranians in the U.S., who desire to create an understanding between the 
two countries, positively influence this hostile relationship, and generate new ideas to 
bridge the two nations toward a possible engagement.  In other words, people who hope 
to create what Gadamer (2004) calls “fusion of horizon,” where the two sides learn about 
each other and enlarge their original perspectives and understanding about the other.  By 
providing a truer understanding of Iran and Iranians and the motives behind their actions, 
Iranians living in the U.S. could influence an American dogmatic view towards Iran, 
which has depicted Iran as a country of fanatics and has been dominant in the U.S. 
government in the past 30 years.  If academics and practitioners are able to provide a 
better understanding on Iran‟s motives, then, the American‟s perspective may expand, 
which ultimately could bring the two countries closer to finding common grounds.     
 When I was in Mr. Abdi‟s house, we broke into laughter several times because he 
suggested that I change the topic of my research from finding peace to finding war 
between the two countries; this joke emerged because he thought war would be easier to 
find and accomplish in today‟s world!  Nonetheless, since he hopes for peace and 
peaceful coexistence with others in our world, at the end, he encouraged me to continue 
with my research.  I gained the insights of an experienced man who was an early 
participator within the Islamic Republic, but who is now a main challenger.   
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I finished my talks with a representative of the revolution in Iran, I realized the 
time had come to meet with someone who belonged to the new generation of Iranians, 
those who the Revolution is more of a fairy tale, a generation who has grown up under 
the socio-political restrictions of the new regime and who are in search of equality and 
democracy at home and free interaction with the rest of the world.  As I left Abdi‟s home, 
I was already thinking about my next conversation partner, a graduate student in political 
science, who represented the potential of youth within Iran.  
Demonstrating Leadership 
 My last conversation partner was Mr. Babak, a graduate student in a political 
science in a college in Tehran, Iran.  Babak did not want his identity to be revealed and 
this is why I only use his first name.  A fresh minded college young man who represents 
a typical Iranian student, who sees how the many countries in the world are now 
improving their economic, political and social standing by being a more effective player 
in the global community and how Iran is isolated and restricted from participation by the 
ideology and stance of its leaders.  He actively follows the political development in Iran 
and in the international arena.  Throughout our conversation, Babak seemed to be hopeful 
for a better future.  This attitude makes Iranians of his age and generation a major source 
of hope for a better future in Iranian society.   
 Having been introduced by a round about circuit of friends and relatives, Babak 
agreed to meet me in his house in Rasht to talk about the US-Iran relationship.  Babak 
represents Beeman‟s idea that the youth are the great potential within Iranian society, a 
belief that in Abdi‟s opinion represents the predicament of the Islamic Republic should 
they engage with the United States and then are forced to face this generation‟s demands 
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for a more open society.   This presents a dilemma in that the potential for the U.S. is also 
the problem for the Islamic Republic.  So my questions to Babak were how the U.S. can 
reduce the notion of threat. 
 Babak, like Amirahmadi and Pickering, emphasized that by taking a more 
proactive and dialogue based role as a world leader, the U.S. may be able to disengage 
Iran‟s defense mechanism, allowing a friendlier engagement of Iran with the western 
world, including the U.S.  Babak, like many young Iranians, see Obama as a consensus 
builder, and there is now a higher hope for the return of the U.S. to the international scene 
as a unifying world leader rather than as a unilateral power.  Babak suggests that Obama 
approach Iran with a humble attitude indicating a leadership quality that is able to 
recognize and lay at rest the other‟s fear.     
To implement these ideals into reality, concrete measures such as using a 
respectful language is needed to build trust.  Since the accusatory language and 
demonization of each other has only increased the level of antagonism between the two 
nations, a more respectful language is a viable option, and may influence this relationship 
in a positive way.  Babak agreed with this concept, advocated also by Beeman and 
Milani, and said: 
Instead of accusing and threatening Iran, it may be better to soften its tone in 
order to soften Iran‟s tone.  Many times, the language of diplomacy is much more 
effective than the language of force.  By the U.S. taking such a step, I mean using 
a respectful and a more diplomatic language in dealing with Iran, this may 
encourage Iran to lessen its hard position.  This may be much more effective to 
resolve this problem than using a harsh language and encouraging Iran to use the 
same harsh language.   
 
Many experts believe that President Ahmadinejad won the presidential election in Iran 
because the political system in Iran realized they needed a stringent president to counter 
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the neoconservatives and their harsh approach towards Iran.  In a hostile environment, it 
is easier for the hardliners in Iran to justify their antagonistic policies against the U.S. and 
suppress Babak‟s generation claim for the need of a more open society.  In a more 
peaceful environment, the rhetoric of “Great Satan” and “Axis of Evil” may vanish and a 
more constructive attitude may prevail.  
 If the U.S. desires a change in Iran, Babak saw the need to engage Iran in the 
international community.  In doing so, Babak surmised, the U.S. may be able to influence 
the Islamic Republic in an indirect way.  On one hand, the Iranian engagement with the 
international community could be considered an incentive by the U.S. for Iranian 
engagement.  On the other hand, the U.S. may be able to request its demands from the 
Islamic Republic through the softer approach.  Babak noted:  
Isolating Iran is not going to solve any problem, while engaging Iran with the 
international community results in a better relationship between the two countries 
and the expansion of democracy within Iran.  For example, the United States can 
help Iran to enter the World Trade Organization, start to trade with Iran, and 
improve its relationship with Iran, while requiring Iran to stop its support for 
violent groups in the region, improve their human rights record, and open up the 
political situation in Iran.  On one hand, Iran can see concrete incentives and on 
the other it sees what needs to be done to gain those incentives.  In the diplomatic 
arena, these are steps that are doable and each of them can help the expansion of 
the engagement. 
 
Babak‟s point represents at the very least an untried possibility that has not been 
attempted in the past.  Since his proposal has never been implemented, it may be 
advantageous to attempt such a policy especially since President Obama has created a 
receptive atmosphere for dialogue and a possible shift in paradigm. 
  Babak was my last conversation partner.  When I left him, I felt better about my 
research topic as his message was more hopeful.  Nevertheless, his optimism didn‟t 
mislead me to distance myself from the reality described by Dabashi and Abdi.  
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Throughout my conversations with all my research partners, two messages were 
prevailed:  first, almost all of them mentioned the existence of a structural problem in 
both countries imposed by their political systems; and second, they also conveyed a 
message of hope by focusing on the potentials that exist in both countries.  This dilemma 
reflects also my challenge throughout my research in re-imagining what the possibilities 
might be in my text and overcoming the challenges to doing so. 
Summary 
The preceding data presentation and preliminary analysis provided an 
introduction to each of the formal research participants.  Sometimes, the themes 
developed throughout the conversations were not specifically related to the research 
categories; however, due to their importance for providing a better understanding of Iran, 
they were presented in this Chapter.  The data presentation also linked the data to related 
theoretical concepts from Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Kearney.  The next part of this research 
interweaves these theoretical foundations with the data gathered from the research 
conversations in order to deepen the understanding of the crisis between the United States 
and Iran through the analysis of the data.  The secondary analysis offers an expanded 
interpretation and understanding of my research experience with my participants and the 
insights that they shared with me.   
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CHAPTER VI 
SECONDARY ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
In this Chapter, I present a secondary reading of the research conversation texts 
overlaid on the research categories introduced earlier in Chapter Four to generate 
meaning from their integration and present this meaning in the form of a narrative.  
Through a deeper analysis of my data, I attempt to obtain new meaning from the review 
of the past history of the two nations, the United States and Iran, the roots of the problem 
between the two, and search for ways to move beyond the current restrictions and 
discover possibilities, through imagination, that never were actualized.  The hope is that 
by imagining differently, there may be a higher chance for each government to expand its 
horizon and enlarge its perspective, which may help them to understand the other in a 
truer way, to refigure a new course of action accordingly that could be peaceful and 
beneficial for both nations.  In this Chapter, I use the theoretical concepts of Ricoeur, 
Kearney, and Gadamer including mimesis1, mimesis2, mimesis3, founding events, 
narrative identity, forgiveness, power of imagination, and fusion of horizon to analyze the 
US-Iran issue at a theoretical level to possibly reach new meaning from the past and 
imagine a better future as a way to uncover a better course of action in the present.  
Mimesis1 
To better analyze the US-Iran relationship and reach a better understanding, I 
thought it is necessary to review the past in a deeper sense.  Gadamer (1976: xv) notes 
that “the past has a truly pervasive power in the phenomenon of understanding.”  The 
US-Iranian diplomatic relationship goes back almost 60 years.  From 1953 to 1979, the 
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United States operated as a major player in Iranian domestic politics.  However, this 
favored relationship soured and became hostile for the last three decades.  Throughout 
my research conversations, several of my participants emphasized the significance of a 
new read of the past in order to reach a new understanding and possibly find potentials 
that were ignored in the fog of the current antagonism.  The emphasis placed on the 
review of the past aligns with Ricoeur‟s (2005: 180) notion of mimesis in action: As he 
notes, “mimesis is poiesis, that is, construction, creation.”  To construct a new positive 
relationship, the first step is to genuinely understand the past which resonates with 
Ricoeur‟s concept of mimesis1.  Therefore, throughout my conversations, I focused on 
the review of the past to see if we could discover positive aspects that have been ignored 
or dismissed.   
One such opportunity was overlooked, according to Amirahmadi, when the two 
sides did not try to approach the problem in order to find common grounds and their 
relationship has been based on retaliation.   
Complicating the situation is also a set of post-revolutionary developments that 
further increased their misunderstanding and mistrust.  The practical responses on 
both sides have been fatal.  Iranians took Americans hostage, and the Americans 
would support Saddam Hussein in the war against Iran and shoot down an Iranian 
civilian air plane; Americans would also impose sanctions on Iran and freeze 
Iranian assets in the U.S.; Iran would develop a clandestine civilian nuclear 
technology and support Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel.  …  The American 
claims against Iran about terrorism, nuclear proliferation, democracy deficit, and 
opposition to Middle East peace are products of this unfortunate history. 
 
Ricoeur (1983: 67) notes that to comprehend a story or a series of events, it is important 
to find out “how and why the successive episodes led to this conclusion ….”  In the US-
Iran relationship, the hostile reactions toward the other were designed as strategic moves 
to satisfy the self interests of each state without trying to understand the motivations of 
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the other and without focusing on the communalities.  As a result, demonizing became 
the norm in this relationship, resulting in a hostile narrative between the two.   
Amirahmadi retelling of the history of mistrust and misconception between the 
two countries is our first stage of the pre-understanding recommended by Ricoeur (1984: 
64) when he says we “can see the richness in the meaning of mimesis1.  To imitate or 
present action is first to preunderstand ….  Upon this preunderstanding … emplotment is 
constructed and, with it, textual and literary mimetics.”  With this new understanding of 
how the two countries retaliated and reached this critical point in their relationship, with 
more awareness, we may be able to avoid what caused the problem to escalate to this 
critical point.  Instead of strategic moves and retaliation against the other, with this new 
realization, we could emphasize our communalities to find common ground rather than 
emphasizing our differences.  Looking for potentials in the past of the two countries may 
be a constructive way for finding common ground for a new reconstruction.   
 A genuine review of the past may highlight the latent historical-philosophical 
communalities that exist in the traditions of the two nations, especially their value 
systems.  According to Milani, we should look for the shared wisdom, the idea of 
something old, foundational, a tradition that can be handed down, and as Riccoer (1983: 
67) emphasizes without a retelling this wisdom can be lost; “it is in the act of retelling 
rather than in that of telling that this structural function of closure can be discerned.”  In 
the act of reframing the past history, we may be able to find potentials that can open up 
new possibilities.  Milani reminded us of the similarities between the two countries: 
Iran has had a history of ideas that were democratic, ideas that were rational, ideas 
that tried to reconcile reason and revelation … that later became the element of 
modernity.  In this country [U.S.] too, I think, what this country is found on is the 
search for modernity … which derived from democratic ideals.   
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These shared values in the traditions of the two nations present a sense of the past, a 
potential common ground for reconstruction.  As Ricoeur (1992: 39) notes:  
 We have to acquire simultaneously the idea of reflexivity and the idea of 
 otherness, in order to pass from a weak correlation between someone and anyone 
 else, which is too easily assumable, to a strong correlation between belonging to 
 the self, in the sense of mine, and belonging to another, in the sense of yours.  
 
Digging into the past and discovering the shared potentials may highlight the 
communalities between the two cultures.   
 Dabashi called this ability to retell the shared potentials between the two 
countries, “the comprehensiveness of both cultures.”  Dabashi provided an example of a 
shared history of where the U.S. and Iran worked together.  In the late 1800s and early 
1900s individual Americans worked with Iranians in different fields such as education, 
medicine, finance administration, and military to modernize their systems and win the 
heart and sympathy of Iranians.  As a result of these interactions, the U.S. and Iran built a 
strong relationship in contrast to other forces such as Britain and Soviet Union which 
abused Iran for their own advantages.  Tapping into the past model of individuals 
working together is a potential created by this review of the past using the concept of 
mimesis1, which Ricoeur (1984: 54-7) describes as the need for preunderstanding of a 
narrative.  These potentials, however, have been blocked by the policy of retaliation and 
repression that exists today.  I will now analyze the sources of this antagonism uncovered 
in my conversations through Ricoeur‟s (1996) concept of “founding event.” 
Founding Events as Historical Barriers 
 In the past 60 years, there were several major historical events that worked as 
negative dynamics in the US-Iran relationship, including the 1953 CIA coup in Iran, 1979 
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American hostage crisis in Tehran, the 1988 American bombing of the Iranian passenger 
flight 655, and the current nuclear crisis.  These events shocked both nations to their very 
core, making each country feel violated as Beeman noted:  
in the case of the coup against Mossadegh, the U.S. violated Iran‟s sovereignty by 
helping to overthrow a legitimate government and installing a government that 
would be favorable to the United States.  So Iran uses that as a violation of their 
sovereignty.  From the point of the United States the hostage crisis was a violation 
of American sovereignty, because diplomats are supposed to be protected by the 
county which they serve.   
 
These events formed a memory in both nations‟ historical memory which has prevented 
both the U.S. and Iran from developing a constructive relationship.  Ricoeur (1996: 7) 
comments that “what really prevents cultures from allowing themselves to be recounted 
differently is the influence exercised over the collective memory by what we term the 
„founding events‟ ….”  On one hand, the seizure of the U.S. embassy became a part of 
the American negative memory about Iran and was the start of an anti-Iranian behavior in 
Washington.  Gary Sick described the negative image that the 1979 hostage crisis placed 
in Americans‟ memory about Iran and Iranians, noting that “American politicians 
remember the pictures of Iranian crowds shouting „death to America‟ in front of the U.S. 
embassy night after night in American television; I think that left an image that it is not 
easy to change.”  What is ignored in this story is that the Iranian sense of antagonism 
began with the violation of their sovereignty in 1953.  This sense of violation generated a 
counter reaction as Iranians justified the seizure of the U.S. embassy and arguing that 
American conduct in Iran was an imperialistic one which had to be stopped by the seizure 
of what they called the “spy house.”  Ricoeur (1992) reminds us that founding events can 
create a perceived narrative that encourages stagnation as opposed to an orientation 
toward change, where the idem overrides the ipse.  The influence of those events on 
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Iranian and American historical memories was so great as to change policy in a negative 
way towards the other.  Iran took to anti-American rhetoric and the U.S. adopted a hostile 
stance in return, which grew into a static narrative of antagonism.   
The Two Nations Narrative Identity 
As a result of the negative influence of the founding events on each other, the 
narrative identity of the two countries changed to a narrative of hostility.  Ricoeur (1992) 
explains that narrative identity is formed by the relationship between one and another.  It 
is a relationship of “concordance and discordance between idem-identity and ipse-
identity; the dialectic of the self and the other than self” (Ricoeur 1992: 291).   As 
Amirahmadi explained after “the coup, the U.S. and Iran entered into the second period 
in US-Iran relations.  During this period, while the governments came increasingly closer 
to each other as allies, the Iranian people became as much more anti-American.”  This 
antagonism was fully revealed when Iranian students took over the American embassy in 
Tehran causing in Gary Sick‟s opinion, the forcing of the U.S. government into a hostile 
reaction.  Amirahmadi confirmed Sick‟s point by saying that after the hostage crisis, “the 
more theoretical hostility became increasingly transformed into practical complaints and 
conflicts.  Both sides have by now developed a laundry bag of grievances against each 
other that some are real and others are fictional.”   
 This false premise encouraged the antagonism where each country demonizes the 
other, very similar to the Cold War policy of Carl Schmitt‟s (2007) “constitution of 
enemy,” which Dabashi said might be one reason why the two countries “can‟t continue 
with these negotiations, talks, dialogue, and diplomacy within their political culture and 
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until these cultures allow them to do so.”  This rigidity of the two governments is a good 
example of Ricoeur‟s (1992) inflexible dimension of a narrative identity: Idem.   
Ricoeur (1992: 115-25) further explains that the notion of narrative identity is 
formed by two dimensions; idem and ipse.  Idem is that dimension of identity that 
remains constant over time, while the ipse is the pole of identity that is oriented towards 
change.  The two dimensions of identity interact with each other, which forms the 
narrative identity of the two entities.  In the US-Iran relationship in the last 30 years, the 
dominance of idem has over shadowed the ipse of their narrative identity, so their 
relationship was led by the forces of idem meaning a conservative hard headed approach 
toward the other.  Until recently this antagonism was represented by the hostile rhetoric 
of President George W. Bush and President Ahmadinejad.  We will have to wait to see if 
the constitution of enemy‟s narrative continues under President Obama. 
 If there is willingness, the US-Iran relationship might be influenced by 
constructive forces within the two political systems.  According to Ricoeur (1996), the 
narrative identity is formed upon the interaction of ipse and idem identity and is 
influenced by the force of one upon the other.  He (1996: 6) argues: 
narrative identity is not that of an immutable substance or of a fixed structure, but 
rather the mobile identity issuing from the combination of the concordance of the 
story, taken as a structured totality, and the discordance imposed by the 
encountered events.  … narrative identity takes part in the mobility of the story, in 
its dialectic of order and disorder. 
 
A positive and constructive approach by one side, even if with minimal impact, could 
influence positively this narrative of hostility.  For example, former Iranian President 
Khatami‟s approach towards the rest of the world is a good example of how the forces of 
change, or ipse, are able to make a small break in the cycle of hostility, or idem.  
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Khatami‟s call for “dialogue among civilization” prompted the American Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright to take action and respond with an apology for the U.S. 
intervention in Iran in 1953.  In fact, Khatami‟s call for dialogue changed the opinion of 
much of the world towards Iran as Babak noted: 
Khatami‟s idea of “dialogue among civilizations” created an opportunity where 
the relationship between Iran and the West was improved dramatically … Iran 
attracted more foreign capital than under any other Iranian president.  Many 
foreign companies were in Iran to work and collaborate in Iranian vast projects.  
Iranians were able to travel easier abroad.  Many students received scholarships 
from foreign embassies in Iran.  All these were the result of agreement between 
Khatami‟s government and the rest of the world.   
 
For a short while, the interaction between ipse and idem was dominated by the forces of 
change, which illustrates how a positive action can influence the dynamics in a stagnated 
relationship.  However, ipse alone cannot change a paradigm.  The combined diplomatic 
efforts of Khatami and Albright were not able to push beyond hostile narrative identity, 
founding events and the idem that ever seeks status quo. 
The Importance of Forgiveness 
My research partners including Amirahmadi and Pickering suggested that if a 
move beyond this stagnated process is to be made then one party may need to forgive the 
other with an ultimate aim of reaching a higher purpose in the relationship and moving 
past shared memory.  Pickering explained how crucial it is: 
to overcome the historical barriers because there is no future if you can not find a 
way around historical barriers.  It is also true that at least, in some societies, being 
able to put historical barriers behind one by in fact having a conversation about 
regret, apology, and change are all part of the process. 
 
Change in the US-Iran narrative could not take place as the political cultures used the 
existing paradigm to block the two states from moving beyond their negative course. 
What was lacking was forgiveness which according to Ricoeur (2004: 468): 
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is directed to the unforgivable or it does not exist.  It is unconditional, it is without 
 exception and without restriction.  It does not presuppose a request for 
 forgiveness.  One cannot or should not forgive, there is no forgiveness, if there is 
 any, except where there is the unforgivable. 
 
It appears that the two sides are more concerned with their strategic moves to gain 
political advantages rather than forgiving and moving beyond this stagnated paradigm.  
Forgiveness never took place as the two countries always placed preconditions before any 
talks.  These preconditions, contrary to what Ricoeur advocates as the idea of forgiving, 
create a negative atmosphere where forgiveness becomes impossible because it becomes 
conditional.   
 This negative atmosphere might be dispersed by strong leadership who sees the 
advantage of moving beyond the restrictions of the past.  As Ricoeur notes (2004: 285): 
 Forgiveness offers itself as the eschatological horizon of the entire problematic of 
 memory, history, and forgetting.  This original heterogeneity does not exclude the 
 possibility that forgiveness imprints the mark of its signs on all the instances of 
 the past: it is in this sense that it offers itself as their common horizon of 
 completion.  
 
Amirahmadi emphasized there is a level of leadership involved in forgiving the other 
party: “At the end of the day, it does not matter who takes the first step or who is seen 
weak or strong.  That becomes irrelevant after the relations starts.  In fact, in the future, 
many may give credit to the guy who starts this process.”  By forgiving, such leaders may 
be able to convert the critical situation from obstinacy to forgiveness and its common 
horizon of absolution.    
 Building trust, as Pickering argued, does not come from a stick and carrot 
approach which has become the norm in the U.S. foreign policy towards Iran.  True 
forgiveness in the foreign policy arena, which according to the political norm is unreal 
and an idealistic wish could be characterized as a transcendental act.  As Obama 
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transcended domestic politics for many during his campaign, the hope is that he can also 
transcend “business-as-usual” foreign policy, including dealing with Iran.  Such a change 
from stick and carrot to a trust building through dialogue in the U.S. foreign policy may 
change the dynamics of this hostile relationship resulting in a shift of paradigm.   
The fear, of course, is that the Islamic Republic does not respond to a positive 
initiative by the U.S. and instead interprets it as a weakness.  Pickering mentioned that 
“making a forward move that would be seen perhaps as being weakness in the face of the 
confrontation with the other” is the biggest fear.  However, Ricoeur (2004: 459) 
emphasizes that the risk is worth the result, that “what is at issue here is nothing less than 
the power of the spirit of forgiveness to unbind the agent from his act.”  Even though the 
Islamic Republic may refuse to engage with the United States, by forgiving, the U.S. 
could show a new form of leadership and moral standing in the international arena.  After 
all, President Obama claimed during his campaign, real leadership sits down with their 
enemies and enters into a dialogue, because sitting down with friends does not represent 
any challenge and does not require real leadership.   
Imagining a Different Course of Action 
 
 In addition to forgiveness, imagining new alternatives may be required to change 
the dynamics of the discourse and to move beyond antagonism.  In my conversations 
with my fellow research partners, they shared many stories with implied possibilities that 
could be implemented.  As Kearney (in Ricoeur 1996: 185) explains, “imagination opens 
us to the foreign world of others by enabling us to tell or hear other stories ….”  As each 
participant shared their stories I thought how we could be, as Pickering said, “providing 
opportunities with [our] own private conversations between the two sides and by making 
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various suggestions of ways to proceed.”  The same effort by people on both sides could 
influence positively the official antagonistic narrative.  Beeman commented that “the 
only thing that you can do is to try to influence public opinion and influence legislatures, 
write as much as you can” about what you think and how you want to challenge the 
official narrative.  When I asked Milani about imagining alternatives, he said the “way 
you influence them is by writing op-ed pieces, by writing scholarly essays, by organizing 
meetings, by trying to have meeting with these people and by teaching students ….”  
Each of my participants‟ stories became part of a larger story that challenges the current 
discourse between the two states, which together form an alternative.  On the power of 
little stories, Amirahmadi reinforced the need for people “to become mobilized, engaged, 
proactive, demanding, and innovative in this relationship.  They should form a strong 
constituency as the matter cannot be just left to their governments.”  During the Clinton-
Khatami‟s presidencies, there was a rise in alternative stories, like that of Abdi and 
Rosen.  The abductor and abducted generated a story that challenged the antagonistic line 
of the hardliners in the two countries and symbolizes the power of imagination.   
My research participants advocate the power and influence of such stories in the 
public arena as a necessary practice, implementing Kearney‟s (2003: 102) power of 
imagination, which emphasizes that 
no experience is so utterly alien or alienating that it removes all possibility of 
human response.  This response may be in terms of protest, praxis, imagination, 
judgment or even „understanding‟ … but to rule out such possibilities, however 
tentative or partial, is, it seems to me, to condemn oneself to the paralysis of total 
incomprehension and, worse, inaction. 
 
As Kearney advocates, imagining alternatives generates new possibilities and he (1998: 
28) encourages us to broaden our imaginations because “the status quo reigns supreme 
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for as long as we refuse our utopian capacity to imagine things being other than they are.”  
After 30 years of demonizing, it may be the time to assess new possibilities that might be 
realized in the relationship of the two countries.  Although influencing the political 
establishments in the U.S. and Iran are very difficult, as Kearney (in Ricoeur 1996: 185) 
notes, the ideals provide new horizons with the power of “transcending the self towards 
possible or alien worlds.”  After all, the ultimate purpose of imagination is to raise the 
level of our political practice from one of the self strategic interests to a comprehensive 
approach that includes the interests of all.   
Fusion of Horizons 
 If the habits of the two sides change and they acquire an orientation open to 
explore the unknown about the other, then, there may be an expansion of their 
perspectives or what Gadamer calls “fusion of horizons.”  In explaining the concept of 
horizon and its expansion, Gadamer (2004: 303) argues that “the horizon is … something 
into which we move and that moves with us.  … the individual is never simply an 
individual because he is always in understanding with others, so too the closed horizon 
which is supposed to enclose a culture is an abstraction.”  Therefore, having an 
orientation to understand the other is an important element in the concept of fusion of 
horizon.  Despite the complexity of the US-Iran relationship, nevertheless, the former 
Iranian President Khatami‟s orientation towards dialogue with others caused the rest of 
the world to expand its view towards Iran in a positive way.  Iran became a much more 
active member in the international community than its current status.   
 To create fusion of horizon, however, each side needs to be willing to leave its 
stagnated position.  Ricoeur (1992: 3) notes that as “long as one remains within the circle 
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of sameness-identity, the otherness of the other than self offers nothing original .…”  The 
question is how to move outside of your own circle and encourage the other to do the 
same.  Pickering suggested that Americans could initiate:  
programs which the U.S. at least has said it is willing to support and that is to 
bring Iranian youth to the United States to take part in our educational system … 
It is often true that when people have personal experience, particularly with the 
citizens of the other country, there is entirely a different concept about what could 
be done and how it could be done.   
 
Such an exchange may remove people from their established norm and move them into 
the unknown area of other.  The opportunity these programs might offer is through the 
exchange the two sides may become more receptive and open.  Pickering continued: 
we need more opportunities to have dialogue among academics, former officials, 
among business people, and among others.  If in fact, because of the U.S. 
sanctions most business with Iran is not possible in the current time, but those 
kinds of conversations and that sort of exchange can help to build trust back and 
re-establish confidence which could come with trust, which is badly lacking now.    
 
These exchange programs in academia, athletics, and trade are useful mediums to learn 
more about each other and possibly break down the barriers in the relationship.   
 Through these programs, instead of strategic military and political moves, higher 
purposes could be followed to bring constructive results.  Gadamer (2004: 304) notes that 
“transposing ourselves … involves rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only 
our own particularity but also that of the other.”  Until policy makers and leaders change 
their perspective about Iran and constructively approach that country, the result will be 
the same failed policies of the past 30 years.  Putting more emphasis on cultural matters 
rather than strategic political and military moves may reduce the tension in this 
relationship.  The act of transposing for Babak included: 
having interactions and establishing a stronger cultural relationship [that] could 
have positive influence on the diplomatic relationship between the two countries 
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….  If ... the cultural relationship expands, there is a higher chance that the 
expanded cultural relationship and interactions could positively influence the 
hostile diplomatic relationship.   
 
Cultural interactions such as exchanging of stories in different forms including art 
exhibitions and film festivals would familiarize the two nations with each other on a 
deeper level.  By exchanging stories in different forms, as Waldenfels (in Ricoeur 1996: 
116-7) notes, the “foreign, thus understood and explained, would cease to exist.  The 
sublimating forms of appropriation and surpassing of the foreign consist in reducing the 
foreign to ownness ….”  If exchange of ideas and stories occur, as he continues, the 
distance “between the ownness and foreignness weakens and tends to abolish itself.”   
 Abdi described these interactions and exchanges “from the cultural perspective 
and structural change in belief system [as] very powerful.”  Sick, Abdi, Pickering and 
Milani argued the effectiveness of being in the public arena and proposing programs that 
could increase the level of understanding of one side about the other.  Their arguments 
resonate with Gadamer‟s (2004: 301) notion of fusion of horizon “to characterize the way 
in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy, and the way one‟s range of vision is 
gradually expanded.”  As he continues, “to have a horizon means not being limited to 
what is nearby but being able to see beyond it.”  This awareness about unseen aspects 
consequently may result in being more aware of the others‟ perspectives and an 
enlargement of self view.  The question is if politicians are willing to transcend the 
established norm and move beyond the established paradigm determined by the hardliner 
in the two countries.    
Amirahmaid emphasized that this depends on the leadership of both countries 
changing their approach as “leaders in both sides at best have spoken their mind for the 
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interest of their own nation but hardly had they expressed willingness for common 
interests and mutual benefits of the two nations.”  As many of my participants described 
how exchange programs could enlarge the horizons of the two people towards the other, 
the question remains as to why this model cannot be implemented with the politicians on 
the two sides.  If academia on both sides can interact and collaborate with the other, if 
normal citizens can do the same thing without bias; why do politicians not initiate such 
interactions?  Are politicians prisoners of their title, forced to live with bias?  Isn‟t it their 
ethical duty to act upon what is right?  Reflections upon these questions may help to see 
the simplicity of taking action about enlarging one‟s view, to better see the other‟s 
perspective, and reach a better understanding about the other.   
The Emplotment of the Author 
 
 In Chapter Two of this document, I tried to lay out the historical events over the 
last 200 years as Iranians experienced them.  Throughout this Chapter, where I provided a 
historical background of Iran and the status of the relationship between the two countries 
in the last 60 years, my goal was to lay out a narrative where I could illustrate Iranian‟s 
perspective for my American readers who may not have been exposed to the Iranian 
viewpoint.  In the preliminary and secondary analysis, I focused specifically on the 
relationship of the two countries with each other.  In the preliminary and secondary 
analysis, my goal was to create a narrative to highlight the possibility that exists for 
another course of action to be actualized through imagining different alternatives.  As 
Ricoeur (1984: 69) emphasizes, the “labor of imagination is not born from nothing.  It is 
bound in one way or another to the tradition‟s paradigms.”  To refigure a new alternative, 
I felt it was necessary that my readers go back in the Iranian modern history and the 
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history of the two countries‟ relationship to understand better the roots of this conflict and 
to use their imagination to refigure a new narrative in their own mind that never had a 
chance to be realized, but might be implemented now.  Ricoeur (1984) calls my action in 
this text as the notion of “emplotment” by the author.   
As he describes, in this text I try to construct a present based on a better 
understanding of the past.  As a result of such configuration of the past through a new 
emplotment, as Ricoeur (1984: 65-6) posits, I create a narrative that could generate new 
possibilities for a different course of action.  In my conversation with Dabashi, he shared 
encouraging stories about the United States involvement in Iran, like Howard 
Baskerville, who was martyred during the Iranian constitutional revolution.  Dabashi 
talked extensively on how to use past potentials in the US-Iran history: 
[researchers] can search for characters and individuals that have been critical of 
these two states and can provide a different narrative of the events.  For example, 
in Iran, the state makes a negative image of the United States and intellectuals 
need to search and find out a character like Howard Conklin Baskerville.  In the 
U.S. is the same; meaning characters, events and accidents that….  For example, 
they need to go and find out people like Morgan Shuster.  He is a character that 
during the Constitutional Revolution in Iran helped the revolutionaries order their 
financial matters.  So, by creating a contrast with what the states offer, they can 
provide a different narrative about the unique and independent characteristic of 
these two cultures and their relationship with each other.   
 
By applying Ricoeur‟s (1984: 65-7) idea of emplotment, where events could be placed in 
a narration to obtain a new meaning, these past potentials could be developed in a new 
and positive narrative between the two states, while my emplotment of Dabashi and his 
proposal in this text may work as an encouragement to my readers for further reflections 
about the unknown possibilities.  By providing a historical background about Iran and the 
status of relationship between the two countries and by emphasizing the possibilities that 
my research partners expressed in their conversation with me, my hope is that I was able 
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to emplot these events in form of a comprehensive narrative to highlight the potentials 
and possibilities that exist and could be developed for a different course of action 
between the two nations.   
Dabashi‟s suggestion to search for characters who can symbolize a constructive 
and positive relationship resonates with Ricoeur (1984: 53) when he describes mimesis2 
as “the concrete process by which the textual configuration mediates between the 
prefiguration of the practical field [mimesis1] and its refiguration [mimesis3] through the 
reception of the work.”  The configuration or the act of emplotment of the past potentials 
that came to surface as a result of a better understanding in the stage of mimesis1 is now 
being put in a new plot, to create a new narrative.  To explain the plot, Ricoeur (1984: 56) 
notes that “understood broadly is the literary equivalent of the syntagmatic order that 
narrative introduces into the practical field.  [It is] the sequential interconnections [that] 
the plot confers on the agents …” that can help realization of a new narrative.  “In short, 
emplotment is the operation that draws a configuration out of simple succession” 
(Ricoeur 1984: 65).  By digging into the past history of the two countries and discovering 
figures such as Baskerville and Shuster and retelling a new story, an unknown level of 
common value and significance may came to the surface that was unknown up to this 
point.  The dedication of these American individuals to assist in the construction of a 
modern society in Iran might illustrate the moral standing that the U.S. had in the past 
with Iran.  Throughout this new narrative, the emphasis could be put on the 
communalities and shared values rather than antagonism which became the norm.   
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My Text and My Readers 
My hope is that my text could be an informative source for reflections.  How has 
the encounter affected my readers?  When I talked to my research partners, they all 
agreed that publishing and advocating a peaceful approach in the US-Iran conflict is all 
we can do.  Babak mentioned that we need to “inform and increase the public‟s 
awareness.  The public awareness comes from organizing conferences, giving speeches 
or publishing of articles or books.”  In regards to policy makers, Amirahmadi stressed: 
We have to try to convince them, we have to argue with them, we have to sit and 
talk with them to engage; that is what I do.  I just stay the course and continuously 
talk to them.  Tell them directly or indirectly through media, through interviews 
or sitting in a room privately.  This is what I have been telling them and we will 
continue telling them as long as it takes. 
 
The doubt of how my dissertation could influence the official narrative was with me 
throughout the process of writing during the past year.  I was not sure if my proposal was 
effective in essence and in these circumstances.  After my conversations with my 
research participants, I believe in the power of the text that an author can create as 
explained by Ricoeur (2005: 16) “human action, no less than literary texts, displays a 
sense as well as a reference; it possesses an internal structure as well projecting a possible 
world, a potential mode of human existence which can be unfolded through the process 
of interpretation.”  Sick also encouraged me about the power and the influence that a 
published text might have and mentioned that even President Obama “has been 
influenced by hard facts or the cultural background and communication [that surrounded 
him] … in some respect, I mean, people who are policy makers are not oblivious to the 
world.”  What is created by the author ultimately has the potential to influence others.   
 149 
Finally, Amirahmadi warned that policy makers need to imagine new alternative and take 
action to change the current hostile narrative because: 
The cost of not taking the action, or the cost of inaction, is much higher than the 
cost of taking action towards peace.  … any compromise for peace is less costly 
than the status quo or the alternative to peace, which is war.  So, the leaders on 
both sides really have to compare the cost of compromise to the cost of inaction, 
which means maintaining the status quo or even worse than that is the cost of 
engaging into a military conflict, which would be devastating.  So, if they are to 
consider logically these alternatives and if they are logical and reasonable people, 
then they will certainly decide in favor of peace and engagement. 
 
With this dire prophecy ringing in my ears, I realize how this text reflects my personal 
effort and action to influence my audience for a better understanding of Iran.   
Ricoeur (1984: 71) calls this stage mimesis3 and emphasizes that it “marks the 
intersection of the world of the text and the world of the hearer or reader; the intersection, 
therefore, of the world configured by the poem and the world wherein real action occurs 
and unfolds its specific temporality.”  He continues that thus “the act of reading becomes 
the crucial moment of the entire analysis.  On this act rests the ability of the story to 
transfigure the experience of the reader” to re-figure their own conclusion or course of 
action in this case (1991a: 430-1).  My hope is that my text has the same effect as 
mentioned by Ricoeur in describing the significance of the relationship between the 
reader and the text: 
Appropriating a work through reading it is to unfold the implicit horizon of the 
world which embraces the action, the personages, the events of the story told.  
The result is that the reader belongs to both the experiential horizon of the work 
imaginatively, and the horizon of his action concretely.  The awaited horizon and 
the horizon meet and fuse without ceasing. 
 
As Ricoeur (1984: 53) notes, I chose critical hermeneutics “to reconstruct the set of 
operations by which a work lifts itself above the opaque depths of living, acting, and 
suffering, to be given by an author to readers who receive it and thereby change their 
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acting.”  The hope is that this text could enable readers to transcend the 30 years of harsh 
rhetoric and non-relationship to provide an opportunity for readers to reflect on the 
potential, which is a source for a new reconstruction of a positive course of action.   
Summary 
 
In this Chapter, I offer a more in-depth analysis of my research conversations 
through the interpretive lens of the theories of Ricoeur, Kearney, and Gadamer.  My 
intent was to see if there could be alternatives that have been ignored by both states, for 
as Kearney (2002: 82) argues, “if warring nations were able to acknowledge their own 
and the other‟s narrative identities, they might then be able to reimagine themselves in 
new ways.”  Further, they might be able to refigure “blocked and fixated memories, 
trapped in compulsive repetition and resentment” which the U.S. and Iran have repeated 
over and over.  I hope my narrative will encourage transcendence beyond the current 
relationship and my text may become a source of influence.  Ricoeur (1984: 79) is very 
encouraging as he believes “reading poses anew the problem of the fusion of two 
horizons, that of the text and that of the reader, and hence the intersection of the world of 
the text and the world of the reader.”  My hope is that if policy makers or leaders read 
this text they may be alerted to the danger of the current course of action and may 
discover the potentials of dialogue, discourse, and reason as alternative to the hostility.  
This is my hope, and if I am to have any influence, I need to begin with myself as Herda 
(1999: 13) stresses “change does not begin by our changing the other, but by changing 
oneself.”  In the next Chapter, I offer a summary of this study, my findings, implications, 
reflections and concluding statement.     
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY:  FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS  
The US-Iran conflict represents a classic conflict with multi-layers of complexity.   
LeBaron and Pillay (2006: 19-23) illustrate three levels in a conflict: material, symbolic, 
and relational.  The material represents the “what” of the conflict, the symbolic represents 
the meaning of the conflict, and the relational represents the necessity of building bridges 
between the parties in conflict in order to discuss the issues.  
 The United States and Iran developed a clear conflict in the last thirty years.  This 
conflict gradually grew bigger, because the two countries accused and demonized each 
other over the material differences that they developed with each other over the years.  If 
the two countries intend to resolve their conflicts, before looking at their differences on 
the material level, they need to understand their conflict in symbolic level (the meaning 
of why they oppose the other) and the medium through which they may be able to solve 
their issues (dialogue).  Until the two countries are able to analyze the meaning and 
significance of their conflicts on the symbolic level, they may never understand the root 
cause of the problems.  To resolve their issues requires discussion; in other words, 
dialogue and building relationships.   
 Only by having discussion and dialogue may they be able to understand why 
Iranians behave in one way and Americans behave the opposite.  Through dialogue and 
having discussion then, they may be able to address the material matters such as the Iran 
nuclear issue and support for terrorism in American‟s mind and the U.S. policy of regime 
change in Iran for the Iranian side.  In this text, the purpose has been to encourage leaders 
and policy makers in the U.S. to move towards engagement with Iran to learn in a more 
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significant way the motivations and purpose of Iranians in order to deal more effectively 
with the issues.  As is advocated in this text, this could be possible if there is a dialogue 
and engagement.   
As Michael Province, one of my informal conversation partners at UCSD, pointed 
out, the United States may need to adapt a new foreign policy based on dialogue and 
inclusion of others.  As he emphasized, it is the lack of understanding about others in the 
foreign policy arena that leads to antagonist situations such as the US-Iran today.  In this 
dissertation, my concern has been to mention that the 21
st
 century requires an inclusive 
approach which could lead to understanding and collaborative problem solving.  In the 
case of Iran, the paradigm of military hegemony, threat, the policy of regime change and 
harsh rhetoric has not changed and are not going to change Iranian behavior.  As a result 
it may be time to take a new course of action based on dialogue and engagement. 
This new course of action will be challenging.  As Abdi and Dabashi emphasized,  
Iran may refuse to engage, but this does not mean that the U.S. should give up hope for a 
peaceful resolution and refer to military conflict as a solution.  As I advocated in this text, 
the United States may have the ethical responsibility to step forward for dialogue and 
disarm Iran from their hostile conduct.  After all, hostility from the U.S. is the ultimate 
response that Iranian conservatives desire in order to oppress the internal democratic 
movements, militarize the situation, and find a cause to rally against the constituted 
enemy.  The challenge is how to transcend from this tradition of demonizing to a new 
paradigm of dialogue and constructive engagement.   
 To transcend beyond the current paradigm of antagonism, the leaders and policy 
makers may need to think in terms of a higher purpose in their foreign relations in the 21
st
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century.  As I quoted Ansari earlier in my presentation of date it is time and our duty to 
move from blinding hostility to envisioning opportunities for the future.  I hope my text 
encourages policy makers and leaders to see the possibilities that exist between the two 
nations, which could be used as a ground for a new relationship.  Then, as Ricoeur (1984: 
77) suggests, it is my “reader, almost abandoned by the work, who carries the burden of 
emplotment” to come up with a new course of action.  I can only hope it is a fusion of 
narratives and the rise of a new more transcended action.   
To take a more effective action, however, there should be an understanding of 
Iran.  As Gadamer (1998: 4) argues, “the more we become acquainted with the past and 
present cultures and traditions of who stand outside our Christian tradition” the more we 
become more effective in how to interact with them. In the last 200 years, Iranians 
struggled to reach an independent and a more democratic society.  The current 
antagonism with the western world, in specific with the U.S., could derive from their 
larger scale struggle for their independence and search for freedom, which they see as 
blocked by westerners.  Presently, Iranian insistence on the nuclear issue may be a 
symbol of their resistance to what they call foreign interference.  Their struggle is the 
search of a people trying to realize their ideals for a better society.  Although the ordinary 
Iranian is prevented a realization of their ideals in this post-revolutionary era, this does 
not mean that they have forgotten those ideals.  A deeper understanding of the Iranian 
struggle for a better society could help policy makers and leaders in the U.S. to see better 
the multiple layers behind Iranian action and to design their policies accordingly, such as 
encouraging and supporting domestic democratic movements in Iran rather that keeping 
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the mentality of regime change.  The first step for U.S. policy change would benefit from 
an active approach toward engagement. 
The Islamic Republic, however, may not engage even if the United States changes 
its approach.  Opening up and engaging with the U.S. may increase the foreign scrutiny 
of Iranian internal affairs.  This may create an opportunity for westerners to give even 
sharper criticism of Iranian leadership and politics.  Under these circumstances, the 
Islamic Republic may see its existence in danger and conclude that the more closed the 
Iranian society is, the better the government can retain their power over Iranian society.  
However, if the U.S. desires a moderation of the position in the Islamic Republic, 
engagement may be the only way to influence the Republic‟s position in a positive way.  
This is what was advocated by President Obama during his campaign in the past two 
years in the foreign policy arena, where the art of diplomacy is expressed not only when 
we sit down with friends, but also when we sit down with enemies.  Although 
negotiations may not lead to accommodation and desired results, they can yield more 
insights.  Discourse with Iran may not necessarily lead to agreement between the two 
states, but it could lead to more understanding, which in turn may result in more 
possibilities, better options, and wiser policy.  At this point, courageous leaders are 
needed to go against the grain and break down the cycle of antagonism.  Now that 
President Obama advocates a newer style in the foreign policy arena, the hope is that he 
can take action to shift this hostile paradigm and engage with Iran.   
In the last three decades, the United States has established two choices in how to 
deal with the Islamic Republic: Either recognize the regime and enter into dialogue on the 
terms of the Islamic Republic or antagonize the Republic by implementing a policy of 
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regime change and imposing sanctions.  The U.S. chose the latter, which has not resulted 
in positive terms for the U.S.  On the other hand, officially recognizing the Islamic 
Republic with its human rights violations, censorship of the press, and violations of the 
freedom of speech, may damage the campaign for these issues.  The complexity of how 
to interact with Iran does not have a specific answer.  The Islamic Republic can certainly 
live without a direct relationship with the U.S. as it demonstrated in the last 30 years as it 
showed in surviving a bloody war with Iraq for eight years which had the support of 
western world including the U.S. and surviving sanctions imposed by the U.S. in the last 
three decades and United Nations in the last few years.  At this point, a more reliable 
choice would be to engage partially with Iran and assess its interactions and adjust and 
appropriate policies and terms of engagement as the relationship furthers.   
From the beginning of this project, my concern was whether I could play a role in 
making a difference in the circumstances that surround the two countries.  As I was born 
in Iran and lived in the United States for the past decade, and as a citizen of both nations, 
I feel I have the responsibility to do something about this problem.  I am concerned about 
finding possibilities to change the current course of action and open up new possibilities.  
Throughout the literature review, conversations, and data analysis I foresaw possibilities 
for change in the current paradigm.  I concluded that there could be a more peaceful 
course of action, if within the two nations there are leaders and policy makers who desire 
a peaceful relationship, who will take the initiative to transcend this relationship from a 
demonizing discourse to a more constructive dialogue with an emphasis on the 
commonalities.  As Milani and Dabashi pointed out, the potentials exist in the two 
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countries‟ traditions and they need to be highlighted for the formation of a common 
ground.     
As the final word in this summary, I must restate that my text is supposed to be 
only an occasion to open up a frank forum for discussion about the topic at hand.  As 
Herda (1999: 90) notes, in “critical hermeneutic research, our attempt is to bring biases 
out into the open, not to technically reduce or control them.”  As a result, my intent was 
not to offer a definite conclusion, because I do not believe there is a clear-cut conclusion 
in social science research.  As Gadamer (2004: 581) puts it, the “ongoing dialogue 
permits no final conclusion.  It would be a poor hermeneuticist who thought he could 
have, or had to have, the last word.”  This text intends to illustrate a new approach in 
international relationships, in this case with Iran, based on constant dialogue and 
understanding of the other, because as long as “we keep dialogue active, we continue to 
learn, understand, and create a relationship of sustainable security” (Lowry & Littlejohn 
2006: 410).  I advocate for this approach, because I believe it is my responsibility to act 
and hopefully stop the escalation of this crisis into a possible military confrontation.  As 
Herda (1999: 131) notes, in “the end, it is our responsibility to think differently, to learn, 
and to act differently.”  
Findings  
1- Antagonism engenders more hostility 
Accusation and antagonism increase the level of hostility on the Iranian side and 
make it more difficult to reach a common ground.  We witnessed how antagonist policies 
in the last three decades failed to bring about any positive change in Iranian behavior.  
The US-Iran relation from 1979 has reached a very critical and dangerous point in the 
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past few years, which was not seen before, when under former President George W. 
Bush, the U.S. government advocated military action against Iran.  This is the highest 
escalation so far of antagonism resulting from the current policy of retaliation. 
2- Lack of understanding 
There is a need for understanding the motivations behind the actions of the 
Islamic Republic.  What the U.S. has not realized is that Iran has been struggling to find 
its own identity as a country in 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries.  Iranian quest for democracy in the 
past 100 years has been opposed by the will of foreign powers.  The CIA coup in 1953 
was interpreted this way.  In the nuclear issue today, for example, Iranians feel the U.S. is 
interfering and opposing their quest toward technological progress and independence.    
While the U.S. thinks that it symbolizes freedom, the view by Iranians is that it is a 
foreign force that opposes Iranian self determination.   
There is not a strong understanding of Iran among the leaders and policy makers 
in the U.S. government.  This is due to the fact that there are not enough people who are, 
politically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously aware of Iranians‟ actions.  The 
American policy makers and leaders tend to simplify Iran and do not distinguish the 
variety of social movements going on beneath the surface.  They usually tend to 
categorize the Islamic Republic as a crazy state which was evident also in the former 
President George W. Bush‟s axis of evil speech in his State of Union address in 2002.  
By using such an antagonist language against the Islamic Republic, the moderate 
government of Khatami faced domestic criticism by the hardliners in Iran who isolated 
Khatami as a soft President when dealing with Iran.  As Khatami position weakened in 
Iran, Ahmadinejad as an ultra-conservative president reached power.   
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3- Potential in shared values of the two countries 
There is vast untapped potential in the past history and in the traditions of the two 
countries.  In a philosophical sense, Iranians have been searching for ideals similar to 
those upon which the American constitution is based.  These ideals are independence, 
political and social freedom, and human rights. 
In a more recent historical sense, there are positive historical events in the history 
of the two countries‟ relationship.  There have been Americans who as missionaries have 
gone to serve and help Iran for many valuable purposes in the late 1800 and early 1900.  
These historical potentials have been ignored in the last 30 years of hostility and nobody 
had a chance to learn about them.  They could be used as shared values in case there is a 
will for engagement.    
4- Structural problem in politics – what if the Islamic Republic does not engage? 
 We shouldn‟t be simplistic about the difficulty of resolving the problem between 
the U.S. and Iran.  International political affairs are a very complex and calculated arena.  
The two countries have two political cultures that demonize each other and benefit by this 
constitution of the enemy as a way to justify their domestic and foreign policies.  The 
U.S. represents Iran as a danger and is able to sell arms to Iranian neighbors for self 
defense and look for its own hegemony in the region and justify its presence there.  Iran 
demonizes the U.S. in order to justify suppressing opposition groups within the country 
by connecting them with the United States.  So in this political culture change doesn‟t 
come easily and it takes a change of mentality over time.   
 We also don‟t know how the Islamic Republic will react to a new approach by the 
U.S.  Even if the U.S. attempts to change policy and engage with Iran, what if the Islamic 
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Republic avoids engagement?  The Islamic Republic does not want engagement because 
a true engagement with the U.S. may increase the international pressure on the Republic 
for fundamental changes. 
Implications 
1- Need to change the old paradigm from Huntington‟s Clash of Civilizations to 
Khatami‟s Dialogue among Civilizations 
Since antagonism has only engendered more hostility, it may be time to change 
policies toward the Islamic Republic; where through engagement there may be a higher 
chance to influence the Republic dogmatism.  The U.S. may need to adapt a more 
compatible foreign policy in the 21
st
 century and leave the Cold War mentality of military 
threat and pressure that no longer works.  The new approach should be based on 
dialogue, discourse and understanding the concerns of others by instituting programs of 
academic, cultural and trade exchanges which are currently under extreme restrictions 
and hindering any interaction or sharing of perspectives.  Until the U.S. applies these 
principles to its dealings with the Islamic Republic and recognizes the Islamic Republic 
as a legitimate state, engages with it, and therefore expands its leverage of influence, they 
may not be able to influence Iranian behavior or moderate the Islamic Republic in its 
position. 
2- Inclusive policies to engage Iran 
 In making their policies, American policy makers and leaders may need to 
recognize Iranians quest for progress and independence.  In the 21
st
 century, the world 
and regional players have changed and the new order needs to be considered.  In the 
Middle East, Iran could become a positive player if it is engaged in regional decision 
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making.  By engaging with Iran and creating policies that recognizes Iran as a regional 
power and stabilizing force in the region, the U.S. may open up possibilities for 
collaboration between the two countries.  This not only satisfies the Iranian sense of 
pride, but also may help the U.S. to maintain its regional influence through Iran.  For 
example, in this time of war against terrorism, it is crucial to have an important strategic 
country such as Iran on the U.S. side.   
Once the U.S. engages with Iran, it may be able to increase its influence in the 
country.  By designing policies that support the democratic social movements such as 
increasing the cultural, literary, political, and academic, and other professional 
interactions, the U.S. may be able to learn more about the complexities of the Iranian 
society and connect in a stronger sense with those movements.  Ultimately, this may 
allow the U.S. to have a greater influence in the Islamic Republic.  In a country where 
there is already a sense of sympathy for the American culture these developments may 
occur in a faster paste.   
3- Expand on shared values through engagement  
 Since there are these philosophical and historical communalities, there is a higher 
chance to influence Iranians through engaging policies rather than antagonizing and 
isolating policies.  These engaging policies include policies for more dialogue, 
interactions, and engagement which could influence the more progressive and democratic 
layers of Iranian society.  There exists a broad basis of support for a relationship with the 
United States.  Creating programs where there is an emphasis on the history of 
Americans who dedicated their professional lives to and in Iran will recall shared values 
between the two nations in a time when they worked together.  Designing these policies 
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may help the U.S. to win the heart and soul of Iranians instead of putting them in the 
defensive by hostility. 
 The U.S. should take advantage of the fact that for the past two centuries Iranians 
have a history of fighting for the values of democracy and most Iranians still want to see 
a democratic state of Iran.  The values Iranians seek are the same basic values found 
within the American Constitution.  By focusing on these shared values and assisting with 
the entry of Iranian academics and students into the U.S. and encouraging cultural 
pioneers to travel between the two countries, they may be able to highlight the 
communality that exists between them both and strengthen the foundation for a 
constructive relationship.  The exchange would enable Americans to influence their 
Iranian counterparts and allow Iranians to learn more about American values. 
4- Leadership is required to change the dynamics 
 Strong leadership could move beyond the political culture and make engagement 
possible and possibly hasten this process of change.  Nixon with his global vision was 
able to break down the wall of mistrust between the U.S. and China.  Even though it took 
40 years, the U.S. and China currently enjoy a level of trade partnership.  Such an action 
by a leader today could break down the wall between Iran and U.S.  We‟ll have to see if 
President Obama as a leader of new policy will be able to start this process. 
 Even if the Islamic Republic is not willing to engage, the U.S. can take action by 
designing policies that encourages governmental engagement.  It may be possible to 
initiate partial engagement by inviting Iranian representatives into the U.S., opening a 
line of relationship between American Congress and the Iranian parliament and 
advancing lower level government exchanges.  This approach is different from the former 
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approach which tended to isolate the Islamic Republic, which is ideal for more extreme 
element within the Islamic Republic.  Through a more robust diplomacy, as advocated by 
President Obama, influencing the Islamic Republic may be more realistic. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Many of my conversations partners such as Milani, Amirahmadi, and Dabashi 
emphasized the existence of characters and events in the past that could be used as 
potentials for a new positive emplotment and narrative in the present time.  Throughout 
this text, I mentioned them on several occasions.  However, I did not mention specifically 
their names.  Some of these characters are American missionaries who traveled to Iran 
and helped the formation of different ministries in Iran in 1800 and 1900.  They include 
Howard Baskerville as Iran‟s first American martyr, Josef Cochran who founded Iran‟s 
first modern medical school, Elgin Groseclose as the Treasury General in Iran, Samuel 
Jordan who is famous as the father of modern education in Iran, John Limbert as an 
American professor in Iran and one of the hostages during 1979-80, William Miller who 
was a representative of Christian church in Iran, Arthur Millspaugh as the Treasury 
General, Richard Nelson Frye as an Iranian expert, Arthur Pope and Phyllis Ackerman as 
Iranian culture revivalists, Morgan Shuster as the Treasury General, and David Stronach 
as an archeologist of ancient Iran.  Conducting future studies on these people and their 
contributions, and emploting their positive influence in Iran within a new narrative could 
be the source of a new story to generate a positive working ground.    
The Iranian youth represents another area for future research.  Today, as they 
form a large majority in Iranian society who are interested to engage with the rest of the 
world in pursue of a better life, different way of connecting with them including through 
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educational, cultural, artistic, social, political, and economical programs represent 
potentials for interaction and engagement.  In this context, understanding their needs and 
finding ways to connect with them represent opportunity for further research.   
Personal Insights 
As for me, this research process became a learning experience.  Throughout my 
research, conversations, and reflections I developed new insights that helped me see 
farther and become a more aware citizen.  Herda (1999: 135) explains that we “do 
change, and consequently how we act can change.  Risking our prejudgments is different 
than learning a new behavior.  The act of learning does not happen in isolation; it only 
happens in a relationship with another, yet remains one‟s own responsibility.”  This 
research process, including the formal and informal conversations, enlarged my horizon 
to see the realities and restrictions before us.  I learned how difficult it is to change the 
established paradigm in the political establishments in the two countries.  I learned how 
the political pressures in Washington and Tehran became a restricted framework upon 
policy makers and leaders that does not allow them to move beyond and transcend this 
relationship to a higher level.  Nevertheless, I also realized the existence of potentials in 
this relationship that could help the reduction of tensions between the two states.  The 
Iranian democratic movement is another potential that the U.S. leaders and policy makers 
may need to have a closer look in order to better appropriate their policies towards Iran.  I 
believe my research process became a meaningful learning experience as it pushed me 
further to engage in conversation with texts and participants, which ultimately enlarged 
my horizon and opened up new possibilities in my mind.     
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A Last Word 
In this dissertation, my intention as a transnational researcher was to provide a 
better understanding of Iran and a new approach in how to deal with Iran in the 21
st
 
century.  After 30 years of non-resolution and as Iran grows stronger in its national and 
geo-political influence, it is time for the U.S. to realize that the Islamic Republic is a 
reality and perhaps a harbinger of things to come in the new world.  The U.S. may be 
able to satisfy it own national interest by satisfying the Iranian‟s desire for independence 
and equal recognition on the world scene.  But the U.S. must realize the time is now to 
create a new approach in this new and ever changing world.  Such understanding, in the 
context of the relationships between the U.S. and Iran, may have the encouraging power 
to begin a model for international crisis resolution.    
I hope that by reading this text it may open a new horizon to my reader, as 
Ricoeur (2005: 143) notes that what the reader appropriates from the text: 
is not behind the text, as a hidden intention would be, but in front of it, as that 
which the work unfolds, discovers, reveals.  Henceforth, to understand is to 
understand oneself in front of the text.  It is not a question of imposing upon the 
text our finite capacity of understanding, but of exposing ourselves to the text and 
receiving from it an enlarged self, which would be the proposed existence 
corresponding in the most suitable way to the world proposed. 
 
For myself as I studied the many texts during this research process, my own vision was 
expanded.  I have shared what I appropriated which changed my perspectives.  So I have 
commenced the journey which Herda (1999: 7) suggests begins with the idea that when 
“I change, the rest of the world changes.”  The rest belongs to the reader.  
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To: ali goldoust 
Date: Tuesday, April 22, 2008 9:32:57 AM 
Cc: Ellen Herda 
Subject: IRB Application # 08-031 - Application Approved 
April, 2008  
Dear Ali Goldoust: 
The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at the 
University of San Francisco (USF) has reviewed your request for human subjects 
approval regarding your study. 
Your application has been approved by the committee (IRBPHS #08-031). Please note the 
following: 
1. Approval expires twelve (12) months from the dated noted above. At that time, if you 
are still in collecting data from human subjects, you must file a renewal application. 
2. Any modifications to the research protocol or changes in instrumentation (including 
wording of items) must be communicated to the IRBPHS.  Re-submission of an 
application may be required at that time. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
University of San Francisco 
Letter of Invitation 
 
Participant‟s Name and Title 
Company or Organization 
Address 
 
 
Dear Mr. / Ms: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in an exploration of my dissertation topic.  
As you know, I am a doctoral student in the department of Leadership Studies at 
University of San Francisco and my dissertation involves a hermeneutic approach to 
finding alternatives for the continued crisis between the United States and Iran and 
involves sustained conversations with a consortium of experts in the field in order to open 
up new avenues and approaches to the problem.  The most challenging part of my 
dissertation is what to do about the antagonist stance of each nation to the other, in order 
to possibly change it and bring it from a confrontational level to a discursive level.   
 
I am inviting my conversation partners to explain how they approach my research 
topic in the practice of their work, including their motivations, observations, and stories 
of their personal journey. 
 
Our conversation will act as data for the analysis of the research topic described.  
Once transcribed, I will provide you a copy of our conversation so that you may look it 
over.  You may add to or delete any section of the conversation during the research 
process.  I will use our conversation to support my analysis.  Data that you contribute, 
your name, and position will not be held confidential.  
 
My hope is that our conversation provides an opportunity for us to learn 
something together through the exploration of the topic I have described.  Again, I thank 
you for your willingness to meet.  I look forward to seeing you soon, 
 
 
With regards, 
 
Ali Goldoust 
 
Researcher, Doctoral Student 
University of San Francisco 
School of Education 
Department of Leadership Studies 
doustcompany@yahoo.com 
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APPENDIX C 
 
University of San Francisco 
Thank You Letter 
 
Participant‟s Name and Title 
Company or Organization 
Address 
 
 
Dear Mr. / Ms: 
 
Thank you for participating in an exploration of my dissertation topic.  Our 
conversation was not only enjoyable, but extremely informative.  Your ideas regarding 
narrative identity and shared values between Iran and the U.S. led me to a new 
understanding of the situation.  I appreciate that you took time from your busy schedule 
to discuss new approaches to the problem with me. 
 
As I mentioned earlier, I hope that my conversations with various experts will 
continue as we all join together and share our narratives.  I‟m enclosing the text of our 
conversation and the themes I identified and my understanding of those themes.  Please 
feel free to correct or further the development of any ideas.  This feedback will increase 
my understanding and I hope, continue our discussion. 
 
I look forward to sharing the conversation discoveries from other participants 
with you as we all explore the possibilities of a changed narrative between the U.S. and 
Iran. Again, I thank you for your willingness to meet.  I look forward to other 
conversations. 
 
 
With regards, 
 
Ali Goldoust 
 
Researcher, Doctoral Student 
University of San Francisco 
School of Education 
Department of Leadership Studies 
doustcompany@yahoo.com 
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APPENDIX D 
 
University of San Francisco 
Transcription of Research Conversation  
 
 
 
Ali Goldoust 
Pilot Study 
Dr. Abbas Milani  
Department of Political Science, Middle Eastern Studies, Stanford University 
11/05/2007 (12:30 pm) 
Stanford University 
38 minutes 
Dr. Milani did not revise the original text.   
 
 
Pilot Study 
Topic:  US-Iran relationship 
by 
Ali Goldoust 
Department of Leadership Studies 
University of San Francisco 
doustcompan@yahoo.com 
 
 
 
Questions sent to Dr. Milani prior to the conversation 
 
In your book, you mention that Iran has a background of openness to “others” with ideals 
like freedom and democracy.  Since these are the same values and ideals in U.S. history, 
have both nations lost their past wisdom and view of the sense of other?  How does this 
play into their history of mistrust, let‟s say in the last 60 years? 
 
 
Ali Goldoust:  Thank you very much for giving me your time Dr. Milani today.  I 
really appreciate it. 
 
Dr. Abbas Milani:  You‟re welcome. 
 
AG:  In your book, Lost Wisdom, it seems you suggest that both sides of this conflict 
that I am interested in, Iran on one side and the U.S. on the other, have both 
traditions that are similar to each other.  The ideal of freedom and democracy 
throughout the history of the two countries are the same.  So Iranians (and equally 
their Persian ancestors) like these ideas and concepts as much as Americans do.  
This basement exists in both sides.  And then, it was also interesting that the title of 
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your book is the Lost Wisdom.  The first question that came to my mind that all 
these tension that exist between the two sides, Iran on one hand and U.S. on the 
other; so, did these two sides lost their wisdom that they can not go back to their 
tradition and come up with a new understanding and develop and relationship? 
 
AM:  No, I think what the two countries, first of all when we talk about the relation 
between the two countries, we have to make a distinction between what the leadership of 
these two countries think and what the people think.  I think there is evidence that a 
majority of Iranian people still have a very positive view of U.S. and although the recent 
war rhetoric is changing American public opinion but I think still American public 
opinion does not see Iranian people as a threat, they see the government as the threat.  So, 
when we talk about how these leaders and how the people of these two countries think of 
one another, we need to make a clear distinction.  The current leadership in Iran and the 
current leadership in U.S., I think have lost their sense of purpose and their wisdom if 
you will, because I think, they both are taking these two countries in a collusion course 
which will be detrimental to all sides concern. 
 
AG:  Dr. Milani, how this concept of …, because when countries are dealing with 
each other, is obviously on their leadership level; at least on the official level.  There 
might be some other type of exchanges that might or might not influence the official 
relationship.  But, how does this concept of „lost wisdom‟ plays in their „mistrust‟ 
that they developed in the last 50 years, let‟s say. 
 
AM:  Well, do you know, in Lost Wisdom what I was trying to argue was that in spite of 
what the current regime says, Iran has had a history of ideas that were democratic, ideas 
that were rational, ideas that tried to reconcile reason and revelation.  In Lost Wisdom I 
tried to show that for example as early as 10
th
 to 12
th
 century Iran had a series of thinkers, 
philosophers, writers who were very much at ease with the West, who understood 
Aristotle and Plato and who wanted pretty much the same things that later became the 
element of modernity.  In this country too, I think, what this country is found on is the 
search for modernity.  This country has been called by one historian the very first nation, 
the very truly modern society.  It is the only society in the world that did not go through a 
traditional period.  It began as a modern experiment.  America is a quintessential modern 
country, Iran, in my view, has tried desperately, for almost 1000 years, to become 
modern.  And, the domination of religion in Iranian politics and the attempt to make 
religion dominant in American politics today is part of what causes this loss of wisdom in 
both sides.  Both sides are going in a way by their leadership, away from their tradition 
toward a new kind of theology. 
 
AG:  So, Dr. Milani some other scholar such as Beeman, I was reading an article by 
this gentlemen who was talking about …, let me go back for a second to your 
previous comment.  Again, the ideal are there, the potentials are there, but in 
dealing with each other and resolving the problems I am assuming that the 
governments are the ones who need to take initiative.  Beeman says that in the last 
half of the last century in the United States, the political system moved toward 
creating a bipolar myth in the political system.  Maybe, we also see that in the 
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Iranian political system, because I lived up to six years ago in Iran, where they 
called U.S. as the big Satan.  At the same time in the U.S. policy, it seems that the 
black and white thing, like the president Bush wanted to distinguish himself and his 
party from the other, when he said you are “… either with us or against us.”  So, 
basically, Beeman is saying that there is a „self‟ that you create for yourself, and 
then the other that you portray as the enemy.  So, by portraying the „other‟ as your 
enemy, you can adjust and make your policy in the way that you want.  As example, 
he talks about U.S versus the Middle East and also Iran.  So, basically, U.S. portrays 
itself as the supporter of freedom, supporter of free market, and the progressive 
force for the world order etc.  And portrays the other, Middle East, or in my case is 
going to be Iran, as the out law country, the crazy country, where there is no 
rational etc.  So, if we look at each other in this way, which is existent in the two 
countries politics … on the other hand, scholars like you in articles such as “A win-
win U.S. strategy for dealing with Iran,” desire to shift the paradigm, to change the 
narrative in order to come up with something new.  To be released from this type of 
paradigm.  How do you deal with this powerful myth, which exists in the politics of 
the two countries, and shift paradigm? 
 
AM:  I think it is very difficult.  Because in both countries, the myth has been nurtured 
by the state, which is a very powerful state.  In both countries, the possibility for other 
voices to be heard is limited for different reasons.  In Iran it is limited because Iran is a 
despotic society.  Here it is limited because here public opinion is made by the media.  
The media seems to follow a kind of herd mentality for a while something becomes 
fashionable, and that becomes the hot topic of the day, and if you are going to go against 
the grain, it becomes very difficult to make an impact.  The only thing that I can think of 
that one can do is in spite of odds against you, make an effort.  It is much easier to go 
against the grain here, because at least they don‟t kill you if you go against the grain here.  
In Iran if you go against the grain or if you try to tell the Iranian people that the image 
that the leadership has up to world is a false manikin vision and the reality does not 
correspond to it, you end up in prison.  Here, you are at best marginalized.  You don‟t get 
a hearing.  But, I see no other way than trying our hardest, relentlessly, to take the 
message that we need to look at this in a different way.  We need to think about 
possibilities of paradigms as you called it, because the current paradigm, the paradigm of 
demonizing the other and the demonization that has gone on in Iran for 29 years, the 
great Satan, demonization, and the demonization that is now going on making Ahmadi 
Nejad, this crazy, dangerous, Hitler type.  We need to show, at least for me, I think I need 
to show that although Ahmadi Nejad is a dangerous man, is in my mind a dangerous anti-
Semitic person, but he does not have as much power of destruction as he is believed to 
have, and the way to defunct, to diminish his power, is in fact the opposite of going to 
war with Iran.  Going to war with Iran, attacking Iran, in my view, would only strengthen 
those who are entrenched in the demonizing narrative.      
 
AG:  Dr. Milani, in the article “A win-win U.S. strategy for dealing with Iran” you 
obviously provide these great ideas of paradigm shift.  However, on a practical level 
maybe sometimes people say, ok these ideas are great, but how are you going to 
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involve them.  Let‟s say, if the power is not interested to do the way you are 
suggesting.  How are you going to influence them, some example?   
 
AM:  The way you influence them is by writing op-ed pieces, by writing scholarly 
essays, by organizing meetings, by trying to have meeting with these people and by 
teaching students, do you know, when you teach in a place like Stanford, you are thinking 
about this as a strategic way, in a place like Stanford is a place where the elites of this 
country are trying to, and if you are teaching in these places, you know, and hopefully, in 
this long term train, the elite, but in the short term you try to make your case as forcefully 
as you can through the media through op-ed, through  scholarly essays, through 
conferences, through lectures, and do you know, it is a hard sale, it is a very difficult 
thing to do, but it works, it is not like it is impossible to change and shape things, do you 
know. 
 
AG:  Dr. Milani, Ricoeur is one of the philosophers of the critical hermeneutic 
theory; he talks a lot about the relationship between the „self‟ and the „other.‟  As a 
matter of fact, he has a book called oneself as another.  He believes that the „self‟ 
and „other‟ are two entities that are connected to each other.  So, whatever one does 
influences the other‟s reaction to the first action.  So, this is dialectic between the 
two.  At the same time, once in a while I follow our former Iranian president/the 
first president of the Islamic Republic, Banisadr, where he talks about this idea of 
systematic relationship between the extreme right wings, because he believes that 
these rights usually help each other, by the extreme positions that they take. For 
example, when Ahmadi Nejad talks about wiping out Israel from the map, Bush 
takes a hard position on him and uses a though language, and this becomes the 
narrative etc.  What we have today basically.  Any comment on this? 
 
AM:  Yes, I think Ricoeur is absolutely right.  Our behavior toward whoever the 
interlocutor is, helps create the reality, the image of that other person, so, there is a 
wonderful Indian expression that says, you become the name you respond to.  If people 
keep calling you something, if people keep labeling you something, gradually you 
become that thing.  You have the tendency to become that thing.  If you keep telling your 
child that is dumb, from the moment of birth, now, more or less, that child would not 
behave in his/her full capacity.  So, I think it is absolutely correct that the radicals, the 
dedicated radicals here in this country and in Iran, want the war.  I think they beget one 
another, they help, they encourage one another, they feed one another‟s needs, sometimes 
of providing the kind of dangerous enemy you need to pursue this kind of reckless 
responses so I think of, I have, do you know, I completely agree that the extreme right in 
Iran and the extreme right in U.S. not only are similar in their beliefs, they both have a 
very simple minded view of the world, both have the manic view of the world, both have 
a demonizing view of the world, that one side is the good and the other side is the bad, 
and both sides are absolutely convince that they speak for God.  They speak for right.  
And this is a very dangerous combination.  And there is no doubt in my mind that these 
two poles strengthen and beget one another. 
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AG:  You are describing the two official sides of the two countries; it appears that 
there is no hope for moderation or reform in their ideologies.  And the only fight 
would be, as you mentioned previously, teaching people, providing knowledge to 
people. 
 
AM:  Yeah, I mean the radicals in the two countries are very much the last people you 
are going to change their minds.  The kind of radical that Ahmadi Nejad is, comes with a 
false sense of certitude, comes with an absolute certainty about the veracity of their own 
claims.  He would be the last person to be changed.  One can hope to lessen the 
possibility that his view of politics would damage Iran, damage U.S., and damage Israel, 
and the way you can do this is to minimize the chance that the radicals would have their 
day, that the voice of reason and moderation will win out, I think it can be done.  It is 
hard, but it can be done.  If it can be done in anywhere, it can be done in a democracy.   
Where one is at least free to try to make one‟s opinion know and try to change others 
based on logical reasons. 
 
AG:  In Lost Wisdom, Dr. Milani, I think, you provide a narrative, how Iran and 
Iranians dealt with the concept of modernity.  For example, one of the examples that 
I liked, is Nasr-al-din Shah, and his trips to European countries, and then you were 
also describing the reaction of religious figures such as Kafi, Majlesi, and Khomeini 
as the famous figures.  You also mentioned the reactions of government officials who 
were disappointed by seeing that European countries progress and Iran‟s position 
compare to them.  Finally, you described the though of secular intellectuals such as 
Shadman and Hedayat.  So, I looked at your story as a story about a nation and its 
narrative with the concept of modernity.  How Iran dealt with modernity.  There 
were ups and downs.  At this point in our history, how would you describe the 
narrative identity of Iranians and Iran?  On one level, there is the conflict of 
Iranians with their government (internal conflict), and on the second level, there is 
the conflict between Iran, as a nation, with West, U.S. in specific.  On the second 
level, for example, I think Ahmadi Nejad was able to make the nuclear case as a 
nationalistic issue. 
 
AM:  These are many different issues that you pointed out.  I think we need to deal with 
them separately.  I think the regime successfully and wrongly sold the people the idea 
that the nuclear technology is the cutting age of science of our time.  If you don‟t have it, 
you are not modern, you are not scientific, which is very absurd.  Nuclear technology 
enrichment is something that U.S. did 50-60 years ago.  Today is cutting age of 
technology, is the information age, if Iran because of its desire to get nuclear enrichment 
technology, is then denied the access to computer technology, to information revolution, 
Iran will be the loser.  That is a different question than what type of narrative the people 
in Iran are writing.  What kind of identity are they defining for themselves.  And I don‟t 
think there is one narrative.  I think, since the Nasr-al-din Shah, several narratives that are 
competing for the domination.  There is a narrative of people like Khomeini, who don‟t 
want to do any thing with modernity.  They want to create their own theocracy, they want 
aspects of modernity, they want their penicillin, they want its guns, but they don‟t want 
its rationalism, they don‟t want its democracy, they don‟t want its secularism.  There is a 
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narrative of people like the Shah, who said I will modernize you but you need to promise 
me to obey me.  We can do everything else freely, don‟t question me politically.  There is 
the narrative of modernity of Iranian democrats who say we want a free, independent, 
secular, republic.  We don‟t want to emulate, we don‟t want to follow anybody but we are 
not afraid of following the West.  There is a model that we want to create and that is an 
Iranian model of democracy.  There is also a narrative of people like Sorush who tries to 
create a religiously modern narrative.  So, I think the last 100 years Iran has been the 
scene of this upheaval, and that domestically, it is what is going on that is historically 
important.  It is not whether Ahmadi Nejad will win or lose.  Ahmadi Nejad is a minor 
footnote to history, I think.  The big question for me is whether the modernist narrative or 
which of these modern narratives will win.  Or whether de-modernizing narrative will 
win.  Will Iran continue to try to be a part of modern world?  Or will Iran try to say the 
modern world is not much to join, we don‟t want anything, we want to stop and get off 
the buss.  My sense is that this battle is the battle of our time, and I don‟t think it has been 
decided yet.  I don‟t think the religious de-modernized.  People like Khomeini have not 
won.  People like him politically won, but I think historically they have lost.  I think if 
anything, the experience of the last 30 years, convinced people that this is not the 
narrative, which is not the identity that is amenable to them and to their interest.     
 
AG:  Dr. Milani, many people describe Ahmadi Nejad as somebody who does not 
have power.  But there are many people who think that, anyhow, he represent a 
layer of power in Iran, which is very powerful.  Believe or not, they could 
manipulate the election of 2005.  Ahmadi Nejad was not a known figure, but the 
people who were behind him were so powerful that could generate people to vote for 
him.  The irony of history is that Ahmadi Nejad compare to Khatami, former 
president, suggested 4-5 times direct talk to the U.S. government.  So, what is your 
comment on this?  What I am trying to say that there is a certain layer of power 
behind him.   
 
AM:  I think there is.  I think there is a certain power, but I don‟t think that Ahmadi 
Nejad is still the determined power.  I think the determined power is still Khamenei, the 
clergy, but I believe that Ahmadi Nejad represents a small but powerful minority of 
revolutionary guard, commanders, the Basijis, people who want a different Iran.  They 
want a radical revolutionary Iran.  And they don‟t have an upper hand yet, but I think if 
push comes to shove if there is a war with Iran, the people like Ahmadi Nejad will 
become more powerful.  This is my fear.  A war is most beneficial to him and his cohorts 
and constitutionally his power is very limited but in time of war, extra constitutional 
power becomes divided essentially on the street and whoever has the street gets more 
power.  And Ahmadi Nejad has certain level of support among the revolutionary guard 
and the Bassijis [Islamic paramilitary force in Iran] and I think in the chaos of the war, 
nobody knows what will come out.  To me, that is the problem.  And part of the reason 
all these offers and counter offers have never materialized, is to go back to your first 
question, precisely because there is still the domination of that demonized „other.‟  Both 
sides are afraid of the other, both sides are afraid of being the first one to break this taboo, 
both sides are afraid particularly, on the American side.  President has been worry of 
becoming the first person that breaks the taboo of talking to Iran.  Because Iran, after the 
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hostage crisis, became, maybe rightly, a „pariah,‟ I mean, no country has done this before.  
To take diplomats of another country hostage for 440 days on the street.  Any president 
that wants to break that, has to be a very historically conscious person, he has to take a 
giant leap, it requires something like Nixon decision to go to China.  And I am not sure if 
Bush is that person.   
 
AG:  Do you see this character in any of the candidates for the next year 
presidential election?  
 
AM:  It looks like Obama is the only one who might do it.  At least, he is the only one 
who talks about it.  Whether, once he becomes the president, the constraints on him will 
prohibit him from doing it, I don‟t know.  But, he is at least so far the only one who has 
said if I become the president I seat down and talk.  No condition, nothing.  I will talk 
about everything, which is what I have suggested they should do for five years now.  I 
mean, this is almost everything that I have written. 
 
AG:  If he is not elected, and let‟s say Clinton is elected, and she said she would not 
go in direct talk with Iran because there are some disciplinary issues that she would 
consider them and prevent them to go in direct talk.  If this is the situation, in 
addition to what you mentioned previously, what is that we as the responsible 
citizens can do?   
 
AM:  I think the only thing we can do is to create a political climate that supports those 
who want to talk, and weaken those who want to go to war.  Everybody, I think, has to 
take the initiative.  If we can convince one person, one neighbor, one lover, one student, 
this is how opinions are changed.  You don‟t change, a society as complex as this, you 
don‟t change opinion or you don‟t make policy over night.  You make it very gradually, 
you make it very quietly.  You make it one person at a time.  You need to have strategy.  
You need to have institutional support.  You need to have think-thanks that support this, 
you need all of those things, but ultimately it is one step at a time.  Each one of us doing 
what we need to do. 
 
 
AG:  Thank you so much Dr. Milani.  I really appreciate it.   
 
AM:  My pleasure  
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APPENDIX E 
 
University of San Francisco 
Research Journal (Journal of My Conversations with Research Partners) 
 
 
Journal of conversation with Dr. Milani (11/2007): 
 
I contacted Dr. Milani directly through an email one month before my actual 
conversation day.  He was very gentle to accept my request without any hesitation and 
referred me to his secretary.  I exchanged a few emails with his secretary until we 
arranged an appointment for my conversation (Monday, November 5
th
, 2007).  I did not 
experience any difficulty arranging this meeting. 
 
I was very happy and excited about my meeting because Dr. Milani was a very well 
known scholar in Iranian studies.  It was good to know I was starting with an excellent 
and valuable conversation partner who would enrich and deepen my research on the 
subject matter.   
 
Since he is a very well known scholar in the field, I thought I needed to prepare myself 
very well for my meeting.  First, I came to know Dr. Milani through one of his articles on 
the Iran-U.S. relationship subject.  That article attracted me because it was on the same 
line of thought as my own.  He and two other co-authors of that article suggested that 
since the United States will not lose anything if it goes to negotiation with Iran, it should 
contact Iran and start a negotiation process on all matters with Iran.  After reading this 
article, I researched Dr. Milani and found out that he has a book, Lost Wisdom, which 
illustrates how the Iranian dealt with the concept of modernity since 10
th
 century.  After I 
made an appointment with him, I realized I had to read his book to be better prepared for 
my conversation. 
 
Few days before my conversation, I felt nervous about my meeting.  I felt Dr. Milani is a 
master of the subject matter and my questions might not attract him to get involved with 
me in a real conversation. The last few days before my conversation passed in this status 
of mind.  However, I read his book, I designed my questions properly, and I felt that I 
was ready to conduct a meaningful conversation.  After all, I had to go and did not have 
any other option. 
 
When I went to his office, I realized he had offered his office hour for this meeting.  As a 
result, he left the door open and there were some distractions.  First, there was this phone 
call that he answered.  Second, there was his secretary who brought some papers and 
lunch for him.  Then, there were these students who wanted to meet with him.  As a 
result, after 35 minutes, Dr. Milani asked me how longer our conversation would last!  
Toward the end, it appeared that there was a little of rushing.  I just felt that I did not have 
a chance to have an informal conversation with him after our recorded conversation.  I 
thought it was important to have a less formal conversation, specifically because our 
formal conversation was in English rather than Farsi, in order to have a good ending.  
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Nevertheless, I had given him all of my main questions.  Before my meeting, I designed 
eight major questions for him which followed a narrative.  As a result, I got a good 
narrative in response to my questions.  After looking at my transcription, the text, I was 
happy with the narrative that I had in front of myself.  However, I realized I could have 
asked at least two more questions to obtain an even better narrative.  I designed those 
questions for the next conversation and will ask them in my next conversation.  I know 
that this was my first experience in conducting a formal conversation about an extremely 
critical subject, so I did not expect from myself a professional job.  The good part of it is 
that I gained very valuable experience for my next conversations. 
 
There is another critical part to my conversation.  I felt my questions became very long, 
almost a monologue, throughout my conversation.  Since he was the expert of the subject, 
I could have been shorter in my preludes in order to have him explain about the subject.   
 
I realized that Dr. Milani was not very relaxed during the conversation.  I think this came 
from the fact that I started recording one minute after I arrived to his office.  We did not 
have time to develop a relationship.  Even though he was very open to accept my request 
for this meeting, I felt our conversation was tense.  The other reason could have been my 
long preludes before asking my questions.  Was this the reason Dr. Milani was tense or 
was it his character, or was there anything else?  I don‟t know.   
 
Despite the fact that I did not experience a warm environment in Dr. Milani‟s office, I 
really think I have a very meaningful text now.  I transcribed the tape the same night that 
I returned home from Stanford University.  I spent 5-6 hours transcribing it.  While I  
listened to the sound file that night, I got frustrated because of my long preludes.  As a 
result of that frustration, I did not return to the sound file and the text for a week.  After a 
week, I read my transcription again.  I realized it was a meaningful text.  I loved the 
narrative that I had in the text.  I forgot all about my frustration.   
 
At the end, I patted myself on the back for a good job after all. 
 
 
Journal of conversation with Dr. Beeman (Spring 2008): 
 
After talking to Beeman, I was amazed about his emphasis on the existing ignorance 
among policy makers and leaders in Washington DC.  Several times, Beeman mentioned 
that in the U.S. government and its related agencies, there is a lack of Iranian experts, 
who are really informed first hand about Iran.  He believed that policy makers who don‟t 
have any idea about Iran, make important decisions about Iran in the U.S. government 
and related agencies.  For Beeman, these policy makers do not have a good sense of what 
is going on in Iran.   
 
Many times, they don‟t know how to read Iranian behaviors.  They don‟t know how to 
use an appropriate language in dealing with Iran, or they don‟t know how important the 
concept of respect is among Iranians.   
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After he talked about the importance of a respectful language and a respectful approach 
towards Iran, I realized how the United States accused Iran in the last 30 years, which 
resulted in what we have today.  Thinking about it, I see that the U.S. government never 
attempted to use a respectful approach or language towards Iran.  Since the accusatory 
language has not resulted in any positive development, the question is, isn‟t it time to 
change the approach?   
 
This makes me more excited about my research, because it shows me how a new and 
inclusive approach which is based on mutual respect, and which I am advocating in my 
dissertation, could change the antagonistic paradigm between the two countries.  By what 
Beeman described as the ignorance of the leaders and policy makers, I became more 
proud of my work and more confident that I my work may play a significant role in 
coming up with a new approach in the future.  I believe my research may contribute to a 
better understanding between the two countries.  
 
 
Journal of conversation with Dr. Amirahmadi (May, 2008): 
  
By re-reading Amirahmadi‟s conversation text, I realized he seemed too optimistic about 
the circumstances.  In his statements, he simplified the challenges and, I guess, did not 
want to see how difficult they are to be resolved.  As a result, his multiple attempts in the 
last few years to engage the two countries have not been successful.  However, I admire 
his courage and consistency to stay on his course.  This was the biggest lesson that I 
gained from my conversation with him; he exemplified somebody who takes action to 
change the paradigm instead of only talking on a theoretical level.   
 
 
Journal of conversation with Ambassador Pickering(June 2008): 
 
My conversation with Pickering was great.  At the beginning, he was in control of the 
conversation.  I was a little intimidated by his long term career in the past, so I did not 
develop a real discussion with him. At the beginning, I had a feeling that the sitting was 
more like an interview rather than a conversation.  But, toward the middle of our 
conversation, I became more confident and was able to ask more open questions to open 
up discussion.    
 
Pickering looked at the problem in a very comprehensive way, illustrating his diplomatic 
skills, and describing what needs to be done in order to have a chance to ease the current 
dispute.  His insights were extremely helpful for moving towards a middle ground 
between the two countries‟ position.  Unknowingly, he advocated Gadamer‟s (2004) 
fusion of horizon.  He laid down the steps that could possibly help the two countries to 
close the gap between them and expand their horizons to embrace each other‟s 
perspective. 
 
I thought he provided valuable insights throughout this conversation.  I thought he 
provided very practical steps in how to more effectively engage with Iran, and how to 
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move beyond three decades of misunderstanding.  This conversation was all about 
practical steps to how to recognize mutual interest and expand working ground.  In 
addition, he seemed to be very insightful about the importance of respect and leadership‟s 
initiative to establish an effective line of communication between the two countries.         
 
I feel very good after having this conversation with him because he showed how real 
steps could be taken for fusion of horizon and how real leaders could help these steps to 
be taken.  Returning to Beeman‟s perspective, if there is a real understanding of Iran, 
then, these leaders who Pickering talked about may better be able to deal with the reality 
that is surrounding this conflict.   
 
Overall, Pickering was very encouraging when he said there is lots of hope on my 
generation who has lived both in Iran and the U.S., know both countries, and who may 
bring a better understanding between the two sides.   
 
 
Journal of my conversation with Dr. Dabashi (June 2008): 
 
I had two conversation sessions with Dabashi.  At the end of our first conversation, he 
told me we could have more conversation if I needed to further discuss the issue.  I told 
him I would go through our conversation and prepare some more questions to ask him, in 
case I need more discussion.  I did arrange a second conversation with Dabashi.   
 
Our conversations turned to be great events.  I gained so much of insights from our 
discussion.  It was a very deep, meaningful, and philosophical discussion with Dabashi.  
It turned to be very meaningful, perhaps, because the conversation was in Farsi, so I was 
better able to communicate with my conversation partner, a barrier that I faced when I 
had my conversations in English with other research partners.  
  
He was very eloquent and philosophical throughout our conversation.  When I asked him 
different questions about the US-Iran conflict, he eloquently moved the discussion 
beyond the issue of US-Iran and put this conflict in a broader context.  In his opinion, the 
US-Iran problem should be seen in this broader framework; in this way, we can better 
define this conflict.  In his belief, there are „stock holders‟ in this conflict that enjoy a 
level of benefit from this hostility between the two nations and, as a result, inflame this 
conflict.   
 
Dabashi also emphasized the existence of political cultures in the two countries.  Political 
cultures that carry on 30 years of antagonism and which benefit from this antagonism, 
political cultures that demonize each other and benefit from this demonization. 
   
As a result, it may be very challenging to change these political cultures.  When I thought 
about the political cultures, I realized how difficult it is to change the cultures in these 
two countries.  I wondered if a theoretical framework such as hermeneutic would give me 
a means to deal with such a big challenge.  I carried this doubt throughout my research 
process.  Nevertheless, what I discovered was, as Dr. Herda (1999) notes in her book, I 
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am the one who is going to change and this change may result in a bigger change in my 
surrounding.  With my research, if I am able to influence people in my community, 
people who may be policy makers or leaders, then, this is a change that may bring about 
bigger changes. 
 
In our conversation, Dabashi draw a line between political and cultural activities; a line 
between politicians and intellectuals.  In his view, intellectuals need to focus on their 
field of studies and do not interfere with the world of politics and leave the politics for 
the politicians (he sounded a little bit utopian and passive here; the idea of an intellectual 
who does not take action is a little passive for me).  Nevertheless, he emphasized that 
intellectuals could have their influence on the politicians in a long run.   
 
 
Journal of my conversation with Dr. Sick (July 2008): 
 
The conversation with Dr. Sick did not go ahead as I wished for or as I planned for.  Due 
to Dr. Sick‟s very busy schedule and because of the developments between the U.S. and 
Iran in July 2008, even before we started our conversation, he told me he was being 
contacted by news agencies in regard to the latest development between the two countries 
and that he could not spend much time with me.   
 
When he said he did not have time and could spend only five to ten minutes with me, I 
realized that it was going to be a tense conversation.  I knew I had the option to cancel the 
conversation right at that moment or ask for another time to do it.  Nevertheless, I also 
knew he was a very valuable source and I did not want to lose this chance.  Our 
conversation lasted almost 20 minutes. 
 
Anyhow, this time table was the first block to our conversation.  Despite having agreed to 
have a 45-60 minute conversation, now, he mentioned he would be brief and right to the 
point due to his busy schedule.  I expected to gain a story out of him, with his history of 
being a high level official in three administrations in the United States in the past.  
Nevertheless, when he said he could not spend that much time, I realized this 
conversation was not going to be as I hoped for.   
 
Indeed, this was not a conversation.  After answering my first question, I realized Sick 
intended to provide short and direct answer to my questions.  Even though I asked my 
first question in a way that I would receive a story from him about the US-Iran 
relationship, he answered very short.  Nevertheless, because he was the highest official in 
my research partner‟s list, I thought his perspective would be very valuable for me. 
 
This experience was another eye opening moment about the value of participatory 
hermeneutic research.  Up to this point, July 16, 2008, I have had five conversations.  
Almost in all of them, I established very good relationships with my research 
participants.  We were able to discuss the issues in a conversational setting; however, the 
experience with Sick was very different from two perspectives. 
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Throughout this conversation, I learned many new lessons that would not be possible, 
had I conducted a quantitative or qualitative research with some measurement tool.  I 
better understood how the participatory research conversation allows the researcher to see 
angles that can not be discovered in a survey without any direct contact between the 
researcher and research participant.  The more conversation I conducted, the more I 
realized the learning process involved in participatory research conversation.  This 
conversation showed me how researchers could get better insights when they establish 
strong relationships with their conversation partners.   
 
Throughout our conversation, or perhaps I should call it interview, I discovered another 
astonishing point.  He did not seem to be as an impartial third party in regard to my 
research topic.  My questions were usually answered with a sense of sympathy towards 
the U.S.  He pictured the United States as the good party in this conflict and blamed Iran 
as the bad party and the cause of the problem.  He sounded like a state man in the U.S. 
whose language is accusative!  I did not have this impression in any of my previous 
conversations and this was an interesting experience for me to see an academic to be 
biased.   
 
His partiality, reminded me of Dr. McPherson‟s comment about my bias throughout my 
proposal.  McPherson is on my dissertation committee and gave me valuable comment on 
how my proposal was biased.  While it was difficult for me to see myself as biased, now, 
by Sick‟s comments, I noticed how one can be biased and not realize it.  Now, I could see 
McPherson point about my bias and how it could limit horizons.  Sick provided a clear 
example of somebody who sees an issue with bias.  This experience might help me to 
conduct my research in a more impartial way.  
  
Finally, I considered this conversation as non satisfactory by hermeneutical standard, it 
was more of an interview than a conversation, however, the lessons from this 
conversation were very valuable for me and made me to see new aspects involved in the 
issue of the US-Iran.  If American high ranking officials such as Sick only saw the 
Iranians‟ wrong doings, and if they do not mention the U.S. wrong doings at all, which 
Iranians interpret as dishonesty, how do they expect the Iranian leadership to be honest 
with them in dealing with different disputing issues that exist between the two?  This was 
the great lesson of today‟s conversation.   
 
 
Tonight is the 29
th
 of July, 2008: 
  
I have been reflecting on the concept of fusion of horizon and I realized that I need to 
make a change in my points about “fusion of horizon.”  The fusion of horizon, really, is 
not something that is going to happen between an American official and an Iranian 
official, because they are told to facilitate a relationship.  The fusion of horizon, really, is 
what my text may bring to a reader.  Though my text, I am inviting my reader to see a 
new perspective and hope to influence them by representing my argument, the 
perspectives that I bring to this relationship in hope of creating a new understanding 
about this relationship.   
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Journal of my conversation with Abdi (August 2008): 
 
After I called Mr. Abdi in Tehran from my home town of Rasht, he recognized me and 
told me to call him when I came to Tehran.  In Tehran, I called him in the morning and he 
asked me to call him later to fix an appointment with him.  I thought he was trying to 
evaluate my trustworthiness due to the risky circumstances that surrounded intellectuals, 
including him, in Iran.  Finally, I meet with him in his house in Tehran at 7:00 pm on 
August 18, 2008.  
    
Another great coincident was the date of my conversation with Mr. Abdi.  Fifty five years 
ego, exactly on this day, CIA conducted its coup to overthrow the democratically elected 
government of Prime Minister Mossadegh.  The date was August 18, 1953. 
 
It was a very friendly meeting.  He was extremely warm, humble, and a casual person.  
He was having a work related meeting with a friend in his house and their conversation 
was very casual.  Apparently, they were investigating systematic crimes in big/industrial 
cities in Iran.  They were also talking about what to do about the 30th anniversary of the 
revolution.  After my arrival, their conversation went on without any interruption.  He 
asked me to join them and have some tea while they were in discussion and this made me 
even more relaxed, because it showed me how friendly they are and gave me time to 
adapt myself to this new environment.  Every thing went perfect so far. 
 
I felt Mr. Abbas Abdi was extremely conservative in what he was saying.  In some cases, 
he answered my questions very vague and, I guess, this was due to his caution about the 
possible consequences for him.  
  
Abdi asked me some question about my background, the topic and purpose of my 
research, and the type of theory I was applying to my research topic.  I explained where 
and what I was studying, and my research topic and my desire for offering an alternative 
course of action to the current course of action between the U.S. and Iran.  
 
The conversation turned to be another great opportunity for me to think about the 
challenges that I face in my research.  How is it possible to apply hermeneutics to a very 
calculated issue in the international arena? 
   
He was not very optimistic about what I was doing.  When I talked about my interest to 
build peace between the U.S. and Iran through my research, he did not seem to be very 
optimistic.  He joked by saying it is easier if “you wanted to build war!”  Later, I realized 
he was not joking!  As somebody who spent several years in prison in the Islamic 
Republic, only because he conducted a survey in which he found out almost 86% of 
Iranians support talks and engagement with the United States, he had this sense of bitter 
humor.  In his opinion, the two governments are on course toward confrontation.  Iran 
does not recognize the new international system and the U.S. does not tolerate this.  For 
him, confrontation is inevitable, even if it may be delayed.  Nevertheless, he mentioned a 
dramatic change in Iranian government may change his prediction.  
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An important point of Abdi was that the Islamic Republic would like to engage with the 
United States, but is very careful to save its image in the Islamic World.  In his opinion, 
this is a dilemma for the Islamic Republic.  They want to engage and be legitimized by 
the U.S. but they do not want to appear as the weaker side of a possible engagement in 
the future (because their ideology of anti-Americanism in the region and in the world).  
This factor makes a possible negotiation and engagement even more difficult. 
    
When transcribing my conversation with Abdi, I realized the pessimism in his views.  He 
did not believe that there is a chance for the creation of a new narrative to challenge the 
official narrative of the two states.  He believed the decisions on the state level are 
beyond wishful hoping!  Nevertheless, what I think is that, it is this wishful hope that is 
the main factor for change in our world.  Abdi, in my opinion, was isolated in a system 
that does not allow to imagine, but this could not stop me from imagining. 
 
It was a great conversation because I discovered a new perspective in the US-Iran 
relationship.  His point was close to Dabashi‟s point where he talked about the political 
cultures in the two countries and their power to restrict alternative narratives.  
  
 
Tonight is October 14, 2008:  
 
I am working on my dissertation writing.  While I was trying to determine the 
significance of my introduction, precisely when I reached my conversation with Dr. 
Michael Provence, I finally realized what my research is all about.  This was an amazing 
moment in my whole research.  After reflecting days and weeks and months on the 
significance of my research and how I am going to apply hermeneutic to my research 
topic, I finally realized that my research is not about solving this problem between the 
two nations.  My research is all about showing that a black and white mind set, where a 
forceful and military mentality prevails, is not going to work any more in the 21
st
 century.  
The Islamic Republic is a good example where the U.S. is not able to accomplish any 
forward movement (because the U.S. does not have the leverage and resources for using 
force against the Republic).  Simply said, the notion of understanding must be inserted in 
the American foreign diplomacy.  Without this concept which requires a new approach, 
the others may not comply with what the U.S. desires the others to do.  I think there was a 
fusion of horizon between me and hermeneutic thought tonight.   
 
 
December 2008: 
 
Here it is the point of this journal.  Some of my research partners, including Abdi, were 
pessimistic about my research.  Some of them mentioned the decision of power holders in 
the two countries as the most important element in this dispute between the two.  They 
mentioned that the decisions of the statesmen are usually strategic and based on interest 
rather than a comprehensive approach to satisfy all parties involved.  The points that 
concerned me were whether a hermeneutical theory can be applicable to this crisis.  
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Sometimes, this theory sound very idealistic to me.  Sometimes, it makes me wonder if 
this theory is going to help me understand a political crisis in the international arena.  
Some of my research participants hesitated when I explained my approach.  Their 
reaction was a little dubious about the applicability of this theory to this international 
crisis.   
 
Even though their views make me have my own doubts about my approach, whether this 
theory is going to work as a framework for my research and whether it is going to be 
functional; nevertheless, I believe the 21
st
 century is a century for paradigm shift as my 
informal research partner Dr. Provence at UCSD emphasized.   
 
Up to this point, strategic maneuvers determined the resolution of political and 
international crisis.  The result of strategic decision making has been disastrous in many 
cases, because of multiple conflicts in the international arena in the 20, and even at the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century.  This century should be is a century for more 
comprehensive and inclusive approach based on understanding the concerns of others.  I 
believe a comprehensive theory, such as hermeneutics, might break down the walls of 
conventional thinking in international arena.  It may bring a new perspective in how to 
see the problems, how to deal with them, and how to hope for their resolution. 
 
This paradigm shift is very challenging, as many of my research participants emphasized; 
but they viewed the conflict by staying within the framework.  What I am proposing in 
my text and inviting my readers to see is a move beyond the norm that has been dominant 
in the 20th century in general and in the US-Iran relationship in the past decades.  Until 
we imagine inclusive approaches to deal with international crisis, until we respect others, 
until we understand the root cause of the problems and until we honest in dealing with 
them, we can not solve the problems.  The US-Iran growing crisis is a good example that 
the mind set should be changed before we can change the narrative in this conflict. 
 
The last point is about my communication line between me and my research participants.  
I realized that English language worked as a barrier in my English conversations 
sometimes.  When I was conducting my conversations in English, sometimes, I was not 
able to further and expand the discussion as I desired.  On the other hand, in my Farsi 
spoken conversations, I was able to go deeper in discussing the issue which gave me 
better insights about the problem.     
 
 
Final Reflections (January 2009): 
 
While I looked at my conversation partners as valuable experts with unique perspectives 
to my research, our conversations became opportunities for political discussions where a 
better understanding emerged at the end of the process.  Throughout this research 
process, I realized I had emerged into this socio-political discussion and my level of 
understanding was transformed from a student to a participant in the forum.  In my 
conversation with Pickering, he mentioned he hoped “we can count on you to have a 
more open mind about some of these particular issues and problems” as we discussed the 
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relationship.  While I always considered myself inferior to my conversation partners who 
are experts in the field, Abdi included me among Iranians who live in the U.S. who might 
reduce the tension between the two countries. 
 
This inclusion of myself in the engagement process reminded me of Gadamer points 
about the research conversation in hermeneutical tradition and the place of researcher and 
research participant where a fusion of horizons between the two reduces the superiority 
of any of them to the other:   
 
As my research participants gave me weight during our conversations and raised my level 
from student to a partner, I felt a fusion of horizon emerge between us.  As Gadamer 
(2004: 304) continues, the fusion of horizon “involves rising to a higher universality that 
overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other.”  Although I had 
differences of opinion with my research participants in some instances, nevertheless, our 
conversations became occasions where different perspectives were discussed in hope of 
expanding each other‟s horizon.  Gadamer (2004: 302) argues that in a true conversation, 
“we are not seeking agreement on some subject – because the specific contents of the 
conversation are only a means to get to know the horizon of the other person.”  While this 
text is a reflection of several experts‟ perspectives on the subject, it is also a testimony of 
the fusion of horizon between me and my participants.     
 
 
 
